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Managing Police Performance in England and Wales:

Intended and Unintended Consequences

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Abstract

Existing literature suggests that police performance in England and Wales has been a focus of successive governments for the past three decades. Research of broad trends identifies that crime reduction and increased detections have been achieved, but by what methods? This study suggests there is a need to recognise the unintended consequences to gain a more informed appreciation of their true impact. This descriptive and exploratory study of performance management regimes between 1982 and 2012 considers the influences of direct government intervention, increased bureaucracy through regulation and scrutiny from inspection.

Analysis of existing records and qualitative data from West Yorkshire Police explores the conduct and behaviour of officers when under pressure to meet targets. The scrutiny of comparative data seems to engender the use of non-legitimate practices to achieve results. 'Bending the rules' seems analogous to anomie and strain theory and the findings of this study show that some officers are more susceptible than others. Although the removal of hard quantitative targets may have diminished the manipulation of figures, evidence from this research reveals such practices still exist.

To reduce the risk of misguided activity by officers striving to meet targets, policy makers need to improve their understanding of potential unintended consequences and provide clear direction about the intended qualitative outcomes. This historical analysis will inform development of evidence-based performance management strategies that will be more important in the context of greater accountability from elected Police and Crime Commissioners.

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List of Abbreviations

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
APA	Association of Police Authorities
APACS	Assessments of Policing And Community Safety
BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic Command Unit
BVPI	Best Value Performance Indicators
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
DS	Detective Sergeant
FP	Felt Pressure
FPN	Fixed Penalty Notice [Tickets]
HM(C)IC	Her Majesty's (Chief) Inspectorate of Constabulary
HOCR	Home Office Counting Rules
IMPACT	Integrated Measurement of the Performance and Activities of Constables and Teams
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
MSF	Most Similar Force
NCRS	National Crime Recording Standards
NFP	Never Felt Pressure
NYPD	New York Police Department
OPR	Operational Performance Review
OR	Odds Ratio
PCC	Police and Crime Commissioner
PPAF	Police Performance Assessment Framework
PSA	Public Service Agreements
PSU	Police Standards Unit
SE	Standard Error [For the correlation coefficient]
SMT	Senior Management Team
SPI	Statutory Performance Indicator
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
TIC	Taken Into Consideration [Offences]
WYP	West Yorkshire Police

Introduction

The intentions of governmental police performance management regimes to reduce crime, increase detections and bring about value for money may seem obvious. However, the emphasis placed upon the achievement of hard targets risks the integrity of police practice and may engender unintended behavioural consequences.

This descriptive study provides a broad review of trends over a period of three decades between 1982 and 2012 and explores the intended and unintended consequences upon officer behaviour of performance management regimes.

Positive outcomes can be associated with the introduction of performance regimes (APA 2006; Flanagan 2008). However, within published literature there is no evidence of a holistic evaluation of regimes that incorporates the impact of negative resultant behavioural change amongst police organisations/officers. By focusing upon the unintended outcomes of such regimes, this research is entering relatively uncharted territory that provides a valuable insight into the wider consequences of police performance management.

No assertions of cause and effect can be made from this descriptive and exploratory research. Key historical events have though been chronologically sequenced to highlight how practices have evolved alongside changes in circumstances. The exploration of the behavioural consequences amongst officers provides a contextualised contribution to the limited research. It also examines anomie and strain theory (Merton 1938) in the context of changes in individual and organisational conduct associated with increased performance pressure.

Analysis of the development of governmental performance management is presented, and six archetypal events/regimes (Table 1) have been selected that typify the arrangements over recent years. The events/regimes are considered within the context of prevailing crime trends and other related data.

Table 1. Key events and performance management regimes

Event / Regime	Date	Description
Policing by Objectives	1983	Focus on efficiency and effectiveness and set objectives for the first time in the police.
Complaints Regulations	1985	A framework for consistent application of the way complaints and misconduct were dealt with.
IMPACT	1998	Strict individual and team performance monitoring in WYP. Generated internal comparison and competition.
Best Value Performance Indicators / Key Performance Indicators	1999	Metrics associated with value for money and early concept of 'more from the same'. Introduced crude league tables and caused tension between quantitative performance improvement and qualitative outcomes.
Street Crime Initiative	2002	Forces with the highest rates of robbery became subject to Home Office scrutiny with a requirement to establish area-based interventions.
Single National Indicator	2009	Removed the individual metrics associated with previous performance management regimes and focused on outcomes of increased public confidence.

The regimes are considered within the context of a rapidly evolving operating environment over the past half-century. The Royal Commission on the Police (1962) brought about major structural and functional reform of policing in England and Wales initiating requirements for the service to achieve efficiency, an accountability framework and proper arrangements for dealing with complaints. The current structure is made up of 43 independent police forces that vary in size

with a few large metropolitan forces and many smaller ‘shire’ based county constabularies. All forces are subject to the same regulatory framework and governance arrangements, which until the introduction of directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in November 2012, was based on a complex tri-partite system of governance between the Home Office, Police Authorities and Chief Constables. Additionally, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is responsible for conducting independent reviews of efficiency and effectiveness and scrutinising force performance across a range of thematic domains.

The laudable performance objectives of the Royal Commission remain pertinent to this study in 2012, but over time they have been interpreted and developed by a plethora of official reviews and reports (Pollitt 1986). From the early 1980s, the effects of new public managerialism and the political nature of crime have meant that police performance in England and Wales has been at the core of successive government agendas (Collier 2006). This has led to a relentless focus by those who hold the police to account. Despite this focus, most commentators have concentrated on the procedural and regulatory aspects of performance management. Whilst this is relevant, there is little theoretical context about the cultural impact on police organisations or individual officers, the subsequent behavioural changes, and how this may have affected the intended outcomes.

Miller, Blackler and Alexandra (1997) describe the institution of the police from the perspective of its culture, autonomy and accountability, but this is not in a UK context and their focus was primarily on the ethics of the organisation. Other

written material includes individual memoirs, such as Young (1991), thematic reports emanating from HMIC inspections and Home Office publications.

Policing by objectives was introduced following Circular 114/83 (Home Office 1983) and these early days of performance management subsequently morphed into quantitative, target driven regimes initiated by central government. This new era of scrutiny saw HMIC introduce and publicise direct comparative data about target attainment in individual forces. The intended, yet inevitable, outcome of this was the strong desire by forces to avoid being bottom of the league. To achieve targets for things such as arrest rates, detection rates and stop and searches, commanders, supervisors and officers were all under pressure to succeed.

The Police Discipline Regulations came into force in April 1985 revoking the previous Police Discipline Regulations 1977. These **Complaint Regulations** were linked to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which set out the procedure for the recording and investigation of complaints against the police and any subsequent disciplinary proceedings. The regulations brought about the establishment of the Police Complaints Authority whose role was to manage and scrutinise the complaints system with the power to investigate public complaints.

WYP introduced **IMPACT** (Integrated Measurement of the Performance and Activities of Constables and Teams) in 1998 in order to enforce performance management,. Designed to support first line managers to conduct productivity assessments at the individual officer level, the system was an in-house development that used existing output-based data sources.

National and local frameworks included **Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs)/Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)** from 1999 and the Police Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) in 2006. Along with local Police Authority Policing Plans, they collectively introduced performance targets and diagnostic indicators. Senior officers were held to account through 'Operational Performance Reviews' (OPRs) where close attention was paid to the detail of the figures.

This was not just a UK phenomenon because similar scrutiny was being applied in the USA. In 1994 New York Police Department Chief Bill Bratton pioneered the use of 'CompStat', where comparative statistics enforced personal accountability on local commanders (Willis, Mastrofski and Weisburd 2003). This methodology subsequently traversed the Atlantic, contributing to existing regimes of regular, relentless scrutiny bringing pressure to achieve specific targets.

Perhaps one of the starkest examples of this scrutiny in the UK came in 2002 with the **'Street Crime Initiative'**, which was launched to address the rising rate of street robberies. For the first time central government directly intervened in the strategies and policies of local policing (ACPO 2008). This key event is highlighted to demonstrate the intended and unintended consequences. Figures from the baseline assessment of West Yorkshire Police (WYP) illustrates at Table 2 that during the period of the Street Crime Initiative, all crime rose by 10.2% and detection rates remained almost static. This is in stark contrast to the reduction in recorded robberies by 33.21% and the increase in detection rate by 39.31% (HMIC 2004).

Table 2. All crime & Robbery recorded & detection rate

	2001/02	2003/04	% Change
All crime per 1000 population	141.41	155.83	10.2%
Robbery per 1000 population	2.68	1.79	-33.21%
% of total crime detected	19.31	19.52	1.09%
% of robberies detected	20.30	28.28	39.31%

Forces that were seen as failing under these regimes were put in 'special measures' with additional scrutiny through HMIC or the Police Standards Unit (PSU), which was introduced after the 'Street Crime Initiative'. To be 'engaged' by the PSU created a stigma, which local police chiefs clearly wished to avoid. At Basic Command Unit level the pressure on teams and individual officers to succeed against targets was measured through local regimes of comparison of team and individual performance data. It is not certain how much additional pressure increased the risks associated with anomie and strain theory. However, Merton's theory suggests that where such pressure to succeed exists, the anomic condition could sometimes result in non-legitimate methods being adopted if they are seen to be effective (Akers 1999).

The **Single National Indicator** for policing, introduced by the (then) Home Secretary in 2009, was designed to 'de-clutter' the performance landscape. The complex and centrally established targets with excessive performance management were stripped away leaving a single measure of public confidence. The intention was to enable freedom for the police and local authorities to tackle the crime and anti-social behaviour issues that mattered locally.

The performance management regimes briefly introduced here collectively influenced changes in crime recording practices that have subsequently impacted upon organisational and individual officer behaviour (HMIC 1999; HMIC 2000; Loveday 2000; Reiner 2008). Existing data and new qualitative information obtained from WYP is used throughout this study to help understand the environment in which these events developed and to describe the consequences of these regimes in more detail. The validity of utilising data from a single police force is based upon WYP's position as the fourth largest force in England and Wales representing approximately 4% of policing in respect of crime and officer-initiated activity. This is detailed in Table 3 and although some anomalies are evident in respect of stop and search and complaints, these are associated with very recent events and are not reflective across the period of review. Stop and search activity halved in 2010 following changes in practice and the complaints figures for 2011/12 uniquely include quality of service issues, almost doubling the force total.

Table 3. WYP representation of policing in England & Wales

Year 2011/12	England & Wales	WYP Totals	Proportion
Recorded Crime	4,043,339	187,670	4.64%
Detected Crime	1,075,927	46,280	4.30%
Stop & Search	1,276,669	23,974	1.88%
Arrests	1,360,500	55,336	4.07%
FPN's	1,927,965	64,641	3.35%
Complaints	33,099	2,321	7.01%
Officer numbers	142,217	5,600	3.94%

The data from WYP used for analysis consists of existing crime records from key categories including burglary and robbery, along with information about discretionary activities including stop and search, Fixed Penalty Notice (FPN) issue and arrests. Previous victim of crime survey records about their experiences and interaction with the police was also used. To add further context a new qualitative survey of serving officers was conducted using three different methodologies to provide new insight into their experiences of performance management regimes. The use of mixed survey methodologies has also identified some issues about the impact of sample bias.

It is acknowledged that the analysis of WYP data offers only one Force's perspective of the impact of performance management regimes, but even this limited study provides a unique and detailed insight into the associated behavioural consequences. No assumptions or assertions are made that this is representative of the position across England and Wales, but there is clear evidence from existing literature that it is not unique either!

A sharper focus on performance is again likely with elected PCCs who will want to demonstrate improvements in policing and in the absence of experimental research, this paper can only provide a descriptive picture of police performance management regimes and the consequences over time. However, some correlative associations are identified with both theoretical and practical importance for policy makers who may work with PCCs and/or Chief Constables and may want to consider the impact of the implementation of any performance management regimes.

Literature Review

The written reference material relevant to this study includes criminological theories, research publications, policy documents and reports from HMIC. These sources are explored in reference to the concepts of intended and unintended consequences, and the impact of performance management on the police in West Yorkshire.

Criminological theory

In his (1938) article in *American Sociological Review,* Robert Merton's theory of social structure and anomie offered a clear hypothesis: that if people felt their objectives were unattainable by accepted means, then they may resort to illegitimate activity to achieve them (Adler, Mueller & Laufer 2004). This claim that people can be 'pressured into deviance' is the core of anomie theory (Agnew & Passas 1997) and this research explores whether pressure placed upon police officers to improve organisational performance influences them to go beyond accepted means to achieve it.

Akers (1999) interprets Merton's theory by proposing that balance is required between social structure and cultural practice. He argues that where this breaks down, anomie can create dissociation between normal values and the legitimacy of practice. Merton is explicit, saying that where goal attainment is the primary focus, a breach of moral and legal norms is more likely than those in settings with less goal oriented cultures (Adler & Laufer 1995). This has relevance to UK performance regimes, despite the foundation of the theory in American culture. Success is supposed to be attained through legitimate and honest endeavour,

Akers (1999) says it is the acquisition of success rather than the obeyance of rules. Merton emphasized cultural aspirations and institutionalisation as important elements (see Adler, Mueller & Laufer 2004) and although not set in a policing context, the principles appear to be applicable.

Akers (1999) has elaborated on Merton's five modes of adaptation to the structural tension of ends and means. The first two of these adaptations seem highly relevant to this study. The most common is 'conformity' where efforts to succeed remain within accepted practice although goals are not always achieved (Adler, Mueller & Laufer 2004). The second mode, described as 'innovation', occurs where commitment exists, but with limited legitimate capability, creative illegitimate means are used (see Adler, Mueller & Laufer 2004).

Considering police ethics, Millar, Blackler and Alexandra (1997), suggested that if the workforce could disobey rules and get away with it, then due to discretion, it was more than just a theoretical likelihood. However, in explaining 'CompStat', a performance management mechanism pioneered in the USA, Willis, Matrofski and Weisburd (2003) described one effect of holding individuals to account was to limit their innovation and flexibility. The inhibition rather than stimulation of innovation (Nicholson 1993) could limit discretion to problem-solve. This follows Merton's original view, that pressure increases conflict between adherence to proper process and the use of illegitimate means to attain goals. This influence over important cultural processes (Nicholson 1993) may be why some of the rules that govern police practice have been circumvented to achieve set objectives.

The difference in subjective evaluation of circumstances means individuals are not always susceptible to anomie. No literature has been identified within this research that identifies rates of deviance. Knowledge about the rates and their likely impact is valuable in understanding the behavioural implications of policy decisions. In his article, *Pressured into Crime,* Agnew (2006) identified variable reactions to different strains or pressures rationalising the lack of uniform departure from rules and guidance. Robert Merton (1938), Albert Cohen (1955) with Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin (1960) pioneered development of strain theory, focusing on an inability to achieve monetary gain or status rather than generic performance achievement (see Agnew 2006). Cohen also perceived "blocked goals as producing deviance inducing strain," proposing that status and acceptance were more important than material success (Akers 1999, p.121).

Whilst relevant to the subject of this study, there does not appear to be a direct theoretical application to the impact of performance regimes creating pressure to attain performance goals in a policing context.

Development of Performance Management

The Royal Commission on the Police (1962) recommended the introduction of control to maximise efficiency, which demonstrates early thinking about performance management. Later, Holdaway (1982) reiterated the need for accountability in the police, but that did not materialise until after Home Office Circular 114/1983. This "seminal text" (ACPO 2008, p.23) influenced police leaders for a decade and became the genesis of modern hierarchical performance scrutiny (Home Office 1983).

Attempts to inculcate a performance-conscious climate existed as far back as 1979 (Pollitt 1986), but the proliferation of government initiatives did not follow until after the 1983 circular. New public managerialism and '**Policing by Objectives**' (ACPO 2008) became the norm in the 1980s. Loveday (2000, p.23) argued the "increasing demands of managerialism" were met through a "comprehensive application" of performance management indicating that performance was judged through input and output measures.

The 1980s saw the introduction of a range of alternative measures such as the British Crime Survey (BCS), which Reiner (2008, p.4) described as "not subject to the reporting and recording vicissitudes of police data". He argued that the rapid growth of recorded crime between 1981-1993 compared with BCS data was a recording phenomenon. Coincidentally, forces began employing professional statisticians and WYP appointed a 'Head of Performance Review' to oversee data collection and analysis for a regime of OPRs.

Early indicators such as the 'number of offences detected' and the 'number of stop and searches per officer' were introduced as part of forty-five new indicators by HMIC (1991). Recorded crime fell between 1992 and 1997 and Reiner (2008) argued this was because it became more onerous for victims to record a crime, whereas he associates the rise in recorded crime from the late 1990s with changes in procedures for counting crimes.

Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR) and National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS) introduced strict recording procedures (see Reiner 2008) because variability in crime recording practices between forces created

interpretation issues. Collier (2006, p.171) suggested that government endeavours to shape police activity were “doomed” unless there was consistency about what was measured and that fostered a desire to introduce comparative measures. Additional scrutiny was considered necessary at force level and WYP introduced a new protocol in 1998 called **IMPACT**. Investment of resources in performance management increased substantially over subsequent years and in 2002 WYP created a ‘Crime Registrar’ to oversee the application of the crime recording standards. The impact of greater investment in this regard coincided with a 20% increase in crime recording rates (HMIC 2003).

In liberal democracies the police, in theory, do not enforce government policy (Millar, Blackler and Alexandra 1997), but the Police Reform Act 2002 endorsed intervention through the creation of the PSU. Established to improve performance against government targets (Barton & Barton 2011), it became directly involved in the **‘Street Crime Initiative’**. WYP was subject to direct engagement and the initiative was “driven home” (WYP 2003, p.1; HMIC 2003) through dedicated resources and additional expenditure totalling over £1.8m (WYP 2002). The White Paper (Home Office 2004a, p.128) pronounced that “Policing must remain independent of political control and direction to retain public trust,” but the reality does not seem to have been borne out in practice. ACPO later said, “the Police Crime and Standards Unit created a culture of compliance” (ACPO 2008, p.54), suggesting national targets should be taken account of in performance appraisals. This culture may account for the crime recording practices that have been highlighted in the findings of this study.

HMIC (1999) reported that ‘Best Value’ created a choice between quantitative

performance improvement and the immeasurable 'service side' of policing. Nevertheless, police **BVPIs** were introduced. Flanagan (2008) later said they had not reflected the extant priorities of that time, which may explain their replacement in 2004/5 with Statutory Performance Indicators (SPI's). Alongside Public Service Agreements (PSA's), National Policing Plans and the PPAF, the SPIs made up governments overarching performance regime (Collier 2006).

Assessments of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) replaced PPAF in 2008 and Barton & Barton (2011) described them as an attempt to simplify the measures of judgement in terms of their success regarding crime and community safety. They were welcomed because of their less complex counting rules than PPAF (Hunton et al. 2009), but they were still a proxy for comparison between individual police forces. Complaints regarding the fairness of inter-force analysis brought about the concept of most similar forces (MSF) (see Barton & Barton 2011; WYP 2006). These groupings of forces, shown at Table 4 are still used by HMIC for assessments and other thematic reviews.

Table 4. WYP Most Similar Forces Group

Most Similar Forces
West Yorkshire Police
South Yorkshire Police
West Midlands Police
Greater Manchester Police
Leicestershire Police
South Wales Police
Northumbria Police
Lancashire Constabulary

Following considerable public policy debate, there was a central focus on metrics to scrutinise police performance (ACPO 2008; Flanagan 2008). Changes, which introduced a **Single National Indicator** however, were designed to engender a broader assessment of trust and confidence (Barton & Barton 2011)

Why has so much effort been expended to embed centrally controlled performance management? One reason seems to be that 'good' police performance is important for those holding the police to account (Alach & Crous 2012). The Association of Police Authorities (APA 2006, p.1) articulated that its reputational and political focus made "headline news". Successive governments have highlighted positive crime statistics as manifesto issues stating, "Chances of being a victim of crime at lowest levels for over 20 years" and "Crime has fallen by 30% since 1997" (Home Office 2004a, p.5; Flanaghan 2008, p.4). More recently, Wankhade (2012) suggested that even the BCS had been changed into a system of performance management used in political debate. These reasons offer insight into why the focus on performance has been relentless and costly. In WYP over £1.1m per annum and forty staff (WYP 2011) were dedicated to performance management during these regimes.

Intended Consequences

The variety of police performance regimes were clearly intended to produce specific positive outcomes such as reduced crime, increased clear up rates and more offenders brought to justice. Sir John Woodcock explained in the *Quality of Service: A Framework of Performance Indicators* report (HMCIC 1991) that measures were there to sustain and encourage the service in setting high

standards of policing. A new performance management system was welcomed by HMIC who had attributed a drop in WYP performance to a lack of an effective performance management framework (HMIC 2003).

The perceived value in performance management regimes continued to grow. In 2004, the Rt. Hon David Blunkett MP as Home Secretary said that preventing, reducing and detecting crime was what effective policing was about, which in turn required robust performance management (Home Office 2004a). He said, “performance management is a central plank of police reform” in his foreword to *A Practical Guide to Police Performance* (Home Office 2004b). The APA and Home Office produced more guidance (APA 2006; Home Office 2008), emphasising central governments persistent belief that the employment of such regimes would secure positive performance consequences.

Performance can be disaggregated into different components including effectiveness and efficiency. Pollitt (1986) argued these are not always complementary, asserting that to be more effective could mean being less efficient. He recognised that there was a “striking imbalance” between measures of efficiency and those of effectiveness (Pollitt 1986, p.162). The Chief Constable of WYP reiterated his focus on crime performance but also noted that confidence and satisfaction needed to be improved (WYP 2006). Pollitt (1986) had described that performance management, as a multi-faceted concept was not always clear what assessment systems were actually trying to capture. This does not seem to have been resolved over time. Wankhade (2012) recently highlighted the importance of understanding what performance is measured, how it is measured and how widely it is used. This lack of clarity seems to have been absent in many

of the performance regimes of the past three decades and is not restricted to the police service.

In his review of performance management in the UK ambulance service, Wankhade (2011, p.385) describes its objectives as not well defined. He reports that objectives were focused “on the measurable’” at the expense of less tangible but equally important aspects of service. This seems to refer to numerical quantitative ‘output’ targets rather than qualitative ‘outcome’ assessments such as public confidence, community safety or the ‘fear of crime’. Seddon (2008) recognised this when he looked at ‘systems thinking’ in police regimes, concluding that whilst measurement binds effective systems, it is measurement of demand and capability rather than that of targets and activity.

ACPO (2008) pointed out that adopting easily measured targets led forces to assume these should be priorities resulting in a focus on narrow outputs such as crime detection. ACPO said, “the net effect of performance management has been to endorse and celebrate sanction over crime reduction” (ACPO 2008, p.11). This concept of sanction suggests more focus on achievement of higher detection rates rather than a holistic approach to promote community safety through crime reduction. Ambiguity about intended outcomes offers one reason why there have been many regime changes endeavouring to get this balance right. Collier (2006) echoes this point, suggesting that police performance was clearly political and had been subject to continuously changing initiatives.

In his report, *The Review of Policing*, Flanagan (2008, p.4) said, “improvements have been supported by a greater emphasis on performance

management". So it seems clear that continued interest in performance management demonstrated by the various regimes, inspections and guidance publications, implies a prevailing belief that overall policing performance would improve through their employment (Barton & Barton 2011).

This view of performance management reflects a reductionist perspective, where selected variables are identified as targets for optimisation without recognising their impact upon the wider system in which they operate. (Newsome 2008) sought to better understand the complex interaction between performance variables and recognise the potential unintended impact of policing activity. The complexity of these interactions is even more significant when considered at an individual behavioural level. The lack of understanding surrounding the potential for unintended consequences in this area offers potential for new insight.

Unintended consequences

Some reviews of performance management regimes in a police context have considered their effects on ethics and corruption. Whilst both these areas have relevance and are considered, it is the broader concept of unintended outcomes rather than just the means by which they are achieved that is the focus of this section. Wankhade (2011) acknowledged that performance measurement can bring positive results, but he also noted it can produce perverse effects if there is a failure to take a holistic view of the complexity of the operational context. Pursuing Merton's theory, it seems that from pressure to perform well, the potential exists for police performance regimes to generate unintended consequences.

A current trawl of the literature available shows that the unintended

consequences fall largely into three areas: Pressure on staff, the impact of pressure and the lack of these issues reflected in policy.

Doig (1995) wrote in his *Mixed Signals* article that the government desire for devolved management in the early 1980s brought new pressures to reduce cost and bureaucracy, which had implications for the adherence to standards and the probity of conduct. The removal of effective systems of audit and compliance for any performance management regime could create risks associated with Merton's mode of 'innovation' and a reduced likelihood of being challenged.

Holdaway (1992) described accountability at different levels, explaining the distinction between the policymaking at the managerial level of the senior ranks, and the policy implementation of the lower ranks. This dissimilarity between roles could influence misinterpretation of policy and lead to unintended activity. Discussing the cultivation of 'professional policing' Holdaway (1982, p.84) said it secured a "significant measure of freedom" and this was echoed later by ACPO (2008) who said that reforms to performance management could create space from direct answerability. Police officers in England and Wales retain individual subjective discretion as an essential part of their role, but this independence could mean they are more exposed to the possible risks of anomie.

Young (1991) recollects the continuous attempts of the police to measure aspects of activity. He provides a detailed reflection of the pressures placed upon individual officers to "cuff" (police slang for not recording) crimes (Young 1991, p.323), which were passed down through generations of officers as accepted activity. Throughout his three-decade career, which began in the 1960's, he

experienced “the manipulation of crimes as a manufactured reality” (Young 1991, p.322) where recorded crime was carefully controlled with little opportunity for any external challenge. He catalogues a long list of activities that were culturally accepted at the time when “institutional desperation for detections” caused officers to ‘fiddle’ the figures (Young 1991, p.365). This early analysis provides the genesis for subsequent reflections on competition between police areas where senior officers turned a blind eye to the manipulation of figures. Some of the detailed activity during that era is disturbing in today’s context, but as Young describes, “it was a world dominated by the ubiquitous need for ‘clear ups’ and detections” (Young 1991, p.259).

These non-legitimate practices persisted through different regimes and this was recognised by HMIC (1999, p.3) who commented that frontline officers were “trawling the margins” in any way to improve the figures. This malpractice was directly related to culture and HMIC (1999) identified three methods that had been used to make detection rates appear better:

1. Not recording reports of crime that were unlikely to result in a detection
2. Inaccurate classification of crimes
3. Encouraging convicted criminals to admits crimes they did not commit

In the 1990s the government wanted forces to adopt a performance culture in order to achieve set targets, but it was clear that this might have encouraged the resurrection of ‘old practices’ (Loveday 2000). This seems to be a poignant reference to the kind of activities that Young experienced; yet many years on, Loveday was still saying, “current pressures to meet targets can only be expected to exacerbate the problem” (Loveday 2000, p.24). HMIC (1999, p.19) said

“pockets of unethical crime recording still needed to be eradicated”.

Young’s memoirs directly relate to the practice of senior officers creating an atmosphere where detection rates need to be increased ‘at all costs’ resulting in ethical recording standards not being considered important (Loveday 2000; HMIC 1999). The contrast between the desire of senior officers and behaviour of junior officers can create a conflict of interest, which is reportedly one of the most common forms of unethical conduct across public sector organisations (Boyce & Davids 2009).

HMIC reviews of police practice reveal how pressure may have affected practice. In its inspection of police integrity, HMIC (1999) found evidence that the emphasis on crime recording and detections had been pushed too far, affecting ethical practices. They reported that an increasing and aggressive performance culture was a major factor affecting integrity, which was agreed by chief constables who highlighted this culture as a cause for lapses in integrity (HMIC 1999). The comment of one CID trainer from that era summed it up by stating, “the performance culture forces you to operate at the edge of the ethical envelope” (HMIC 1999, p.19), although it seems that ‘envelope’ was regularly breached. It was consequent to HMICs review that detections from post sentence interviews stopped being counted towards detection rates, and recognition was given that public confidence in how results were obtained were as important as what was achieved (HMIC 1999).

Research commissioned by the Home Office (Burrows et al. 2000) found that the police classified a fifth of crimes differently from the initial report. Specifically,

half of allegations about personal offences and a quarter of property offences were not even recorded as a crime. Without assessing the impact of the newly implemented counting rules, Burrows et al. (2000) felt that officer discretion was the primary reason for the differences. It seems they had not taken cognisance of Young's analysis that counting rules had created "an industry concerned with counting, measuring and classifying crime to be presented in such a way to create the best impression of efficiency" (Young 1991, p.267) implying some degree of manipulation.

Seddon (2008) suggests that the bureaucracy of recording reflected a lack of trust in officers' use of discretion describing it as 'deliverology'. However, he also recognises the justification for the control of crime recording following many examples of police officers "reclassifying offences in order to meet targets" (Seddon 2008, p.124). Another HMIC review had specifically looked at this issue finding inconsistency in recording processes (HMIC 2000). Their inspection revealed an error rate between 15% and 65% in crime recording across forces together with misclassification of crimes (HMIC 2000, p.9; Loveday 2000). There was inconsistent application of the counting rules through a recognition that adherence to the rules could impact on a force's relative BVPI league table position. Centralised recording units were advocated to provide "independence from the performance pressures at BCU level" (HMIC 2000, p.13).

Another consequence of HMICs review was the introduction of a new concept known as the 'prima facie versus the evidential' model shown at Figure 1. HMIC said the evidential model artificially reduced recorded crime and increased detection rates (HMIC 2000). The NCRS later sought to make the 'prima facie'

model the norm for crime recording (Reiner 2008).



Figure 1. HMIC 'Prima Facie' Model of crime recording

Loveday (2000, p.24) said the introduction of this model was seen as a challenge to forces that for a variety of understandable reasons had "traditionally managed and massaged crime figures". This new approach though enabled collection of reliable data through a change in culture, which could be monitored by HMIC who looked for evidence of this during inspections. Loveday (2000) suggested that evidence of a 'performance culture' in policing might have further consequences that undermine quality of service and question effectiveness. Interestingly, none of the twelve hallmarks of effective performance measurement set out by the Home Office mention risks associated with recording practices (Home Office 2008).

This review has considered the outcomes of what was done, but it is also useful to consider why individuals and organisations adopted these practices. Millar, Blackler and Alexandra (1997) explain that the discretion police officers use across a wide range of powers can result in them not using proper means to achieve self-interested ends. This suggests that novel means could be deployed, identifying with anomie where innovation is the most frequently adapted non-conformist mode (Akers 1999). Supporting this concept, a study of police

managers conducted by Adlam (1998, p.146), identified they had a moral tendency “to get the job done at all costs”. His probing about these negative tendencies met with the direct response, “That’s what happens when you’re only evaluated on performance indicators and results” (Adlam 1998, p.147).

In any democratic society there is an expectation that the police will not only comply with the law but also follow proper process. In his analysis of police corruption, Punch (2000, p.315) suggests, “there is a complex constellation of variables that produces police culture” and it is in this context that officers learn to bend the rules. In a similar vein, during research into police ethics and integrity, Westmarland (2005, p.148) reported from a survey of British police officers (n=267) that “41% didn’t feel administrative rule bending was serious”. It is important to contextualise police culture because it seems officers have felt that, their [rule bending] activities were not contrary to police integrity (Westmarland 2005). One factor of police deviance or corruption relates directly to where organisational culture allows the breach of internal rules, procedures and policy about performance (see Punch 2000; Porter and Warrender 2009). Interestingly, WYP included ‘bending the rules or ignoring procedures’ as one strand of ‘corruption’ in a professional standards leaflet (WYP 2001).

Punch (2000) concludes that police culture can foster solidarity, so that organisations condone deviance by colluding in the falsification of results. Westmarland (2005) supports this proposition, suggesting that pressure to produce results can strengthen internal solidarity, which may become a driver of misconduct. In classic anomic perspective, she argues that the police have been constantly involved in the “thankless task of trying to reconcile pressure” to do

something about rising crime rates (Westmarland 2005, p.161).

There is some conflation in the use of terms to describe non-legitimate police behaviour, but Punch (2000) explains that ‘corruption’ is a term that covers a broad range of deviant activity. A phrase often coined to describe the use of illicit means to achieve organisational goals is ‘noble cause’ corruption and Westmarland (2005) argues that morals, ethics and integrity are all interrelated concepts. However, it seems apparent that, whatever the label, the “ramifications for not following due process are important and should not be dismissed (Cooper 2011, p.181). One highly publicised example where trust in the police was damaged was the exposé of undercover officer Mark Kennedy who tried to meet his objectives of intelligence gathering through “disproportionate intrusion” (HMIC 2012, p.24). This supports the proposition that noble cause activity can be a slippery slope into less noble forms of corruption (Cooper’s 2011).

Although there has been increased scrutiny and accountability through sustained performance management (Home Office 2004a), the risk that quantitative indicators may create perverse incentives has been identified (Flanaghan 2008). Driven by Home Office requirements to capture data on certain types of crime, Seddon (2008) argues the issues were not about bad or bent police officers but the bad and bent system in which they were working. It seems that despite the many changes of regime, the unintended consequences still exist. Chief Constable Creedon of Derbyshire Constabulary recently wrote in *Police Professional* magazine that too strong a focus on statistics leads to potentially artificial improvements in performance. He went on to say, “The more you chase numbers, the more chance you have of getting dirty numbers” (Creedon 2012,

p.12). However, no principle is suggested for getting this balance right, nor is any evidence offered on which this assumption is made.

This is not confined to the UK context either, because Goldstein (2012) reported in the New York Times that the integrity of crime statistics had been brought into doubt after officers said they were being pressured by their supervisors to reduce the number of crimes reported. It seems a similar methodology has been adopted in the USA, with deliberate misclassification of crimes, and as Wilford Pinkney (a former first grade detective with NYPD) said, there is a “pressure people feel” not to exceed last year’s crime numbers (Goldstein 2012).

In summary, there has been a relentless governmental focus on police performance management through a proliferation of regimes. There is clear evidence of pressure applied and felt, and tied with the impact of this pressure could link the theoretical construct of anomie and strain theory with the practical examples of performance regimes and subsequent behaviour. This review also identified that mixed messages are often given by those in authority about what practice is acceptable by officers in their endeavour to improve performance. HMIC (2011) reported that strong leadership was necessary to set high standards of integrity, with appropriate scrutiny reinforced through examples of their own behaviour.

There are gaps in the available literature around key areas that, if filled, would be useful for policy makers. Rates of deviance and demographic vulnerability are not discussed leaving little knowledge of the extent of any issues. Similarly, the

context of era and when non-legitimate practice occurs combined with analysis of where and how pressure manifests itself are areas not previously considered. This study aims to provide a valuable and unique contribution to filling that void.

Methods

The intention of this research was to develop a greater understanding of the intended and unintended consequences of managing police performance. This study was not predisposed to test any one hypothesis or produce any causal inferences. The research question was to see whether there are any unintended consequences following the introduction of various performance management regimes and whether any patterns of non-legitimate police behaviour or practice could be identified.

To address this question, both descriptive and exploratory research was required to understand what social science researchers describe as, *"What's going on here?"* (Bachman & Schutt 2011, p.9). In addition to gathering new data, extensive 'historical events research' was also conducted through analysis of official reports, legislation and policy implementation. Although important to narrate historical social phenomena, it is not possible to glean cause and effect from chronological sequences. The fact that one event followed another does not mean that the former caused the latter, because any number of other factors could have been responsible (Miles & Huberman 1994). A lack of internal validity diminishes any proposed hypothesis (Robson 2002; Ruane 2005; Hagan 2006), but setting out the events in a chronological order with as much contextual information as possible is the only way to explore such matters.

Research design was important (see Ruane 2005) because the broad range of issues in the study called for a mixed methods approach, collecting both quantitative and qualitative data (see Bachman & Schutt 2011). This provided a

broad and complimentary range of data (Neuman & Weigand 2000), a blueprint for the study (Hagan 2006) and a contextual platform for subsequent detailed analysis. Although the data cannot be used to establish causal links, the validity of the research remains important for interpretation and correlative propositions.

The careful use of statistics and design helped mathematically ascertain the extent to which any phenomena could be related (see Bachman & Paternoster 1997). To enrich the research design, the key steps of a focussed research process were followed: Collection, analysis and interpretation of the data and presentation of the findings (Neuman & Weigand 2000). In order to improve validity (see Hagan 2006), high standards of data integrity were kept, because although essentially social research, a “scientific attitude” (Robson 2002, p.18) of being systematic, sceptical and ethical was maintained throughout the research process.

Quantitative Data Sets

The quantitative data comprises multiple data sets. The first was drawn from existing recorded data comprising of WYP recorded crime figures, which are routinely collected and aggregated into monthly/ annual counts for internal performance monitoring and to comply with statutory reporting requirements for the Home Office. Between 1982 and 1992 the data are limited to paper based aggregates of annual totals by crime category variables but are available in electronic format from 1993 onwards. The consistency of the data is affected by changes in local recording practice, the introduction of HOCR in 1998 and the NCRS in 2002 (Reiner 2007). The data for crime detections is available in the

same category variables and time frame as for recorded crime. The data was compiled in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet in a format suitable for uploading into a predictive analytics software package called SPSS. The purpose of including this data is to compare and contrast police recorded crime with changes to the performance environment, particularly where it relates to crime levels, e.g. the Street Crime Initiative.

The second set comprises police officer initiated activity data, which is also available in category variables to reflect the use of different police powers, including stop and search, arrests, FPN issue and crime detections. These are routinely collected and aggregated into monthly/annual counts at force level. This data may have been influenced by legislative changes or high profile events such as the murder of Stephen Lawrence (Macpherson 1999), which created limitations in respect of recording methodology.

In relation to the use of stop and search powers data are available in detail from 2005 onwards, but from 1989 to 2004 the data are limited to annual force level totals and there is no data for this variable prior to 1989. In relation to arrests, the data are available from 1994 onwards but appears inconsistent in this first year of recording, so its value is limited to 1995 onwards.

With FPNs, data are available from 2004 onwards but policy changes regarding usage, such as the introduction and increased use of speed cameras, alternative disposals for drunk and disorderly and public order offences may have created limitations regarding its consistency. This data set was included to

compare and contrast police initiated activity with changes to the performance environment, particularly where it related to productivity.

The third set is victim satisfaction qualitative data, available as ordinal variables drawn from regular victim satisfaction surveys carried out in the WYP area. The sample is broadly in line with overall victim groups in terms of age, gender, ethnicity and crime types and the sample size is calculated using calculators from the market research field and is an accepted statistical standard in accordance with the Home Office User Satisfaction methodology. The quality of the survey methodology ensures that the findings are based on a statistically representative sample of the victim population (de Leeuw, et al. 2008) across categories of crime including domestic burglary and violent crime. The data are a limited sample and therefore subject to sampling error (Bachman & Schutt 2001), but this is mitigated through the annual sample size of around 7,500 per annum, acceptable confidence intervals and a stable survey methodology. The data are available from 2004 onwards and includes two questions that are highly relevant to this study:

1. Did the police in any way try to dissuade you from reporting this crime?

2. Did the police ask you to provide evidence prior to them accepting the crime report?

This data is included to compare and contrast victim perception of officer behaviour with changes to the performance environment, particularly where it relates to crime levels.

The final part to this data set incorporates complaints and conduct matters, which also contain category variables. They are maintained in a computerised

database that details the people involved, the allegations, times and dates and the result/disciplinary outcomes. Prior to the computerised system (pre 2004) all the information was held on a local manual system, which was later decommissioned and the data transferred across to the current database. Although electronic data are now available from 1996, it is limited until 2004 in that the entries are sporadic in completeness with missing variables. Hand written Discipline Registers of all misconduct hearings are available from 1976 but the detail requires manual extraction and following a scoping exercise it was beyond the capacity of this research study. This data enables comparison of the volume and type of public complaints alongside changes to the performance environment.

Quantitative Data Analysis

In order to help answer the research question, detailed analysis is required to establish if any changes coincide or relationships exist (to recording practices, service delivery and police initiated contact) and whether these align with any performance regime changes. A list of data issues and limitations along with the action taken to mitigate impact for these data sets is shown at Appendix A. Given the known performance priorities over time, the variables shown in Table 5 have been used for analysis.

In order to establish comparable trend lines over time for these datasets, which have very differing values, the value of each of the variables described above was converted into Z-scores. This conversion was completed in Microsoft Excel, using the formula:

- (Variable value – Arithmetic Mean) / Standard Deviation

Table 5. Existing data – Variables for analysis

Total crime recorded per 1000 population
Total crime detection rate
Robbery recorded per 1000 population
Robbery detection rate
Burglary recorded per 1000 households
Burglary detection rate
Criminal damage recorded per 1000 population
Criminal damage detection rate
Stop and search per police officer
Stop and search arrests per police officer
Total arrests for notifiable offences per police officer
FPN's for motoring offences per police officer
Victim perception – % of victims dissuaded from reporting crime
Victim perception – % of victims asked to provide evidence
Victim perception – % of victims satisfied with overall service delivery
Complaints per arrest
Complaints (subset) per arrest
Complaints per stop and search
Complaints (subset) per stop and search
Misconduct per robbery recorded
Misconduct per FPN issued

This allowed comparison between different distributions in terms of changes over time on the same axis. When plotted on a chart, the multiple variables can be visually observed to assist in understanding any similarity between the trends and determine the extent of change that has taken place in a variable over time (Bachman & Paternoster 1997). The charts also contain information as to when

performance regime changes took effect in order to draw attention to when any changes coincide.

In addition to plotting z-scores, variables were paired and scatter diagrams produced to further explore the possible strength of any relationship between specific variables (Bachman & Paternoster 1997). This was to see if they appeared similarly sensitive to changes in the performance regime; for example, if the increased uses of stop and search powers has a positive correlation with increased volume of complaints from the public. This was to enable further assessment of whether pressure to perform may influence a change in behaviour that goes outside accepted practice, e.g. pressure to reduce recorded crime coincides with behaviour to dissuade victims from reporting crime. Paired values shown in Table 6 were selected for plotting on scatter diagrams.

Table 6. Existing Data Paired Values

Total crime recorded	Victim perception – Dissuaded
Total crime detected	Victim perception – Provide evidence
Stop & Search per officer	Complaints per officer
Arrests per officer	Complaints per officer
Robbery recorded	Victim perception - Dissuaded
Robbery recorded	Victim perception – Provide evidence
Robbery recorded	Misconduct per officer
FPN’s per officer	Misconduct per officer

The scatter diagrams help to illustrate the extent of any relationships between two datasets through plotting the values of each variable on charts with each dot representing a single point in time. If a relationship appeared to exist, further

exploration was required to see if a more precise nature of that relationship could be established. Where the plotted points lie closest to a straight line this identifies the highest degree of correlation between the two variables. The amount of 'scatter' gives a rough measure of the strength of any correlation but to offer more precision a numerical index (or coefficient 'R') was calculated. This correlation coefficient measures the closeness with which the pairs of values fit a straight line and Microsoft Excel was used to calculate the value for the R^2 coefficient, which ranges from 0 to 1 (as Excel automatically squares the R value). A value of 1 implies that a linear equation describes the relationship between *X* and *Y* perfectly, with all data points lying on a line for which each increases in line with the other. A value of 0 implies there is no linear correlation between the variables.

This helps understand the strength and direction of any relationship between pairs of values based on the coefficient value (Bachman & Paternoster 1997), but sample size is important to have confidence that any findings represent the population rather than just the sample. This is demonstrated through calculation of the standard error of the correlation coefficient to have confidence (at the 95% level) in the result (Field 2009).

Qualitative Data Sets

A key aspect for the research is to explore any impact of changes to the performance regime on police officer activity and behaviour. To offer some contextual basis for the quantitative data, three additional methods were used to collect new information from serving police officers in the Force. This was achieved through a combination of on-line and paper surveys and face-to-face

interviews to provide primary data about activities and behaviour over time in relation to performance management arrangements. It is acknowledged that this sample-based method of research could have created risks whereby the characteristics of the sample were not reflective of the population group and therefore have limited generalisability (Bachman & Schutt 2011). However, these were mitigated to some extent through the use of systematic procedures for sample selection and increased sample sizes (de Leeuw et al. 2008).

Specifically, the survey was designed to gain information relating to any pressure officers may or may not have felt to deliver performance outcomes and if that resulted in changes of behaviour and practice. To gather a range of experiences, the officers were stratified into four 'length of service' bands to improve representation (Bachman & Schutt 2001. The stratified groups are shown in Table 7 along with the key regimes on the performance management timeline.

Table 7. Alignment of stratified groups with key regimes

Length of service	Description
0 – 9 years	This service band incorporates the period of targets and performance indicators used locally and by the Home Office/HMIC and the realignment from central to more local accountability following the introduction of the Single National Indicator in 2009.
10 – 13 years	This service band incorporates the period of the Street Crime Initiative associated with the rigorous scrutiny of performance and engagement by the Police Standards Unit.
14 – 19 years	This service band incorporates the period of BVPIs / KPIs and the introduction of IMPACT. Officers with less service will also have experienced the effects of the regime.
Over 20 years	This service band incorporates the period of Policing by Objectives and the introduction of the Complaints Regulations.

Firstly, a 'Discoverer' query was used to extract information from the WYP HR computer system for all police officers including names, length of service, rank and email address). Table 8 shows how this information was stratified in the four service length bands.

A random number was applied to each record within the file using the 'RAND' function in Microsoft Excel and pasted as a value, which was then sorted firstly by the length of service band and secondly by the random number.

Table 8. Stratified Service Bands

Length of Service	Total Officer Strength
0 – 9 years	2497
10 – 13 years	651
14 – 19 years	847
Over 20 years	1188
Total	**5183**

With limited research capacity, an assessment of what was manageable to conduct this research showed that no more than 20 interviews and approximately 100 paper surveys could be realistically achieved and processed. Therefore, taking into account the impact of likely abstractions and/or unavailability, the first 10 records for each length of service band (n=40) were separated out from the file. These were first contacted by telephone or email and invited to take part in a later face-to-face interview. Once twenty appointments were fixed, made up of five from each band, the remaining officers on this list were put back into the cohort for the online survey.

The next 30 records for each length of service band (n=120) were separated out to receive a paper survey for delivery through their line manager, although completion was ultimately dependant on their availability. All remaining police officers (n=5043) received an on-line electronic survey. Table 9 shows the breakdown by length of service and Table 10 shows the breakdown by rank of each officer identified against each survey methodology.

Table 9. Breakdown by length of service against survey methodology type

By Length of Service	E-mail	Paper	Face-to-face	Total strength
0 – 9 years	2462	30	5	2497
10 – 13 years	616	30	5	651
14 – 19 years	812	30	5	847
Over 20 years	1153	30	5	1188
Total	**5043**	**120**	**20**	**5183**

Table 10. Breakdown by rank against survey methodology type

By Rank	E-mail	Paper	Face-to-face	Total Strength
Constable	3894	91	12	4087
Sergeant	691	18	5	714
Inspector	252	5	2	259
Chief Inspector	63	5	0	68
Superintendent	32	1	0	33
Chief Superintendent	15	0	0	15
Chief Officer	6	0	1	7
Total	**5043**	**120**	**20**	**5183**

On-line survey

The on-line survey was created in SNAP, which is a proprietary survey software package already used by the Force for other research purposes. The questions were prepared to reflect the timeline of key events and the practices identified in previous research material. Some of the questions were amended to be less specific about the conduct of officers otherwise it may have created vulnerability or compromise for both the responder and the researcher if any disclosures of misconduct were made. Following discussions with research practitioners the questionnaire was finessed through piloting of other officers not connected with the Force to provide construct validity (de Leeuw, et al. 2008).

The survey was made deliberately short, taking only approximately 5-10 minutes to complete, acknowledging restricted time available of officers and to encourage completion. The questions predominantly requested nominal or ordinal information, but a free text field was also incorporated for additional contextual comment. To assist understanding of any influence of context, a series of demographic questions were also asked including gender, rank, length of service and age.

Once the survey was designed and finalised it was published as a HTML file, hosted on an internal web server and distributed using e-survey technology in an endeavour to maximise response rates within limited time availability. The survey was accessed via a link to the web address and the questions answered on-line. The survey responses were automatically emailed back to the server and

subsequently imported back into SNAP enabling exportation into SPSS for analysis. Figure 2 illustrates the process flow for the on-line survey methodology.



Figure 2. Process Flow for on-line survey

On the 9th August 2012, all officers, except those selected for paper survey or face-to-face interview, in WYP (n=5043) were sent an email containing a link to the survey and invited to provide an anonymised response. Just over 600 officers completed the survey within the first week and a follow up email was sent out on the 20th August 2012 reminding officers of the survey to encourage completion. Both emails are attached at Appendix B. A study of the automated 'Out of Office' replies indicates that many officers were away from their workplace, and additional known abstractions due to sickness or support for the 2012 London Olympics meant that a number of officers were unavailable to complete the survey (n=677). Table 11 shows the detail of those unavailable to take part in the survey. A final response (n=679) was achieved when the survey closed on 28th August 2012 giving a response rate of 13.5%.

Table 11. Officers unavailable to take part in on-line survey

Unavailability to respond	Total
'Out of Office'	278
Abstraction for sickness	126
Abstraction for Olympic duties	273
Total	**677**

All the electronic responses were uploaded into SPSS and given a coding type to identify the online methodology.

Paper survey

The identified officers in each length of service band (n=120) were separated out to receive the paper survey for completion through their line manager. This number compensated for unavailability and once the known abstractions from the randomly generated sample were taken out (n=18), the desired approximate number was achieved. The actual response (n=102) represents 100% of those available to be surveyed using this methodology. Table 12 shows the detail of unavailability.

Table 12. Officers unavailable to take part in paper survey

Number randomly identified	Unavailable	Available to respond	Response
120	18	102	102

The survey questions were exactly the same as the on-line survey, but this methodology was adopted to get a full response from this sample. This was to enable analysis of whether any differences were apparent in the responses given the two different methodological approaches.

The line managers of the recipients were identified and supplied with a brief explaining that the completion by their staff should be supervised but the content not monitored. The researcher felt the sensitivities surrounding the subject matter could have influenced officers to be less than frank about their responses if directly monitored. The completed surveys were then placed in sealed anonymised envelopes and returned by the line managers to the researcher. The information was then similarly captured for later analysis through a proprietary paper survey scanning system called Cardiff Teleform. This automatically scans the data into a database reducing error from human transfer although the free text fields are manually typed. The database was then uploaded into SPSS and given a coding variable to identify the paper-based methodology.

Face-to-face Interviews

The specific purpose of interviews was to explore more fully the consequences of performance regimes and understand how officers behaved in order to comply with the regime and be seen to be successful. Officers from the list in each length of service band (n=40) were contacted via telephone and email until appointments had been secured from the first five in each band (n=20). These subsequently took part in a semi-structured interview, which was based on the paper survey already described. This facilitated more in depth questioning ensuring consistency but without limiting the responses.

Four research staff conducted the actual interviews to limit variance in approach or style. They also represented a neutral position in respect of the subject matter, which was important given the sensitivity of potential disclosures.

The interviews were recorded through contemporaneous notes taken by the interviewer, in agreement with the interviewee's preferences. The transcripts of the interviews provided a basis for the application of a coding scheme, which along with direct quotations was developed to provide a thematic framework for later analysis.

Some of the comments and direct quotations offer additional context on the issues and these are used to illustrate and bring greater depth to the findings. This qualitative data adds richness to the context of changing performance regimes and preserves the chronological nature of changing circumstances (Miles & Huberman 1994).

Qualitative Data Analysis

All the survey and interview data was coded and uploaded into the SPSS software so that each question could be analysed in terms of demographics and other relevant questions to identify if any correlations exist. Initially, the survey data was subject to simple descriptive analysis because the level of measurement, specified within the variable view, influences the type of statistics that should be used. Almost all the data within the SPSS file is either Nominal or Ordinal and therefore summary statistics focuses on frequency and percentages represented by bar charts.

The data was subsequently analysed to produce both descriptive and inferential statistical information that could demonstrate changes in trends over time, which may provide insights into why any changes may have occurred. The 'Crosstabs Function' was used to conduct chi-squared tests against all crosstabs

to ascertain the significance of any relationships, although this is limited in that it fails to exploit the ordering of categories and counts all variable as a nominal scale. Small values in some category variables caused some reporting issues for the chi-squared tests, so these were ‘collapsed’ or ‘combined’ into dichotomy variables although this limits the granularity of the analysis. Other analyses were conducted including the use of effect size calculations and odds ratios (OR) (Campbell Collaboration 2012).

Summary

These different methodologies were designed to be complementary and in combination provide research material that would be both unique and useful in the descriptive and exploratory analysis. The initial analysis is focussed on the existing recorded data and provides a set of category and ordinal variables, which are presented as annual totals for WYP. The limitations relating to each of the data variables are formally identified and reported upon, however, the data allows an understanding of changes in workload, police officer behaviour and service user (crime victim) experience. This is overlaid to enable comparison and contrast examination of changes over time, with changes in the national and local performance regimes.

To scan for any kind of correlative links between a pressure to perform and officer behaviour, the data is presented as time series from 1 April 1982 to 31 March 2012 (depending on the availability of each variable). In order to present the times series data in a comprehensible and comparable format the observations for each variable were translated into z-scores. This time series is

overlaid with timelines of key events or triggers that may have influenced the performance regime (Appendices C & D).

The detailed analysis of the survey/interview data, which was stratified across different length of service bands, provides additional contextual information. The stark contrast in answers and the frankness of direct quotes brings depth and value to the research. The combination of utilising quantitative and qualitative data together as both factual and contextual information indicating some divergence of the key issues provides powerful statistical information.

This presentation and style of analysis is the only way to explore the research question. Once aligned to the timeline the data one may be able to infer what the future could hold for policing in terms of new performance management.

Findings and Discussion

The intention of this descriptive analysis and exploratory research was to develop a greater understanding of the intended and unintended consequences of managing police performance. This study was not predisposed to test any one hypothesis or produce any causal inferences. However, the use of existing recorded data and new qualitative information from WYP helps contextualise the changes in culture and practice that have occurred over time.

The literature review identified key performance regimes introduced with an intention to drive positive changes in police behaviour. The intended consequences were aligned to increasing efficiency, reducing crime and building confidence. However, findings from this study show some correlations between increased pressures from performance management with changes in police behaviour aligned to non-legitimate practices. These unintended activities to achieve results seem to be associated with anomy and strain theory and the qualitative information acquired from the surveys offers some indication of the extent of the issues.

The findings and discussion from this analysis are set out in chronological sequence. The first part sets out the response rates and demographics from the different survey methodologies used. The second part describes the broad trends over time of crime related activities alongside the identified performance regimes**.** The third part shows the statistical tests that support the key findings from the surveys and the final section summarises the discussion points. All parts are

supported by direct commentary from the qualitative surveys to help understand *"what was going on here?"*

Part 1 - Survey Response and Demographics

New data was collected through three survey/interview methodologies to gather contextual information. The primary purpose was to identify whether any officers felt pressure to deliver performance outcomes and if so whether that resulted in non-legitimate behaviour or practice. A secondary purpose was to consider differences in responses between research methodologies.

The total responses (n=801) from on-line survey (n=679); paper survey (n=102) and face-to-face interview (n=20) were analysed individually and collectively. The 13.5% response rate (n=679) for the on-line survey was lower than expected. This methodology could have suffered from sampling bias (Bachman & Schutt 2001; Hagan 2006), because those who chose to complete the survey may have had a predisposition to answer the questions a certain way. By contrast, there was no element of self-selection that could influence sampling bias for the paper survey or interviews because of the 100% completion rate. The demographic profiles of respondents are shown at Tables 13-16.

Responses were received from constable up to chief officer and Table 13 shows the breakdown by rank. Although the highest proportion of responses were from constables at 53.3% (n=427) they had the lowest response rate of all ranks whereas the highest response rate was for inspectors at 34% (n=88).

Table 13. Population and response rate broken down by rank

Rank	Population				All surveys			On-line survey		
	All surveys		On-line							
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Response rate	Frequency	Percent	Response rate
Constable	4087	78.9%	3984	79.0%	427	53.3%	10.4%	356	52.4%	8.9%
Sergeant	714	13.8%	691	13.7%	152	19.0%	21.3%	136	20.0%	19.7%
Inspector	259	5.0%	252	5.0%	88	11.0%	34.0%	79	11.6%	31.3%
Chief Inspector	68	1.3%	63	1.2%	18	2.2%	26.5%	18	2.7%	28.6%
Superintendent	33	0.6%	32	0.6%	9	1.1%	27.3%	9	1.3%	28.1%
Chief Superintendent	15	0.3%	15	0.3%	4	0.5%	26.7%	3	0.4%	20.0%
Chief Officer	7	0.1%	6	0.1%	2	0.2%	28.6%	2	0.3%	33.3%
Prefer not to say	-	-	-	-	101	12.6%	-	76	11.2%	-
Total	**5183**	**100.0%**	**5043**	**100.0%**	**801**	**100.0%**	**15.5%**	**679**	**100.0%**	**13.5%**

Although 48.2% of all officers in the force have less than 10 years service (n=2497), a total response of only 167 was achieved from this cohort. Table 14 shows that this was the lowest response rate across all length of service bands contrasting with those with more than 20 years service who had the highest response rate.

Table 14. Population and response rate broken down by length of service

Length of Service	Population				All surveys			On-line survey		
	All surveys		On-line							
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Response rate	Frequency	Percent	Response rate
0 to 9 years	2497	48.2%	2462	48.8%	167	20.8%	6.7%	141	20.8%	5.7%
10 to 13 years	651	12.6%	616	12.2%	135	16.9%	20.7%	107	15.8%	17.4%
14 to 19 years	847	16.3%	812	16.1%	151	18.9%	17.8%	124	18.3%	15.3%
20 years plus	1188	22.9%	1153	22.9%	283	35.3%	23.8%	254	37.4%	22.0%
Prefer not to say	-	-	-	-	65	8.1%	-	53	7.8%	-
Total	**5183**	**100.0%**	**5043**	**100.0%**	**801**	**100.0%**	**15.5%**	**679**	**100.0%**	**13.5%**

Table 15 shows the proportion of responses from male and female officers is broadly in line with the strength profile and achieved similar response rates of

14.0% and 12.8% respectively. However, the response rate for female officers in the on-line survey was lower at just 9.1%.

Table 15. Population and response rate broken down by gender

Gender	Population				All surveys			On-line survey		
	All surveys		On-line							
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Response rate	Frequency	Percent	Response rate
Male	3615	69.7%	3528	70.0%	507	63.3%	14.0%	463	68.2%	13.1%
Female	1568	30.3%	1515	30.0%	200	25.0%	12.8%	138	20.3%	9.1%
Prefer not to say	-	-	-	-	94	11.7%	-	78	11.5%	-
Total	**5183**	**100.0%**	**5043**	**100.0%**	**801**	**100.0%**	**15.5%**	**679**	**100.0%**	**13.5%**

Table 16 shows that the responses received from those aged under 35, who predominately have less than 13 years service, is lower than for those aged over 35 who generally have longer service.

Table 16. Population and response rate broken down by age

Age	Population				All surveys			On-line survey		
	All surveys		On-line							
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Response rate	Frequency	Percent	Response rate
16 to 24	43	0.8%	43	0.9%	3	0.4%	7.0%	3	0.4%	7.0%
25 to 34	1764	34.0%	1726	34.2%	154	19.2%	8.7%	131	19.3%	7.6%
35 to 44	1946	37.5%	1877	37.2%	294	36.7%	15.1%	249	36.7%	13.3%
45 to 54	1376	26.5%	1345	26.7%	224	28.0%	16.3%	200	29.5%	14.9%
55 to 64	54	1.0%	52	1.0%	11	1.4%	20.4%	10	1.5%	19.2%
Prefer not to say	-	-	-	-	115	14.4%	-	86	12.7%	-
Total	**5183**	**100.0%**	**5043**	**100.0%**	**801**	**100.0%**	**15.5%**	**679**	**100.0%**	**13.5%**

The results from the paper survey and the on-line survey have been used for the statistical calculations enabling direct comparison between the two methodologies. Comments and quotations from the face-to-face interviews have been included to add context to the findings.

Part 2 – Broad Trends Historical Analysis

It is prudent to state that the many limitations of the existing data sets were considered and addressed as described in Appendix A. Refined figures were computed into Z-scores and plotted on charts so the distribution of each variable could be observed over time on a constant axis. The charts also highlight when the key performance regime changes occurred. To explore the possible strength of any relationships between variables, further analysis was conducted using paired values (see Table 5 in the Methods Section) and scatter diagrams to see if variables were similarly sensitive to changes in performance regimes. Each diagram includes the correlation coefficient (R^2 value – calculated using Excel) to assist understanding of any relationships and the R^2 value is interpreted as shown in Table 17 (Rowntree 1981).

Table 17. Depicts range of R^2 values and interpretation

Value	Interpretation
0.0 to 0.2	Very weak, negligible
0.2 to 0.4	Weak, low
0.4 to 0.7	Moderate
0.7 to 0.9	Strong, high, marked
0.9 to 1	Very strong, very high

Where the R^2 value was >0.4, the standard error for the correlation coefficient (SER^2 – calculated using Excel) is provided. This is to explore, given that the data represents a sample of the overall populations, the range within which the correlation coefficient actually lies for the population as a whole. This range is calculated by subtracting/adding 1.96 x SER^2 (at the 95% level of confidence).

Crime Trends

The crime trend information gives a generalised presentation of the changes in recorded and detected crime set against the identified performance regimes. The first chart shown at Figure 3 provides an initial overall perspective of the broad trends of crime and detection rates between 1982 and 2012.



Figure 3. Total crime per 1000 population and detection rate

From 1982 to 2006 crime rates per 1000 population and detection rates seem diametrically opposed with peaks of difference corresponding with the era of Policing by Objectives and the period of the Street Crime Initiative. Since 2006 both rates appear to have lowered and stabilised.

The trends of three crime categories that have had specific relevance to performance management regimes are shown in Figure 4. Each category of recorded crime follows a similar path to that of total crime over the three decades. Of particular note though are the spikes of burglary in the mid 1990s and robbery in the early 2000s.



Figure 4. Recorded crime by category per 1000 population

These categories were then looked at in detail and compared with detection rates, shown at Figures 5-7.

Burglary

The rate of increase of burglary in the early 1990s is mirrored in time with a decreasing detection rate. However, following its peak in 1993 the rates mirror once again but this time they converge and since 2004 both rates rate have both lowered and stabilised.



Figure 5. Burglary per 1000 households and detection rate

This spike in burglary is not aligned to one of the key regimes discussed in this study, but the recording of criminal damage shown in Figure 6 shows a steady increase from about the same time as burglaries begin to decrease.



Figure 6. Criminal damage per 1000 population and detection rate

The recorded rate of criminal damage is almost diametrically opposed to the detection rate, but in this case the divergence follows sequentially that for the case of burglary. Young (1991) reflects that the recording of criminal damage was used historically as a means to reduce the recording of burglary and HMIC (1999) found that there was still inaccurate classification of crime recording in the late 1990s. These points were also reflected in the responses to the survey:

> *'If there was even the smallest possible chance that a burglary or attempt burglary could be crimed as a damage then that was what you were told to record.'*
>
> (Respondent – age: 35 to 44, gender: male, length of service: 14 to 19 years)

> *"You were almost made to feel you had done something wrong by trying to record a burglary dwelling. This attitude was prevalent in CID. You were treated as if you did not really know what you were talking about. Thankfully those days are gone!"*
>
> (Respondent – age, gender, and length of service: not specified)

Robbery

The sustained rise in the rate of recorded robbery offences from 1997 shown in Figure 7 was a pre-cursor to the Street Crime Initiative (HMIC 2003; WYP 2003).



Figure 7. Robbery per 1000 population and detection rate

Immediately following the introduction of the regime, recorded robbery in WYP fell markedly by 33.21% (HMIC 2004) and the detection rate increased rapidly. These outcomes were the clear stated intentions of government. However, the survey findings show that some officers have been influenced to use non-legitimate practice to achieve results:

"If there is any grey area, go for the lesser offence"

(Respondent 7 – age: 35 to 44, gender: male, length of service: 14 to 19 years)

"Not exactly pressure but you felt as though you were incapable of making your own decision as to how to record a crime when you were told to record it differently to what had actually taken place"

(Respondent – age: 35 to 44, gender: female, length of service: 20 to 25 years)

The decline in the recorded robbery rate and the increase in the detection rate post 2002 are both steep and rapid but appear to stabilise from 2004 onwards.

To explore relationships between paired variables that may have contributed to the reduction in recorded robbery and the increased detection rate, additional analysis was conducted using scatter plots. Figures 8 – 10 show the results.



Figure 8. Robbery per 1000 population paired with victim perception that they were dissuaded from reporting a crime



Figure 9. Robbery per 1000 population paired with victim perception that they were asked for evidence of the crime



Figure 10. Robbery per 1000 population paired with misconduct per officer

The first two scatter plots show no visible relationship and display negligible correlations between the values. Although visually there appears to be a negative relationship between the variables in Figure 10, the R^2 value suggests only a weak correlation. It seems that over time, none of these variables have a definitive relationship with the rate of recorded robbery.

One consistent observation in this review is that the detection rate was highest in the early period between 1982 and 1991 when the recorded crime rate was lowest. The introduction of the first regime of formal metrics and central measurement (HMCIC 1991) coincided with the end of this period. However, the literature review did not identify this as a key event that had a marked effect on crime figures. Conversely, the introduction of the Single National Indicator for public confidence in 2009 coincided with a period where all the recording and detection rates settled into a much more stable pattern. The deliberate move away from hard target driven regimes to focus on qualitative outcomes, seems to have had a positive effect on crime figures. No causal inference can be drawn, but this coincides in time with the reduction of direct pressure on performance management of specific crime categories (WYP 2011).

Discretionary Activities

Crime trends can only provide general picture, whereas a more direct and specific relationship can be studied between discretionary activities and performance pressure. The first framework of performance indicators introduced metrics relating to activities self-initiated by officers (HMCIC 1991). Analysis of these activities helps understanding about the quantifiable outputs of officers at certain times and is therefore plotted against the timeline. Limitations regarding the availability of data meant that it was not possible to plot against the complete timeline. Figure 11 shows the increasing trend in outputs until the mid 2000s when there was a sharp decrease.



Figure 11. Stop and search, arrests and fixed penalty tickets per officer

Looking back over time, the three types of police discretionary activity follow very similar trends. IMPACT was designed to increase individual officer productivity, however activity started to reduce within a year of that regime in contrast to a stark increase immediately following the Street Crime Initiative. After the mid 2000s there is a sustained pattern of decline in activity until after 2009, which coincides with the introduction of the Single National Indicator. There is some evidence that some officers' behaviour was influenced by performance regimes:

> *"I submitted stop & search forms for anyone I arrested and no-one ever made the link"*
>
> (Respondent 1 - age: 25 to 34, gender: female, length of service: 5 to 9 years)

> *"I might be influenced to use my discretion to assist targets but not make anything up"*
>
> (Respondent 4 - age: 35 to 44, gender: female, length of service: 14 to 19 years)

However, not all officers identify that they felt this pressure. This supports existing literature that suggests some individuals are more susceptible to the

principle of anomie than others (Agnew 2006). The following quote seems to reflect the other side of this susceptibility:

> *"My personal integrity means that I wouldn't do anything I couldn't justify or defend, but plenty of others do even now. They do it for an easier life, to keep the attention away from themselves and because of the pressure from above"*
> (Respondent 7 - age: 35 to 44 , gender: Male, length of service: 14 to 19)

Stop and Search

Figure 12 shows the trends of stop and search per officer and the resulting arrest rate. Once again it seems that the two rates are diametrically opposed over time. The pressure to increase the number of discretionary activities from initiatives such as IMPACT in the late 1990s may be associated to the increase at this time.



Figure 12. Stop and search per officer and resulting arrest rate

Of particular interest is the rate of stop and search activity compared with much lower arrest rates around the time of the Street Crime Initiative. After the

introduction of the regime, the rate of arrests from stop and search began to fall in comparison to the increase in the rate of just stop and search.

This suggests that officers felt compelled to undertake high volumes of stop and search without a sufficient evidential case that may have resulted in an arrest. The following quote from a serving police officer supports this:

> *"Personally wouldn't stop anyone without grounds, but would go for quantity rather than quality until I'd met the monthly target"*
> (Respondent 3 - age: 35 to 44, gender: male, length of service: 10 to 13 years)

> *"Supervisor instructed us to 'stop everything that moved' within a certain area. I stopped a male outside his own house and checked his documents - this was an order from a supervisor"*
> (Respondent 12 - age: 35 to 44, gender: female, length of service: 10 to 13 years)

Since the introduction of the Single National Indicator both measures of stop and search have lowered and stabilised in a similar way to crime rates.

Victim Perception

Data from victim perception surveys provides a separate perspective from the decision making of individual officers. The data remains free from the anomalies associated with crime recording practices and therefore helps in understanding the impact on crime recording rates. The analysis over time is limited due to the availability of data, but nevertheless Figure 13 shows three variables that have contrasting trends.



Figure 13. Victim perception by category

The Single National Indicator removed the focus on individual crime metrics and this coincided with changes to victims' perceptions. Analysis of the responses from the survey found that officers had felt less pressured about crime recording rates in more recent times:

'We are more open and honest these days'

(Respondent 17 - age: 45 to 54, gender: male, length of service: 26 years plus)

From this research it is not possible to show that high crime rates directly create pressure on individual officers. However, some evidence exists (Westmarland 2005; Seddon 2008), echoed by the findings in this study, which show the pressure to respond to crime trends influences the behaviour of the police. Additional analysis was conducted using scatter plots to explore relationships between perception variables paired with the recorded crime rate.



Figure 14. Recorded crime per 1000 population paired with victim perception that they were dissuaded from reporting a crime

Figure 14 shows that based on the visual representation of the R^2 value there is a strong positive correlation between the level of recorded crime and the % of victims who felt that the officer tried to dissuade them from reporting the crime. The SE suggests that the actual correlation rests between 0.6 and 0.93 showing a moderate to strong correlation and this is interesting because this position was not reflected in the specific case of robbery where there was a negligible correlation.

Figure 15 shows there is a negligible relationship between the crime detection rates and the perception of victims stating additional evidence was requested from them.



Figure 15. Total crime detection rate paired with victim perception that they were asked for evidence of the crime

The overall picture relating to victim perception suggests that efforts by officers to dissuade victims from reporting a crime have a strong relationship with periods of high crime rates. However, the evidence does not support that position with respect of additional evidence being required.

Complaints and Misconduct

Complaints and misconduct cases might provide a proxy measure for the impact on the public of the use of non-legitimate practices by officers. This could be through excessive use of discretionary activities such as stop and search. Analysis of complaints and misconduct data helps understanding about the changes in the behaviour and practices by officers but is limited due to the availability of data over time. The broad trends are plotted against the timeline and are shown at Figure 16.



Figure 16. Complaints per arrest for crime and per stop and search, misconduct per robbery and per ticket for motoring offences

Not much can be gleaned from this chart except that the variables for all complaints and misconduct have increased steadily since 2003. However, after the introduction of the Single National Indicator there is a sharp change to a downward trend in 2010. To explore relationships between these variables, additional analysis was conducted using scatter plots.



Figure 17. Complaints per officer paired with stop and search activity per officer

The plots in Figure 17 display a slight negative relationship and the R^2 value suggests a moderate correlation. However, the SE suggests that the actual R^2 value lies between 0.05 and 0.80 representing anything from a negligible to a strong correlation.



Figure 18. Complaints per officer paired with arrests for crime per officer

The plot in Figure 18 displays a more marked negative relationship but the R^2 value suggests that there is a negligible correlation.



Figure 19. Misconduct per officer paired with tickets for motoring offences per officer

The plots in Figure 19 displays a negative relationship between the variables and the R^2 value suggests this is a strong correlation. The SE value suggests that the actual correlation coefficient could lie between 0.56 and 0.91 supporting a moderate to a very strong correlation.

The detail of analysis regarding complaints and misconduct is generally too vague to make any assertions. However, an interesting relationship may exist whereby the number of complaints reduces with the increased frequency of stop and searches but this would require more specific research. The strongest relationship exists between the reduction in misconduct and the increased rate of issue of FPNs. However, no inferences can be drawn from this analysis to enlighten the position regarding intended or unintended outcome from performance regimes.

Part 3 – Findings from qualitative surveys

Many variables within the surveys contained small values, which could not be analysed with chi-square tests so every question was collapsed to create new dichotomy variables. These dichotomies were then compared as two-by-two tables firstly between survey methodologies and subsequently with demographic variables to investigate whether responses were influenced by rank, length of service, gender or age.

The chi-square tests determined the extent of any relationship between the variables and the significance level *(p)* was automatically calculated by SPSS as part of the chi-square test. A *p* value of less than 0.05 was considered statistically significant (Field 2009) rejecting the hypothesis of independence concluding that

the relationship observed within the cross tabulation was real and not due to chance.

The OR is a measure of effect size (Campbell Collaboration 2012) and provides information on the strength of the relationship between two variables. The OR evaluates whether the odds of a certain event or outcome is the same for two groups within a two-by-two table through consideration of probabilities. An OR of 1 suggests there is no difference between the results for two groups whereas an OR above 1 indicates the extent to which it is more likely that the event will occur in one group over the other group. For example, an OR of 2 suggests that the probability of an event occurring is twice as likely for one group than for the other.

To investigate the effect of sampling bias on the results of the on-line survey, chi-square tests and Odds Ratios (OR) were used to compare the results of each question between the on-line survey and the paper survey results. The key findings and themes are shown in this section but a copy of the full questionnaire and the output from analysis of all responses are attached at Appendix E and F.

Detail is included here to show that dependent on demographics, some officers felt more pressure or responded outside of accepted norms than others. Merton's theory (1938) does not offer predicted rates of deviance through anomie, so this analysis provides useful information for police leaders and policy makers in this context.

Extent of Pressure

The primary finding and headline figure is that 91.6% of all those officers surveyed have, at some time, felt pressure such to 'bend the rules' offering some indication as the extent of the issues associated with performance regimes. Table 18 shows the frequency and percentages.

Table 18. Frequency and percentages of combined pressure felt

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	FP	734	91.6	91.6	91.6
	NFP	67	8.4	8.4	100.0
	Total	801	100.0	100.0	

Only 8.4% of all those officers surveyed said that they had never felt pressure to misclassify recording of crimes, boost detection rates by questionable means or carry out a discretionary activity such as stop and search other than when properly justified.



Figure 20. Percentages of combined pressure felt

In what way did the pressure manifest itself?

One limitation of this research is that it is not able to be specific about the details of how pressure manifested itself into specific activities. However, additional analysis and comments from respondents give some general indicators. One activity seems to be associated with reclassifying 'priority' crimes as a way of minimising monitored recorded crimes. Table 19 shows that 68.8% of officers surveyed felt pressured to do this.

Table 19. Frequency and percentages of pressure to reclassify crimes

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never Felt Pressure	244	30.8	31.2	31.2
	Felt Pressure	528	68	68.8	100
	Total	772	98.9	100	
Missing	System	9	1.1		
Total		781	100		



Figure 21. Percentages of pressure to reclassify crimes

Quotes from surveyed officers supports the position that when rates of crime classed as priority are high, then there is pressure not to record them correctly:

> *"I have been informed in the past many a times not to either record robberies or burglaries when the figures in these areas have been high, when clearly the incident has either been a burglary or robbery".*
> (Respondent 48) - age: 35 to 44, gender: Female, length of service: 10 to 13 years)

Discretionary activities such as stop and search require lawful justification. However, it seems that pressure felt to simply boost numbers of this activity is another unintended consequence of performance management However, the historical analysis showed that there was no correlation between stop and search and an increase in complaints suggesting there was less of an impact in this area. Table 20 shows that this pressure had affected 77.3% of respondents.

Table 20. Frequency and pressure to exercise stop and search

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never Felt Pressure	177	22.1	22.7	22.7
	Felt Pressure	603	75.3	77.3	100
	Total	780	97.4	100	
Missing	-1	21	2.6		
Total		801	100		



Figure 22. Percentages of pressure to exercise to stop and search

The other categories of discretionary activities seem to have been affected in a similar way. Tables 21 and 22 show the frequencies and percentages.

Table 21. Frequency and percentages of pressure to make arrests

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never Felt Pressure	204	25.5	26.6	26.6
	Felt Pressure	562	70.2	73.4	100
	Total	766	95.6	100	
Missing	-1	35	4.4		
Total		801	100		



Figure 23. Percentages of pressure to make arrests

Table 22. Frequency and percentages of pressure to issue tickets

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never Felt Pressure	313	39.1	41.8	41.8
	Felt Pressure	436	54.4	58.2	100
	Total	749	93.5	100	
Missing	-1	52	6.5		
Total		801	100		



Figure 24. Percentages of pressure to issue tickets

Impact of pressure

A question associated with this practice is, what is the impact on the public and in particular victims of the crimes themselves? Table 23 shows that in the opinion of the attending officers, 74.2% felt that by reclassifying the crime it made some or a lot of difference to the quality of the investigation.

Table 23. Frequency and percentages of difference to quality of investigation

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No difference	137	17.5	25.8	25.8
	Some or alot of difference	393	50.3	74.2	100.0
	Total	530	67.9	100.0	
	System Missing	251	32.1		
	Total	781	100.0		



Figure 25. Percentages of difference to quality of investigation

Some quotes from officers add context and detail to this position:

"If you record as a lesser offence it would be dealt with by routine officers who have a higher workload and therefore less time to devote to the investigation"
(Respondent 11 - age: 35 to 44, gender: male, length of service: 14 to 19 years)

"If you downgrade the offence you automatically downgrade the response"

(Respondent 4 – age: 35 to 44, gender: female, length of service: 14 to 19 years)

A secondary point is what is that if the quality of investigation suffers, does that directly impact on service delivery to the victim? Table 24 shows that once again the majority of officers felt that it made some or a lot of impact.

Table 24. Frequency and percentages of impact on victim

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No impact	186	23.8	34.8	34.8
	Some or alot of impact	349	44.7	65.2	100.0
	Total	535	68.5	100.0	
	System Missing	246	31.5		
	Total	781	100.0		



Figure 26. Percentages of impact on victim

Some quotes from officers add context and detail to this position:

'Some investigative and support options did not then become available to the victim'

(Respondent 2 - age: 45 to 54, gender: male, length of service: 20 to 25 years)

'More thorough investigation, more likely to get a detection and so bound to impact on victim'

(Respondent 11 – age: 35 to 44, gender: male, length of service: 14 to 19 years)

When did this pressure occur?

One key question from this analysis was, when did all this occur? There was certainly evidence from the literature review that activities such as these have been prevalent in the past (HMIC 1999), but an important area for this study was to explore if it was still relevant. Table 25 shows that only 10.9% specifically said they had felt pressure in the last 12 months with 68% saying that it had occurred in the past. However, a rather disturbing 21.1% of those surveyed said they felt pressure always.

Table 25. Frequency and percentages of when pressure felt

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Only recently (last 12 months)	70	8.7	10.9	10.9
	In the past (more than 12 months)	437	54.6	68	78.8
	Always	136	17	21.1	100
	Total	643	80.3	100	
Missing	0	158	19.7		
Total		801	100		



Figure 27. Percentages of when pressure felt

Quotes from officers seem to suggest that things have changed:

"Perspective has changed now..... where the onus is on getting it recorded correctly"

(Respondent 2 - age: 45 to 54, gender: Male, length of service: 20 to 25)

Although others felt that the pressure still exists:

“This still goes on, younger in service officers accept the 'encouragement' without seeing a need to challenge”

(Respondent 12 – age: 35 to 44, gender: female, length of service: 10 to 13 years)

Where does the pressure come from?

Another key area to explore is, where does this pressure come from? An open question in the survey generated a wide range of responses that were subsequently coded into themes. The top three are shown in Figure 28 with over 30% suggesting pressure came from specialist departments and in particular the supervisors in those departments.



Figure 28. Percentages of where pressure originated

Detailed quotes from officers offer a perspective on the sources of the pressure:

Dictates' from the highest levels in division to run any priority crimes past CID sergeants so that they could ensure that there wasn't an alternative crime that could be crimed.

(Respondent 13 (On-Line survey) - age: 35 to 44, gender: Male, length of service: 14 to 19 years)

The SMT are focused on keeping certain crimes at a reducing rate so to impress the public and show which party is in government are doing this right, a burglary is a burglary pressure has no doubt being passed down the command chain to scrutinise the MO and find a way to lower the crime offence, i.e. having to contact a DS for permission to crime a Dwelling Burglary, thankfully my colleagues at the sharp deal with the crime as a crime and fulfil all the necessary elements of the investigation.

(Respondent 46 (On-Line survey) - age: 45 to 54, gender: Male, length of service: Prefer not to say)

Do these policies/procedures generate mixed messages?

This question is really important to contextualise the extent to which officers understood the intended outcomes of performance management. Table 26 shows that in this research 66.5% of respondents show that managers and supervisors give mixed messages about the integrity of crime recording.

Table 26. Percentages of whether managers give mixed messages

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree	359	46	66.5	66.5
	Disagree	181	23.2	33.5	100
	Total	540	69.1	100	
Missing	2	235	30.1		
Total	System	6	0.8		
	Total	241	30.9		
Toatl		781	100		



Figure 29. Percentages of whether managers give mixed messages

Quotes from officers described how mixed messages were given:

“Despite being encouraged by supervision to correctly identify offences and demonstrate understanding of definitions, pressure has come to reclassify burglaries (attempted) as damages”

(Respondent 9 - age: 25 to 34, gender: female, length of service: 5 to 9 years)

“Managers tell us to be open and honest and that it's all about integrity and then callafudge the figures”

(Respondent 11- age: 35 to 44, gender: male, length of service: 14 to 19 years)

“On one hand providing a statement relating to integrity and then tongue in cheek suggestions that crimes should be pushed over the border.”

(Respondent 3- age: 35 to 44, gender: male, length of service: 10 to 13 years)

Are any demographic groups affected more than others?

The broad demographic groupings shown in Table 27 show that there was no statistical significance between the paired groups.

Table 27. Combined demographic table from all survey types

Survey type	Demographic	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Combined	Constables	35	64.81%	54	8.20%	427	392	60.68%	646	91.80%	427	X^2 (1, N=700) = 0.358, p= 0.55	1.19
	All Supervisory ranks	19	35.19%	54	6.96%	273	254	39.32%	646	93.04%	273		
	Length of service < 10 Years	11	19.30%	57	6.59%	167	156	22.97%	679	93.41%	167	X^2 (1, N=736) = 0.405, p= 0.524	2.30
	Length of service > 10 Years	16	28.07%	57	2.81%	569	523	77.03%	679	91.92%	569		
	Gender - Male	43	76.79%	56	8.48%	507	464	71.27%	651	91.52%	507	X^2 (1, N=707) = 0.772, p= 0.38	1.33
	Gender - Female	13	23.21%	56	6.50%	200	187	28.73%	651	93.50%	200		
	Age >35 years	44	83.02%	53	8.32%	529	485	76.62%	633	91.68%	529	X^2 (1, N=686) = 1.135, p= 0.287	1.49
	Age <35 years	9	16.98%	53	5.73%	157	148	23.38%	633	94.27%	157		

Specific key findings from individual survey questions

Although there were no general differences of significance across the demographic groups, some were identified in the individual questions along with identified differences between survey methodologies. The responses to those questions that yielded a statistically significant outcome are explored in this section.

Q1. Have you ever felt under pressure to record what is given the circumstances, more likely to be one of the above (burglary dwelling, robbery and theft) as an alternative crime type in order to reduce the recording of a priority crime?

This question was too vague to understand the rate at which any officers succumbed to the effects of anomie. Tests indicated no statistically significant differences between responses obtained from the on-line or paper surveys for this question and therefore the results were combined for analysis.

A chi-square test to establish whether there were differences between those officers who felt pressure and those who didn't was based on comparisons with the demographic variables shown in Table 28. Column X^2 represents the output from the chi-square test with the value shown alongside the sample size (N). The significance level *p* is also shown in the table, with any value less than 0.05 shaded to highlight statistical significance of the relationship being tested. The OR is presented in the final column to signify the effect size.

Table 28. Breakdown for officers who never felt pressure compared to those who had

Question / Survey type	Demographic	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q1. On-Line & Paper	All Supervisory ranks	95	44.0%	216	35.8%	265	170	36.8%	462	64.2%	265	X^2 (1, N=678) = 3.191, p=0.074	1.35
	Constables	121	56.0%	216	29.3%	413	292	63.2%	462	70.7%	413		
	Length of service > 10 Years	178	79.5%	224	32.2%	553	375	76.5%	490	67.8%	553	X^2 (1, N=714) = 0.758, p=0.384	1.19
	Length of service < 10 Years	46	20.5%	224	28.6%	161	115	23.5%	490	71.4%	161		
	Gender - Male	160	73.4%	218	32.6%	491	331	70.9%	467	67.4%	491	X^2 (1, N=685) = 0.464, p=0.496	1.13
	Gender - Female	58	26.6%	218	29.9%	194	136	29.1%	467	70.1%	194		
	Age >35 years	172	82.3%	209	33.7%	511	339	74.5%	455	66.3%	511	**X^2 (1, N=664) = 4.902, p=0.027**	**1.59**
	Age <35 years	37	17.7%	209	24.2%	153	116	25.5%	455	75.8%	153		

The tests indicated that respondents under 35 years old were significantly more likely to have felt under pressure than for those over 35 years old with an OR of 1.59. No significant differences were found between the other demographic variables.

Q1a. If so, do you believe this made a difference to the quality and completeness of the crime investigation?

This question relies on the professional judgement and perception of the individual officers involved. The test results in Table 29 indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the responses with an OR of 2.32 therefore they were analysed separately.

Table 29. Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	No difference					Some or a lot of difference					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q1a	Paper	34	24.8%	137	41.0%	83	49	12.5%	393	59.0%	83	**X^2 (1, N=530) = 11.73, p=0.001**	**2.32**
	On-line	103	75.2%	137	23.0%	447	344	87.5%	393	77.0%	447		

Further tests on the on-line survey results identified the demographic variables found to have a significant influence and are shown in Table 30.

Table 30. Demographic variables having a significant impact on the on-line responses

Question / Survey type	Demographic	No difference					Some or a lot of difference					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q1a. On-Line	All Supervisory ranks	46	51.7%	89	29.7%	155	109	35.2%	310	70.3%	155	**X^2 (1, N=399) = 7.948, p=0.005**	**1.97**
	Constables	43	48.3%	89	17.6%	244	201	64.8%	310	82.4%	244		
	Age >35 years	74	83.1%	89	25.3%	293	219	72.8%	301	74.7%	293	**X^2 (1, N=390) = 3.967, p=0.046**	**1.85**
	Age <35 years	15	16.9%	89	15.5%	97	82	27.2%	301	84.5%	97		

Respondents under 35 years old were significantly more likely to have felt that pressure made a difference to the quality and completeness of the investigation than for those over 35 years old with an OR of 1.85. Constables were also significantly more likely to feel that this impacted on the investigation than for those in supervisory roles with an OR of 1.97.

Further tests on the paper survey results showed the demographic variables found to have a significant influence and are presented in Table 31.

Table 31. Demographic variables having a significant impact on the paper responses

Question / Survey type	Demographic	No difference					Some or a lot of difference					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q1a. Paper	Age >35 years	22	91.7%	24	47.8%	46	24	63.2%	38	52.2%	46	**X^2 (1, N=62) = 6.244, p=0.012**	**6.42**
	Age <35 years	2	8.3%	24	12.5%	16	14	36.8%	38	87.5%	16		

This analysis revealed a significantly higher proportion of respondents under 35 felt that there was impact on the investigation with a very high OR of 6.42. Other demographic variables were found to have no significant effect on responses.

Q1b. If so, did this impact on service delivery to the victim?

This sub-question probes the impact on service delivery and victim satisfaction. The test results in Table 32 indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the responses from the two surveys with an OR of 2.00 therefore they were analysed separately.

Table 32. Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	No impact					Some or a lot of impact					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q1b	Paper	40	21.5%	186	48.8%	82	42	12.0%	349	51.2%	82	**X^2 (1, N=535) = 8.386, p=0.004**	**2.00**
	On-line	146	78.5%	186	32.2%	453	307	88.0%	349	67.8%	453		

Chi-square tests carried out on both the on-line and paper data did not reveal any significant influences from the demographic variables.

The historical analysis tells us that victim satisfaction has steadily increased since recording began in 2004 so the findings may relate more to the past.

Q2a. If so did you try to dissuade a victim from reporting a crime?

The chi-square test results shown in Table 33 indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the responses from the two surveys with a high OR of 5.16 and therefore they were analysed separately.

Table 33. Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	No					Yes					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q2a	Paper	59	36.9%	160	90.8%	65	6	10.2%	59	9.2%	65	**X^2 (1, N=219) = 14.729, p=0**	**5.16**
	On-line	101	63.1%	160	65.6%	154	53	89.8%	59	34.4%	154		

Tests for both survey methodologies indicated that the age, gender, rank and length of service demographic variables had no influence on the responses to this question.

Q2b. because of this pressure, have you required victims to provide additional evidence that an offence has occurred?

The chi-square test results shown in Table 34 indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the responses from the two surveys with a high OR of 5.91 and therefore they were analysed separately.

Table 34. Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	No					Yes					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q2b	Paper	49	45.0%	109	79.0%	62	13	12.1%	107	21.0%	62	**X^2 (1, N=216) = 28.394, p=0**	**5.91**
	On-line	60	55.0%	109	39.0%	154	94	87.9%	107	61.0%	154		

Tests for both survey methodologies indicated that the age, gender, rank and length of service demographic variables had no influence on the responses to this question.

Q3. Have you ever felt under pressure to reclassify or under record offences purely to reduce the recording of a particular crime/incident type?

The chi-square test results shown in Table 35 indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the responses from the two surveys with an OR of 1.56 and therefore they were analysed separately.

Table 35. Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q3	Paper	42	15.8%	266	43.8%	96	54	10.7%	504	56.3%	96	**X^2 (1, N=770) = 4.109, p=0.043**	**1.56**
	On-line	224	84.2%	266	33.2%	674	450	89.3%	504	66.8%	674		

To understand the distribution of responses for this question a frequency count was produced within SPSS shown in Table 36 along with the corresponding bar chart at Figure 30.

Table 36. Frequency count and percentage of responses

Q3. Have you ever felt under pressure to re-classify or under-record offences purely to reduce the recording of a particular crime/incident types?

		Survey Type		Total
		On-Line	Paper	
Never	Count	224	42	266
	% within Survey Type	33.2%	43.8%	34.5%
Only recently (last 12 months)	Count	46	3	49
	% within Survey Type	6.8%	3.1%	6.4%
Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)	Count	155	22	177
	% within Survey Type	23.0%	22.9%	23.0%
Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)	Count	192	24	216
	% within Survey Type	28.5%	25.0%	28.1%
Always	Count	57	5	62
	% within Survey Type	8.5%	5.2%	8.1%
Total	Count	674	96	770
	% within Survey Type	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%



Figure 30. Distribution of responses based on percentages

Chi-square tests for both survey methodologies indicated that the age, gender, rank and length of service demographic variables had no influence on the responses to this question.

Q4. Have you ever felt that your supervisors have been put under pressure to reclassify or under record offences purely to reduce the recording of a particular crime/incident type?

This question was asked to help understand where any pressure to achieve success against performance targets was being felt the most. The chi-square test results shown in Table 37 indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the responses from the two survey methodologies with an OR of 1.56 and therefore they were analysed separately.

Table 37. Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q3	Paper	42	15.8%	266	43.8%	96	54	10.7%	504	56.3%	96	**X^2 (1, N=770) = 4.109, p=0.043**	**1.56**
	On-line	224	84.2%	266	33.2%	674	450	89.3%	504	66.8%	674		

To understand the distribution of responses for this question a frequency count was produced within SPSS, which is presented in Table 38 along with the corresponding bar chart at Figure 31.

Table 38. Frequency count and percentage of responses

Q4. Have you ever felt that your supervisors have been put under pressure to re-classify or under-record offences purely to reduce the recording of a particular crime/incident types?				
		Survey Type		
		On-Line	Paper	Total
Never	Count	195	39	234
	% within Survey Type	29.0%	39.0%	30.3%
Only recently (last 12 months)	Count	50	6	56
	% within Survey Type	7.4%	6.0%	7.3%
Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)	Count	152	20	172
	% within Survey Type	22.6%	20.0%	22.3%
Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)	Count	182	30	212
	% within Survey Type	27.1%	30.0%	27.5%
Always	Count	93	5	98
	% within Survey Type	13.8%	5.0%	12.7%
Total	Count	672	100	772
	% within Survey Type	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%



Figure 31. Distribution of responses based on percentages

Further tests revealed no significant relationships between the demographic variables and whether they felt their supervisors had been put under pressure

from the paper survey. However, some were identified in the on-line survey and these are shown in Table 39.

Table 39. Demographic variables having a significant impact on the on-line responses.

Question / Survey type	Demographic	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q4. On-line	Length of service < 10 Years	51	28.3%	180	36.2%	141	90	20.2%	445	63.8%	141	**X^2 (1, N=625) = 4.823, p=0.028**	**1.56**
	Length of service > 10 Years	129	71.7%	180	26.7%	484	355	79.8%	445	73.3%	484		

This analysis revealed 73.3% of officers >10 years service thought their supervisors felt pressure compared with 63.8% of those <10 years service with an OR of 1.56.

In summary, the majority of officers felt that their supervisors had been put under pressure. Officers with more than 10 years service were more likely to say this than those with less service.

Q5. Managers and supervisors give mixed messages about our values/integrity about crime recording?

This question is really important to contextualise the extent to which officers understood the intended outcomes of performance management. The chi-square test results shown in Table 40 indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the responses from the two survey methodologies with an OR of 2.04 and therefore they were analysed separately.

Table 40. Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	Disagree					Agree					X^2	OR
		n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q5	On-line	150	82.9%	181	31.5%	476	326	90.8%	359	68.5%	476	**X^2 (1, N=540) = 7.252, p=0.007**	**2.04**
	Paper	31	17.1%	181	48.4%	64	33	9.2%	359	51.6%	64		

Further tests revealed no significant relationships between the demographic variables and whether officers thought that managers and supervisors gave mixed messages about values/integrity regarding crime recording from the paper survey. However, some were identified in the on-line survey and these are shown in Table 41.

Table 41. Demographic variables having a significant impact on the on-line responses.

Question / Survey type	Demographic	Disagree					Agree					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q5. On-line	Constables	49	37.4%	131	20.1%	244	195	66.1%	295	79.9%	244	**X^2 (1, N=426) = 30.529, p=0**	**3.26**
	All Supervisory ranks	82	62.6%	131	45.1%	182	100	33.9%	295	54.9%	182		

This analysis revealed 79.9% of constables thought their supervisors gave mixed messages compared with 54.9% for all supervisory ranks with an OR of 3.26. No significant differences were found between the other demographic variables.

Q6. Have you ever felt pressured to boost your individual or divisional detection rates with questionable offences taken into consideration (TICs)?

The chi-square test results shown in Table 42 indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the responses from the two survey methodologies with an OR of 1.79 and therefore they were analysed separately.

Table 42. Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q6	Paper	79	14.6%	541	79.8%	99	20	8.7%	229	20.2%	99	**X^2 (1, N=770) = 4.946, p=0.026**	**1.79**
	On-line	462	85.4%	541	68.9%	671	209	91.3%	229	31.1%	671		

To understand the distribution of responses for this question a frequency count was produced within SPSS, which is presented in Table 43, along with the corresponding bar chart at Figure 32.

Table 43. Frequency count and percentage of responses

Q6. Have you ever felt pressured to boost your individual or divisional detection rates with questionable offences taken into consideration (TICs)?				
		Survey Type		
		On-Line	Paper	Total
Never	Count	462	79	541
	% within Survey Type	68.9%	79.8%	70.3%
Only recently (last 12 months)	Count	18	3	21
	% within Survey Type	2.7%	3.0%	2.7%
Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)	Count	40	5	45
	% within Survey Type	6.0%	5.1%	5.8%
Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)	Count	129	11	140
	% within Survey Type	19.2%	11.1%	18.2%
Always	Count	22	1	23
	% within Survey Type	3.3%	1.0%	3.0%
Total	Count	671	99	770
	% within Survey Type	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%



Figure 32. Distribution of responses based on percentages

Further tests revealed no significant relationships between the demographic variables and those officers who said they had felt pressure to boost their

detection rates with questionable TICs from the paper based survey, however some were identified in the on-line survey and these are shown in Table 44.

Table 44. Demographic variables having a significant impact on the on-line responses

Question / Survey type	Demographic	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q6. On-line	Length of service < 10 Years	108	25.2%	428	78.3%	138	30	15.4%	195	21.7%	138	**X^2 (1, N=623) = 7.536, p=0.006**	**1.86**
	Length of service > 10 Years	320	74.8%	428	66.0%	485	165	84.6%	195	34.0%	485		

This analysis revealed 34.0% of officers >10 years service felt pressure compared with 21.7% of those <10 years service with an OR of 1.86.

The comments from those officers longer in service supported the finding that some officers had felt pressure to push for TIC detections:

"Became a league table of performance - this was the 'norm' in CID departments"

(Respondent 18 - age: 45 to 54, gender: male, length of service: 20 to 25 years)

Q7. Have you ever been set performance targets that have caused you to feel you needed to exercise any of the following powers? (Stop and search, issue of FPNs, make arrests)

The chi-square test established a difference between the responses from the two survey methodologies for this question. There only was significant difference indicated for stop and search and arrests as shown in Table 45. In both cases the OR suggests that on-line respondents were almost twice as likely to have felt they needed to exercise their powers to deliver against performance targets than for those completing the paper survey. This was a direct question about individual

integrity and anonymised on-line respondents may have been less concerned about reporting their activities. The two methodologies were analysed separately.

Table 45. Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q7 - Stop and Search	Paper	34	19.4%	175	34.3%	99	65	11.0%	592	65.7%	99	**X^2 (1, N=767) = 8.577, p=0.003**	**1.96**
	On-line	141	80.6%	175	21.1%	668	527	89.0%	592	78.9%	668		
Q7 - Tickets	Paper	48	15.6%	308	49.5%	97	49	11.5%	427	50.5%	97	X^2 (1, N=735) = 2.637, p=0.104	1.42
	On-line	260	84.4%	308	40.8%	638	378	88.5%	427	59.2%	638		
Q7 - Arrests	Paper	36	17.9%	201	38.3%	94	58	10.5%	551	61.7%	94	**X^2 (1, N=752) = 7.342, p=0.007**	**1.85**
	On-line	165	82.1%	201	25.1%	658	493	89.5%	551	74.9%	658		

The multiple responses relating to this question were grouped into multiple response sets within SPSS and then tabulated using the custom table function to produce frequency distribution shown at Table 46. The combined data from the frequency table was then plotted to show the distribution of responses across the range of performance management regimes shown at Figure 33.

Results from both survey methodologies showed officers felt most pressure in relation to stop and search and arrest targets particularly in relation to individual officer monitoring (IMPACT) and performance indicator regimes.

Table 46. Frequency count and percentage of responses

Q7. Have you ever been set performance targets that have caused you to feel you needed to exercise any of the following powers?		Survey Type					
		On-Line		Paper		Total	
		Count	Column N %	Count	Column N %	Count	Column N %
StopSearch	Never felt pressure	141	21.1%	34	34.3%	175	22.8%
	Always	142	21.3%	15	15.2%	157	20.5%
	policing by objectives	105	15.7%	7	7.1%	112	14.6%
	police discipline regulations	15	2.2%	0	0.0%	15	2.0%
	individual officer monitoring	258	38.6%	23	23.2%	281	36.6%
	Performance Indicators	394	59.0%	48	48.5%	442	57.6%
	Street Crime initiative	90	13.5%	5	5.1%	95	12.4%
	the Single National Indicator	17	2.5%	1	1.0%	18	2.3%
Tickets	Never	260	40.8%	48	49.5%	308	41.9%
	Always	75	11.8%	9	9.3%	84	11.4%
	policing by objectives	57	8.9%	5	5.2%	62	8.4%
	police discipline regulations	7	1.1%	0	0.0%	7	1.0%
	individual officer monitoring	197	30.9%	18	18.6%	215	29.3%
	Performance Indicators	266	41.7%	35	36.1%	301	41.0%
	Street Crime initiative	23	3.6%	0	0.0%	23	3.1%
	the Single National Indicator	12	1.9%	0	0.0%	12	1.6%
Arrests	Never	165	25.1%	36	38.3%	201	26.7%
	Always	109	16.6%	13	13.8%	122	16.2%
	policing by objectives	86	13.1%	6	6.4%	92	12.2%
	police discipline regulations	11	1.7%	0	0.0%	11	1.5%
	individual officer monitoring	251	38.1%	19	20.2%	270	35.9%
	Performance Indicators	364	55.3%	41	43.6%	405	53.9%
	Street Crime initiative	54	8.2%	4	4.3%	58	7.7%
	the Single National Indicator	15	2.3%	0	0.0%	15	2.0%



Figure 33. Distribution of responses from the on-line and paper surveys based on percentages

Further tests revealed no significant relationships between the demographic variables and officers who had felt pressure to exercise their powers of stop and search, issue tickets or make an arrest from the paper survey. However, some were identified from the on-line survey and these are shown in Table 47.

Table 47. Demographic variables having a significant impact on the on-line responses

Question / Survey type	Methodology	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q7 On-Line - Tickets	Length of service < 10 Years	68	28.1%	242	50.4%	135	67	19.1%	351	49.6%	135	**X^2 (1, N=593) = 6.615, p=0.01**	**1.66**
	Length of service > 10 Years	174	71.9%	242	38.0%	458	284	80.9%	351	62.0%	458		

Only length of service was found to have a significant difference in the on-line survey with 62.0% of those with >10 years service stating that they had felt pressure to issue tickets compared with 49.6% for those with <10 years service with an OR of 1.66.

Q8a. Has performance pressure led to you behaving in a way, which has resulted in a complaint from the public?

Tests on the combined survey results revealed a significant difference within one demographic variable of officers who felt pressure had led to a complaint from the public and these are shown in Table 48.

Table 48. Demographic variables having a significant impact on responses.

Question / Survey type	Demographic	Never had pressure					Pressure led to a complaint					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q8a. On-Line & Paper	Length of service < 10 Years	141	23.1%	610	87.0%	162	13	12.5%	104	8.0%	162	**X^2 (1, N=714) = 7.205, p=0.007**	**2.14**
	Length of service > 10 Years	461	75.6%	610	83.5%	552	91	87.5%	104	16.5%	552		

Only length of service was found to have a significant difference with 16.5% of those with >10 years service stating that pressure had led to a complaint from the public compared with 8% for those with <10 years service with an OR of 2.14.

Further chi-square tests did not reveal any other significant influences from the demographic variables.

Q8b. Has performance pressure led to you behaving in a way, which has resulted in an internal investigation?

Although the numbers involved were very small, tests on the combined survey results revealed a significant difference within one demographic variable of officers who felt pressure had led to an internal investigation and these are shown in Table 49.

Table 49. Demographic variables having a significant impact on the responses

Question / Survey type	Demographic	Never had pressure					Pressure led to an internal Investigation					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q8b. On-Line & Paper	Length of service < 10 Years	154	24.0%	643	96.3%	160	6	9.4%	64	3.8%	160	**X^2 (1, N=707) = 7.062, p=0.008**	**3.04**
	Length of service > 10 Years	489	76.0%	643	89.4%	547	58	90.6%	64	10.6%	547		

Only length of service was found to have a significant difference with 10.6% of those with >10 years service stating that pressure had led to an internal investigation compared with 3.8% for those with <10 years service with an OR of 3.04. Further chi-square tests did not reveal any other significant influences from the demographic variables.

Summary of findings

In summary, the genesis of modern hierarchical performance scrutiny began with Home Office circular 114/1983 and observers noted that performance management regimes have matured since that time (Flanagan 2008). Over 90% of officers surveyed said they had felt pressure at some point in their career

regardless of their length of service, but to a much lesser degree in recent times. Nevertheless, it is crucial for policy makers to note that over 10% of respondents in this study, said that performance pressure still affected them.

The dissipation over time of performance pressure is apparent in the finding that officers with more than ten years service were also significantly more likely to have had a complaint from the public or subject to an internal investigation, which they felt was as a result of performance pressure than for those with less than ten years service. Similarly, the survey indicated that almost a third of respondents said that their supervisors had been put under pressure to reclassify or under record but only in the distant past.

Agnew (2006) said that subjective reactions could vary in relation to different strains or pressures, resulting in a lack of uniform departure from rules or guidance. This aspect of theory seems to have been borne out through responses to certain questions where officers under 35 years old were significantly more likely to have felt pressure than those over 35 years old. Similarly, officers identify that they felt pressure following the introduction of **IMPACT** in WYP and this is shown as the second biggest driver of performance pressure over time. The variable reaction to such pressures supports the observations by Agnew (2006) who reiterated that some individuals are more susceptible to the principles of anomie than others.

The findings suggest that the higher the crime level the more likely the responding officer would try to dissuade the victim from reporting a crime although the percentage of victims who actually felt officers tried to dissuade them from

reporting a crime is relatively low at 3.5%. The proportion does increase significantly as crime levels increase and around one third of officers identified that they had tried to dissuade victims from reporting a crime.

The findings also suggest that there may be a negative relationship between the volumes of stop and search activity and complaints. However, there are so many unknown variables with regard to stop and search activity such as training and operating environment that it is difficult to interpret the results in any meaningful way. The SER^2 shown in Figure 17 also shows such a broad possible range of where confidence lies in terms of relationship that an already complicated context becomes even more confused. As such there is no substantive finding that can be relied upon.

Direct political intervention from the Home Office to address increasing recorded robbery levels led to a huge resource deployment to reverse the trend. As this was only 10 years ago, it is also remembered widely by many serving police officers. A sharp reduction in robbery achieved by WYP over a relatively short period of time was out of step with other crime types. The tactics used by the force to achieve this political imperative accord with Merton's (1938) theory, that target attainment was the primary focus and overrode demand based resource allocation practice. The Home Office response and the requirements placed on forces contradict Seddon's (2008) argument that a focus on narrow outputs (the imposed robbery reduction target) opposes effective systems where measurement is focussed on demand and capability.

Conclusion

Prior to 2009 there is a consistent pattern where high levels of crime were accompanied by lower detection rates and vice versa. This volatility in crime levels and detection rates may suggest knee jerk responses where police forces felt compelled to respond to performance pressure. Attempts by central government to simplify the performance landscape in 2009 with the establishment of the **Single National Indicator** for policing appears to coincide with a stabilisation of crime trends and may have created an environment where 'systems thinking' described by Seddon (2008) is encouraged.

Analysis of responses to the on-line survey identified that constables were significantly more likely to say that supervisors gave mixed messages than other ranks did about their supervisors. This concurs with HMIC findings that mixed messages are often given by those in authority about what practice is acceptable by officers in their endeavour to improve performance, HMIC (2011).

Differences were identified between the responses from the on-line and paper survey methodology. Those completing the (self selection) on-line survey were, for the majority of questions, significantly more likely to indicate that they felt pressure related to performance management regimes than for those completing the (mandated) paper survey. This raises issues relating to the methodological approach to such research as sampling bias (Bachman & Schutt 2001) may occur where self-selection to participate in a survey is emphasised by a low response rate. In contrast the paper survey in this research was mandated, thereby removing any element of self-selection and therefore sampling bias.

As with all research there are limitations. For example, in this case the existing recorded data was not complete and required some refinement as described in Appendix A. Also the sample size from the on-line survey suffered from relatively low response rates, although efforts to mitigate this were made by using different methodologies. The questions in the survey could, on reflection, have been more specific with regards to specific performance regimes to help clarity although difficulties exist in this kind of research about self-incrimination.

However, none of this is uncommon in social science research (Bachman & Schutt 2001) and the study has provided a wealth of contextual information about the intended and unintended consequences of performance management regimes.

It is not possible to establish any causal links between the different performance regimes and officer behaviour without historical experimental data or new randomised control trials. However, the results and findings may support a proposition that there could be a relationship. Furthermore, this study could provide a basis for further research to underpin an evidence-base that may influence the future decision making of policy makers including central government, Police and Crime Commissioners and senior police officers.

Conclusions and Implications

This thesis set out to describe the performance management regimes imposed on the police over the last three decades to explore the intended and unintended consequences. From a thorough examination of the available literature it is apparent that much of the implementation of governmental performance management has emphasised the reduction of 'hard' numbers of recorded crimes rather than qualitative outcomes. The analysis of broad trends over time has shown stark changes to recorded numbers that coincide with the introduction of various regimes, but the qualitative research conducted in this study suggests this may be more to do with the manipulation of figures. This clearly has implications for the public trust and confidence in the police and is an important area for study.

The relentless focus of central government on police performance has much to do with political agendas about crime rates and the fear of crime. Central to most manifestos over the years, this has produced a proliferation of different performance management regimes from successive governments introduced to improve crime figures. There has been direct government intervention, increased bureaucracy through regulation and scrutiny from inspection. The creation and use of comparative data between police forces to determine 'league tabling' of key performance areas has generated a real sense of pressure to succeed. This has been manifested firstly by police leaders and then through the ranks to include junior officers. The question of whether this pressure helped bring about the intended outcomes or engendered perverse incentives for the police to utilise non-legitimate practices was central to this study and challenged existing thinking about why this might occur.

Understanding the criminological theories of anomie and strain have provided a conceptual basis for the reasons why some individuals in police organisations resort to non-legitimate activities to achieve results against set targets. Pressure applied and felt that goes on to influence perverse and unintended behaviour seems to be analogous to anomie and strain. These theories have previously only been contextualised in American societal culture and not applied in this police performance management perspective. However, this thesis has directly considered the extent to which rates of deviance and demographic vulnerability has been relevant to unintended outcomes of performance management. This research has shown that in one police organisation a huge majority of the staff have been directly affected by performance pressure influencing their behaviour in many cases to ‘bend the rules’.

No causal inferences can be made, but a powerful argument is put forward to suggest that without absolute clarity, through strong leadership about the intended performance outcomes, there remains a strong likelihood that perverse and unintended behaviour could occur. Further research could provide a wider base of empirical evidence from across other police organisations to assist academic understanding about the applicability of anomie and strain in this context. It is useful for police leaders to understand the extent to which perverse practice occurs and the impact it has on actual crime related outcomes rather than just numbers. Equally useful would be additional research that builds on understanding the demographic vulnerabilities that may influence the rate of deviance from accepted practice.

In addition to the analysis of existing data, the different qualitative research methodologies deployed in this study showed that there were some statistically significant differences in the responses. Given the nature of the subject matter it may not be surprising that an anonymised on-line survey carried risks of sample bias, but the combined use of face-to-face surveys/interviews from stratified and randomly selected individuals provided comparative data. This combined type of research methodology would therefore seem to provide greater validity for those carrying out this kind of sensitive research.

Most of the performance management regimes studied had an associated, but often-discreet policy for implementation. The intended outcomes were described in terms of broad themes like ‘effective performance management’ or ‘improve performance’ (HMIC 1999; Home Office 2008) but this study has shown that vague messages are insufficient. Without clarity about the intended outcomes there is a real risk that misinterpretation could leave room for the perverse activities identified here to flourish. Governmental policy makers and police leaders would do well to recognise this vulnerability and heed the requirement for detail about policy implementation and specific outcomes.

The fixation on numbers, with individual forces more concerned with movement up performance ‘league tables’ has left little room for police leaders to concentrate on improving qualitative outcomes such as crime reduction, public confidence and quality of service. ACPO (2008, p.10) said that reforms to performance management have the “potential to create space” and the Single National Indicator introduced in 2009 seems to have gone some way to achieving that. The results of this study show performance pressure and non-legitimate

practices have reduced in recent times coinciding with that change of regime. However, more still needs to be done to understand and manage the impact of performance pressure if the police are to avoid recent national news headlines such as those shown in Figure 34.


Five police held over 'false crime statistics'

New challenges facing elected commissioners

Figure 34. Front-page headline – The Times, November 15 2012

As a basis for further research and experiment, this has particular relevance with directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners whose role may introduce a new political dynamic closer to operational police decision-making than ever before. The information in this analysis may be crucial for national and local policy makers to maintain and build trust and confidence in UK policing through the protection of its integrity.

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Appendix A - Data Issues

	Issue identified	Action Taken
1	Recorded and detected crime is net of 'no crimes'	Noted, No action required
2	Crime data for 1995 to 1997 was extracted electronically from the data warehouse as at the 8/6/12 as historical data had been archived. The figures will be slightly different to those previously published due to historic no-criming and reclassifications - this will be negligible and will not affect the trend over time	Noted, No action required
3	Crime data for 1998 had to be modified slightly due to 'missing' data for drugs offences (part of the 'other' category)	Noted, No action required
4	Crime data prior to 1993 is only available as 'calendar year' aggregates	All data is presented as calendar year for consistency
5	Stop and search data is available as 'calendar year' aggregates up to 1997 and from 2005 to date, but only as financial years from 1997 to 2004	Noted, No action required
6	Section 1(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2004 introduced a further category of stop and search for items of criminal damage.	The full year effect of this new category was first seen in 2004/5 when 5,646 stop and searches took place using this power. This was 7.5% of the total that year. Subsequent years identified that a similar proportion of stop and searches were undertaken using this power (8.0% 2004/5, 8.1% 2006/7, 9.9% in 2007). The total number of stop and search records each year prior to 2004 has been inflated by the average of these increases

		(8.4%) to provide a comparable dataset
7	Changes in recording mechanisms (paper and electronic) for stop and search activity render the breakdown by reason for stop incomparable	Analysis will be based on total volume and total arrests only
8	Stop and search volume and subsequent arrests are related to the number of police officers in the organisation so changes in volume of one may be a reflection of changes in the other	The risk of this distorting the analysis will be mitigated by transforming the actual number of stop and searches in a rate per 1000 police officers
9	Tickets issued for motoring offences is directly related to the number of police officers/PCSOs in the organisation so changes in volume of one may be a reflection of changes in the other	The risk of this distorting the analysis will be mitigated by transforming the actual number of tickets in a rate per 1000 police officers/PCSOs
10	Misconduct/conduct data - from 2003 to 2007 issues that failed to reach the formal complaint stage were dealt with as 'misconduct' and categorised against 12 categories. Since 2008 these have been re-labeled at 'conduct' and the categories changed to those shown	Only the 'total' row will be used to analyse these data
11	The Home Office have a set of counting rules for recording crime and, in 2002, introduced the national standard for crime recording (NCRS) to ensure consistency in the way forces applied the rules. This led to an estimated 23% increase in violent crime offences (Home Office published assessment)	In order to ensure a consistent data set prior to the introduction of the NCRS violent crime offences have been inflated by 23% and new crime totals created shown in rows 18 and 19 of the Raw Data sheet
12	There are 23 complaint categories, those most likely to be influence by officer	These 4 categories have been aggregated into a single category for

	behaviour relate to complaints of oppressive conduct or harassment, incivility, impoliteness and intolerance, lack of fairness and impartiality and discriminatory behavior	analysis shown on row 91 of the Raw Data sheet
13	Arrest data is for notifiable offences only (offences that are reported to the Home Office)	Noted, No action required
14	Arrest activity is directly related to the number of police officers and PCSOs in the organisation so changes in volume of one may be a reflection of changes in the other	The risk of this distorting the analysis will be mitigated by transforming the actual number of arrests in a rate per 1000 police officers/PCSOs
15	The complaints data is based on the number of allegations against members of the organisation, it higher than the actual number of complaints made as multiple officers could be involved in a single complaint	Noted, no action required as this is considered the most appropriate basis for analysis, given the purpose of the research
16	All complaint and conduct data is input onto the Centurion computer system in PSD. It details the people involved, the allegations, times and dates and the result/ disciplinary outcomes. Analytical software has been used to extract this data, however it is only as accurate as the information contained within the database. The figures may appear to be inflated as it shows each officer linked separately (i.e. 3 officers could be linked to the same allegation) - this is so that we can obtain the outcome for each officer. Data before 2002 is available but sporadic and not a complete and accurate picture of all cases. Historical	Noted, no action required

	paper records have either been shredded or are out of bounds due to asbestos. We do have discipline books of all misconduct hearings dating back to 1976. They detail the persons involved, the allegations and the sanctions imposed. As there were only between 10 - 20 hearings per year, a small percentage of the total complaint and misconduct cases and would not add significant weight to the data already provided.	
17	The number of complaints is related to the number of employees in the organisation so changes in volume of one may be a reflection of changes in the other	The risk of this distorting the analysis will be mitigated by transforming the actual number of complaints to a rate per 1000 employees
18	The number of crimes recorded is related to the population size and/or household volume so changes in the number of one may be a reflection of changes in the other	The risk of this distorting the analysis will be mitigated by transforming the actual number of crimes to a rate per 1000 resident population or household, as appropriate
19	The number of crimes detected is related to the volume of crime recorded so changes in one may be a reflection of changes in the other	The risk of this distorting the analysis will be mitigated by transforming the actual number of detections into a percentage of crime recorded (known as the detection rate)
20	Population figures are based on the census year findings (every 10 years) or the mid-year estimates provided by the Office for National Statistics	Noted, no action required
21	Household figures are based on the Census data or mid-year estimates	In order to have a complete dataset the missing data has been estimated

	provided by ONS, years 1982 to 1990 were not available from ONS	using the SLOPE function in Microsoft Excel to calculate the trajectory of the line for the missing years, based on the available data

Appendix B - Invitation to complete of on-line survey

Initial email:

Dear Colleague,

I am undertaking research, supported by Cambridge University into the consequences of different performance regimes. Specifically, I am looking at the pressures that police officers feel when external or internal performance scrutiny takes place.

Depending on your length of service, you may have experienced scrutiny such as the Street Crime Initiative, where the Home Secretary intervened in the way that forces responded to increasing trends in robbery and snatch theft or the introduction of IMPACT (individual officer performance monitoring) or other changes in the way that performance was managed.

I am interested in how you and your colleagues dealt with these changes.

Can you please take the time to complete a survey, accessed via the link below, to help us in the development and implementation of performance regimes in the future across West Yorkshire police.

The survey should only take 5 minutes of your time to complete and is completely anonymous.

Click here to access the survey

Thank you

John Parkinson
Deputy Chief Constable

Follow up email:

Dear colleague,

Thank-you to those who have completed my questionnaire about performance regimes, so far I have had just over 600 responses. It is really important I get as many views as possible to influence future policy and so I would encourage you to complete it. There is still time for you to make a valuable contribution to this research and so if you haven't already done so please click on the link below and complete the survey.

Survey link

Many thanks,

John Parkinson
Deputy Chief Constable

Appendix C – Performance Timeline



Appendix D – Conduct Timeline



Appendix E - Survey Questionnaire

WEST YORKSHIRE POLICE

Assessment of the consequences of performance management regimes in West Yorkshire

Key events that have been intended to improve performance such as the introduction of
policing by objectives in 1983 (Home Office),
police discipline (complaints) regulations 1985 (Legislation),
Individual Officer Monitoring (IMPACT) in 1998 (Force Policy),
Performance Indicators (BVPIs/KPIs) in 1999 (Home Office),
the Street Crime Initiative in 2002 (Home Secretary),
the Single National Indicator in 2009 (Home Secretary),
may have influenced the way in which forces manage performance.

In order to help our understanding of the consequences that performance regimes may have on shaping officer behaviour, could you please take 5 - 10 minutes to answer the following questions. This survey is completely anonymous and is for the purpose of academic research.

Crime recording

Q1. Reducing burglary dwelling, robbery and theft are key priorities for the force and are therefore subject to central and local performance scrutiny, with this in mind...

Have you ever felt under pressure to record what is, given the circumstances, more likely to be one of the above as an alternative crime type e.g. record a burglary as a 'damage to dwelling' in order to reduce the recording of priority crime ?

○ *Never* ○ *Only recently (last 12 months)* ○ *Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)* ○ *Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)* ○ *Always*

Q1a. If so, do you believe this made a difference to the quality and completeness of the crime investigation?

○ *No difference* ○ *Some difference* ○ *A lot of difference*

Q1b. If so, did this impact on service delivery to the victim?

○ *No impact* ○ *Some impact* ○ *A lot of impact*

Q1c. How were you put under pressure?

Q2. Reducing crime overall is also a priority for the force and is therefore subject to central and local performance scrutiny, with this in mind …

To your knowledge have you or others ever felt under pressure to dissuade a victim from reporting a crime purely in order to reduce the recording of crime?

○ *Never* ○ *Only recently (last 12 months)* ○ *Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)* ○ *Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)* ○ *Always*

Q2a. If so, did you try to dissuade a victim from reporting a crime?

○ *Yes* ○ *No*

Q2b. Because of this pressure have you required victims to provide additional evidence that an offence has occurred?

○ *Yes* ○ *No*

Q3. Have you ever felt under pressure to re-classify or under-record offences purely to reduce the recording of a particular crime/incident types?

○ *Never* ○ *Only recently (last 12 months)* ○ *Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)* ○ *Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)* ○ *Always*

Q4. Have you ever felt that your supervisors have been put under pressure to re-classify or under-record offences purely to reduce the recording of a particular crime/incident types?

○ *Never* ○ *Only recently (last 12 months)* ○ *Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)* ○ *Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)* ○ *Always*

Q5. Managers and supervisors give mixed messages about our values / integrity regarding crime recording

○ *Strongly agree* ○ *Agree* ○ *Neither agree nor disagree* ○ *Disagree* ○ *Strongly disagree*

Detecting crime

Q6. Have you ever felt pressured to boost your individual or divisional detection rates with questionable offences taken into consideration (TICs)?

○ *Never* ○ *Only recently (last 12 months)* ○ *Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)* ○ *Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)* ○ *Always*

Police initiated contact

Q7. Have you ever been set performance targets that have caused you to feel you needed to exercise any of the following powers?

			Yes, in relation to					
	Never	*Always*	*policing by objectives*	*police discipline regulations*	*individual officer monitoring*	*Performance Indicators*	*Street Crime initiative*	*the Single National Indicator*
a. Stop and Search	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. Tickets	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c. Arrests	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Q8. Has performance pressure led to you behaving in a way which has resulted in a ...

	Never	*Only recently (last 12 months)*	*Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)*	*Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)*	*Always*
a. Complaint from the public	○	○	○	○	○
b. Internal investigation	○	○	○	○	○

Demographics

Division

- ○ *North West Leeds*
- ○ *North East Leeds*
- ○ *City and Holbeck*
- ○ *Wakefield*
- ○ *Kirklees*
- ○ *Calderdale*
- ○ *Bradford South*
- ○ *Airedale and North Bradford*
- ○ *Prefer not to say*

Rank

- ○ *Constable*
- ○ *Sergeant*
- ○ *Inspector*
- ○ *Chief Inspector*
- ○ *Superintendent*
- ○ *Chief Superintendent*
- ○ *Chief Officer*
- ○ *Prefer not to say*

Length of service

- ○ *0 to 4 years*
- ○ *5 to 9 years*
- ○ *10 to 13 years*
- ○ *14 to 19 years*
- ○ *20 to 25 years*
- ○ *26 years plus*
- ○ *Prefer not to say*

Gender

- ○ *Female*
- ○ *Male*
- ○ *Prefer not to say*

Age

- ○ *16 to 24*
- ○ *25 to 34*
- ○ *35 to 44*
- ○ *45 to 54*
- ○ *55 to 64*
- ○ *65 or above*
- ○ *Prefer not to say*

Thank-you for taking the time to complete this survey and helping our understanding of performance management regimes.

Appendix F - Survey Questionnaire Analysis Output

Q1. Have you ever felt under pressure to record what is given the circumstances, more likely to be one of the above (burglary dwelling, robbery and theft) as an alternative crime type in order to reduce the recording of a priority crime?

Frequency count and percentage of responses

Q1. Have you ever felt under pressure to record what is given the circumstances, more likely to be one of the above as an alternative crime type in order to reduce the recording of a priority crime?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never	244	31.2	31.6	31.6
	Only recently (last 12 months)	45	5.8	5.8	37.4
	Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)	172	22.0	22.3	59.7
	Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)	209	26.8	27.1	86.8
	Always	102	13.1	13.2	100.0
	Total	772	98.8	100.0	
Missing	System	9	1.2		
Total		781	100.0		



Breakdown for officers who never felt pressure compared to those who had

Question / Survey type	Demographic	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q1. On-Line & Paper	All Supervisory ranks	95	44.0%	216	35.8%	265	170	36.8%	462	64.2%	265	X^2 (1, N=678) = 3.191, p=0.074	1.35
	Constables	121	56.0%	216	29.3%	413	292	63.2%	462	70.7%	413		
	Length of service > 10 Years	178	79.5%	224	32.2%	553	375	76.5%	490	67.8%	553	X^2 (1, N=714) = 0.758, p=0.384	1.19
	Length of service < 10 Years	46	20.5%	224	28.6%	161	115	23.5%	490	71.4%	161		
	Gender - Male	160	73.4%	218	32.6%	491	331	70.9%	467	67.4%	491	X^2 (1, N=685) = 0.464, p=0.496	1.13
	Gender - Female	58	26.6%	218	29.9%	194	136	29.1%	467	70.1%	194		
	Age >35 years	172	82.3%	209	33.7%	511	339	74.5%	455	66.3%	511	**X^2 (1, N=664) = 4.902, p=0.027**	**1.59**
	Age <35 years	37	17.7%	209	24.2%	153	116	25.5%	455	75.8%	153		

Q1a. If so, do you believe this made a difference to the quality and completeness of the crime investigation?

Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	No difference					Some or a lot of difference					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q1a	Paper	34	24.8%	137	41.0%	83	49	12.5%	393	59.0%	83	**X^2 (1, N=530) = 11.73, p=0.001**	**2.32**
	On-line	103	75.2%	137	23.0%	447	344	87.5%	393	77.0%	447		

Demographic variables having a significant impact on the on-line responses

Question / Survey type	Demographic	No difference					Some or a lot of difference					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q1a. On-Line	All Supervisory ranks	46	51.7%	89	29.7%	155	109	35.2%	310	70.3%	155	**X^2 (1, N=399) = 7.948, p=0.005**	**1.97**
	Constables	43	48.3%	89	17.6%	244	201	64.8%	310	82.4%	244		
	Age >35 years	74	83.1%	89	25.3%	293	219	72.8%	301	74.7%	293	**X^2 (1, N=390) = 3.967, p=0.046**	**1.85**
	Age <35 years	15	16.9%	89	15.5%	97	82	27.2%	301	84.5%	97		

Demographic variables having a significant impact on the paper responses

Question / Survey type	Demographic	No difference					Some or a lot of difference					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q1a. Paper	Age >35 years	22	91.7%	24	47.8%	46	24	63.2%	38	52.2%	46	**X^2 (1, N=62) = 6.244, p=0.012**	**6.42**
	Age <35 years	2	8.3%	24	12.5%	16	14	36.8%	38	87.5%	16		

Q1b. If so, did this impact on service delivery to the victim?

Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	No impact					Some or a lot of impact					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q1b	Paper	40	21.5%	186	48.8%	82	42	12.0%	349	51.2%	82	**X^2 (1, N=535) = 8.386, p=0.004**	**2.00**
	On-line	146	78.5%	186	32.2%	453	307	88.0%	349	67.8%	453		

Q1c. How were you put under pressure?

Coded responses to on-line and paper survey

Q1c. How were you put under pressure?							
	Code text	On-Line		Paper		Total	
		Count	Column N %	Count	Column N %	Count	Column N %
1	Pressure from specialist departments e.g. CID, DI or DS	118	31.9%	11	20.0%	129	30.4%
2	General pressure to reduce figures	85	23.0%	14	25.5%	99	23.3%
3	Pressure from supervision	72	19.5%	14	25.5%	86	20.2%
4	Pressure on recording burglaries	58	15.7%	12	21.8%	70	16.5%
5	Negative impact on officers	46	12.4%	5	9.1%	51	12.0%
6	Negative impact on victim	46	12.4%	4	7.3%	50	11.8%
7	General pressure from managers, peers, organisation, crime evaluators	32	8.6%	4	7.3%	36	8.5%
8	Pressure from senior managers	28	7.6%	4	7.3%	32	7.5%
9	Pressure on recording robberies	27	7.3%	3	5.5%	30	7.1%
10	Pressure from performance management products or processes e.g. Team performance meetings, Operational Performance Reviews, targets	20	5.4%	0	0.0%	20	4.7%
11	Pressure on supervision	10	2.7%	0	0.0%	10	2.4%
12	CID/Specialist depts avoid recording crimes which their depts would investigate to reduce their workloads	8	2.2%	0	0.0%	8	1.9%
13	Pressure on recording vehicle crimes	8	2.2%	0	0.0%	8	1.9%
14	Personal pressure to do a good job (ensuring allegations are legitimate)	5	1.4%	3	5.5%	8	1.9%
15	No pressure - force scrutiny to correctly record is robust	5	1.4%	1	1.8%	6	1.4%
16	Hotspot analysis/CPA/Op optimal mislead by false recording	4	1.1%	0	0.0%	4	0.9%
17	Crimes recorded as a lesser offence until unless detected	4	1.1%	0	0.0%	4	0.9%
18	Pressure on probation or newly qualified officers (less pressure on officers with longer service)	3	0.8%	0	0.0%	3	0.7%
19	No impact on victim	3	0.8%	0	0.0%	3	0.7%
	Total	370	100.0%	55	100.0%	425	100.0%



Q2. To your knowledge, have you or others ever felt under pressure to dissuade a victim from reporting a crime purely in order to reduce the recording of crime?

Frequency count and percentage of responses

Q2. To your knowledge have you or others ever felt under pressure to dissuade a victim from reporting a crime purely in order to reduce the recording of crime?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never	600	76.8	77.5	77.5
	Only recently (last 12 months)	13	1.7	1.7	79.2
	Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)	48	6.1	6.2	85.4
	Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)	95	12.2	12.3	97.7
	Always	18	2.3	2.3	100.0
	Total	774	99.1	100.0	
Missing	System	7	.9		
Total		781	100.0		



Q2a. If so did you try to dissuade a victim from reporting a crime?

Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	No					Yes					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q2a	Paper	59	36.9%	160	90.8%	65	6	10.2%	59	9.2%	65	**X^2 (1, N=219) = 14.729, p=0**	**5.16**
	On-line	101	63.1%	160	65.6%	154	53	89.8%	59	34.4%	154		

Q2b. because of this pressure, have you required victims to provide additional evidence that an offence has occurred?

Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	No					Yes					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q2b	Paper	49	45.0%	109	79.0%	62	13	12.1%	107	21.0%	62	**X^2 (1, N=216) = 28.394, p=0**	**5.91**
	On-line	60	55.0%	109	39.0%	154	94	87.9%	107	61.0%	154		

Q3. Have you ever felt under pressure to reclassify or under record offences purely to reduce the recording of a particular crime/incident type?

Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q3	Paper	42	15.8%	266	43.8%	96	54	10.7%	504	56.3%	96	**X^2 (1, N=770) = 4.109, p=0.043**	**1.56**
	On-line	224	84.2%	266	33.2%	674	450	89.3%	504	66.8%	674		

Frequency count and percentage of responses

Q3. Have you ever felt under pressure to re-classify or under-record offences purely to reduce the recording of a particular crime/incident types?

		Survey Type		Total
		On-Line	Paper	
Never	Count	224	42	266
	% within Survey Type	33.2%	43.8%	34.5%
Only recently (last 12 months)	Count	46	3	49
	% within Survey Type	6.8%	3.1%	6.4%
Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)	Count	155	22	177
	% within Survey Type	23.0%	22.9%	23.0%
Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)	Count	192	24	216
	% within Survey Type	28.5%	25.0%	28.1%
Always	Count	57	5	62
	% within Survey Type	8.5%	5.2%	8.1%
Total	Count	674	96	770
	% within Survey Type	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%



Q4. Have you ever felt that your supervisors have been put under pressure to reclassify or under record offences purely to reduce the recording of a particular crime/incident type?

Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q3	Paper	42	15.8%	266	43.8%	96	54	10.7%	504	56.3%	96	**X^2 (1, N=770) = 4.109, p=0.043**	**1.56**
	On-line	224	84.2%	266	33.2%	674	450	89.3%	504	66.8%	674		

Frequency count and percentage of responses

Q4. Have you ever felt that your supervisors have been put under pressure to re-classify or under-record offences purely to reduce the recording of a particular crime/incident types?

		Survey Type		Total
		On-Line	Paper	
Never	Count	195	39	234
	% within Survey Type	29.0%	39.0%	30.3%
Only recently (last 12 months)	Count	50	6	56
	% within Survey Type	7.4%	6.0%	7.3%
Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)	Count	152	20	172
	% within Survey Type	22.6%	20.0%	22.3%
Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)	Count	182	30	212
	% within Survey Type	27.1%	30.0%	27.5%
Always	Count	93	5	98
	% within Survey Type	13.8%	5.0%	12.7%
Total	Count	672	100	772
	% within Survey Type	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%



Demographic variables having a significant impact on the on-line responses.

Question / Survey type	Demographic	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q4. On-line	Length of service < 10 Years	51	28.3%	180	36.2%	141	90	20.2%	445	63.8%	141	**X^2 (1, N=625) = 4.823, p=0.028**	**1.56**
	Length of service > 10 Years	129	71.7%	180	26.7%	484	355	79.8%	445	73.3%	484		

Q5. Managers and supervisors give mixed messages about our values/integrity about crime recording?

Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	Disagree					Agree					X^2	OR
		n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q5	On-line	150	82.9%	181	31.5%	476	326	90.8%	359	68.5%	476	**X^2 (1, N=540) = 7.252, p=0.007**	**2.04**
	Paper	31	17.1%	181	48.4%	64	33	9.2%	359	51.6%	64		

Demographic variables having a significant impact on the on-line responses.

Question / Survey type	Demographic	Disagree					Agree					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q5. On-line	Constables	49	37.4%	131	20.1%	244	195	66.1%	295	79.9%	244	**X^2 (1, N=426) = 30.529, p=0**	**3.26**
	All Supervisory ranks	82	62.6%	131	45.1%	182	100	33.9%	295	54.9%	182		

Q6. Have you ever felt pressured to boost your individual or divisional detection rates with questionable offences taken into consideration (TICs)?

Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q6	Paper	79	14.6%	541	79.8%	99	20	8.7%	229	20.2%	99	**X^2 (1, N=770) = 4.946, p=0.026**	**1.79**
	On-line	462	85.4%	541	68.9%	671	209	91.3%	229	31.1%	671		

Frequency count and percentage of responses

Q6. Have you ever felt pressured to boost your individual or divisional detection rates with questionable offences taken into consideration (TICs)?

		Survey Type		Total
		On-Line	Paper	
Never	Count	462	79	541
	% within Survey Type	68.9%	79.8%	70.3%
Only recently (last 12 months)	Count	18	3	21
	% within Survey Type	2.7%	3.0%	2.7%
Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)	Count	40	5	45
	% within Survey Type	6.0%	5.1%	5.8%
Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)	Count	129	11	140
	% within Survey Type	19.2%	11.1%	18.2%
Always	Count	22	1	23
	% within Survey Type	3.3%	1.0%	3.0%
Total	Count	671	99	770
	% within Survey Type	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%



Demographic variables having a significant impact on the on-line responses

Question / Survey type	Demographic	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q6. On-line	Length of service < 10 Years	108	25.2%	428	78.3%	138	30	15.4%	195	21.7%	138	**X^2 (1, N=623) = 7.536, p=0.006**	**1.86**
	Length of service > 10 Years	320	74.8%	428	66.0%	485	165	84.6%	195	34.0%	485		

Q7. Have you ever been set performance targets that have caused you to feel you needed to exercise any of the following powers? (Stop and search, issue of FPNs, make arrests)

Comparison of survey methodology

Question	Methodology	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q7 - Stop and Search	Paper	34	19.4%	175	34.3%	99	65	11.0%	592	65.7%	99	**X^2 (1, N=767) = 8.577, p=0.003**	**1.96**
	On-line	141	80.6%	175	21.1%	668	527	89.0%	592	78.9%	668		
Q7 - Tickets	Paper	48	15.6%	308	49.5%	97	49	11.5%	427	50.5%	97	X^2 (1, N=735) = 2.637, p=0.104	1.42
	On-line	260	84.4%	308	40.8%	638	378	88.5%	427	59.2%	638		
Q7 - Arrests	Paper	36	17.9%	201	38.3%	94	58	10.5%	551	61.7%	94	**X^2 (1, N=752) = 7.342, p=0.007**	**1.85**
	On-line	165	82.1%	201	25.1%	658	493	89.5%	551	74.9%	658		

Frequency count and percentage of responses

Q7. Have you ever been set performance targets that have caused you to feel you needed to exercise any of the following powers?

		Survey Type					
		On-Line		Paper		Total	
		Count	Column N %	Count	Column N %	Count	Column N %
StopSearch	Never felt pressure	141	21.1%	34	34.3%	175	22.8%
	Always	142	21.3%	15	15.2%	157	20.5%
	policing by objectives	105	15.7%	7	7.1%	112	14.6%
	police discipline regulations	15	2.2%	0	0.0%	15	2.0%
	individual officer monitoring	258	38.6%	23	23.2%	281	36.6%
	Performance Indicators	394	59.0%	48	48.5%	442	57.6%
	Street Crime initiative	90	13.5%	5	5.1%	95	12.4%
	the Single National Indicator	17	2.5%	1	1.0%	18	2.3%
Tickets	Never	260	40.8%	48	49.5%	308	41.9%
	Always	75	11.8%	9	9.3%	84	11.4%
	policing by objectives	57	8.9%	5	5.2%	62	8.4%
	police discipline regulations	7	1.1%	0	0.0%	7	1.0%
	individual officer monitoring	197	30.9%	18	18.6%	215	29.3%
	Performance Indicators	266	41.7%	35	36.1%	301	41.0%
	Street Crime initiative	23	3.6%	0	0.0%	23	3.1%
	the Single National Indicator	12	1.9%	0	0.0%	12	1.6%
Arrests	Never	165	25.1%	36	38.3%	201	26.7%
	Always	109	16.6%	13	13.8%	122	16.2%
	policing by objectives	86	13.1%	6	6.4%	92	12.2%
	police discipline regulations	11	1.7%	0	0.0%	11	1.5%
	individual officer monitoring	251	38.1%	19	20.2%	270	35.9%
	Performance Indicators	364	55.3%	41	43.6%	405	53.9%
	Street Crime initiative	54	8.2%	4	4.3%	58	7.7%
	the Single National Indicator	15	2.3%	0	0.0%	15	2.0%



Demographic variables having a significant impact on the on-line responses

Question / Survey type	Methodology	Never Felt Pressure (NFP)					Felt Pressure (FP)					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q7 On-Line - Tickets	Length of service < 10 Years	68	28.1%	242	50.4%	135	67	19.1%	351	49.6%	135	**X^2 (1, N=593) = 6.615, p=0.01**	**1.66**
	Length of service > 10 Years	174	71.9%	242	38.0%	458	284	80.9%	351	62.0%	458		

Q8a. Has performance pressure led to you behaving in a way, which has resulted in a complaint from the public?

Frequency count and percentage of responses

Q8a. Has performance pressure led to you behaving in a way, which has resulted in a complaint from the public?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never	658	84.3	85.2	85.2
	Only recently (last 12 months)	12	1.5	1.6	86.8
	Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)	29	3.7	3.8	90.5
	Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)	64	8.2	8.3	98.8
	Always	9	1.2	1.2	100.0
	Total	772	98.8	100.0	
Missing	System	9	1.2		
Total		781	100.0		



Q8b. Has performance pressure led to you behaving in a way, which has resulted in an internal investigation?

Frequency count and percentage of responses

Q8b. Has Performance pressure led to you behaving in a way which has resulted in an Internal investigation?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never	691	88.5	90.7	90.7
	Only recently (last 12 months)	8	1.0	1.0	91.7
	Only in the recent past (12 mths to 5 years)	23	2.9	3.0	94.8
	Only in the distant past (more than 5 yrs)	38	4.9	5.0	99.7
	Always	2	.3	.3	100.0
	Total	762	97.6	100.0	
Missing	System	19	2.4		
Total		781	100.0		



Demographic variables having a significant impact on the responses

Question / Survey type	Demographic	Never had pressure					Pressure led to an internal Investigation					X^2	OR
		n	%within NFP	N of NFP	% within row variable	N of row variable	n	%within FP	N of FP	% within row variable	N of row variable		
Q8b. On-Line & Paper	Length of service < 10 Years	154	24.0%	643	96.3%	160	6	9.4%	64	3.8%	160	**X^2 (1, N=707) = 7.062, p=0.008**	**3.04**
	Length of service > 10 Years	489	76.0%	643	89.4%	547	58	90.6%	64	10.6%	547		