The pursuit of cohesion: an exploratory study of the values of, and relationship between Heads of Security and Heads of Safety in prisons

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**Abstract**

Research on prison staff and managers has evidenced that values and relationships influence behaviours and contribute to the moral performance of prisons. Yet little is known about the values of and interactions between Heads of Security and Safety despite their responsibility for the most complex and high-risk functions within their establishments. In the context of rising violence, criminality and drug-use within prisons, cohesive working between these two functions is necessary but not always a reality.

This study explores the values of Heads of Security and Safety in Category B local prisons and whether their working personality and values have been shaped by their distinct roles. The study also examines the relationship and interactions between these individuals and to what extent they work together to achieve shared objectives.

This mixed methods study drew upon a survey based on Valerie Braithwaite’s harmony and security value balance model and semi-structured interviews with ten ‘pairs’ of safety and security governors. This research found that there was continual interaction between an individual’s values and their specific job role and operational managers usually demonstrated stronger commitment to values relevant to their role. In addition, the increasing importance of managerialism was found to influence priorities and working practices.

Four different patterns of behaviours between security and safety managers were identified: *silod*, *boundaried*, *supportive* and *cohesive*. These modes of working were distinguished by varying degrees of mutual understanding of priorities and effective communication. The Governing Governor, wider staffing group and resourcing were found to influence the nature of these relationships.
These findings invite further research on the decision-making processes of operational managers and their influence in wider prison culture and encourage organisational reflection on how to more effectively promote collaborative working to achieve safety and security objectives.
**Student Declaration**

I declare that this thesis is not more than 18,000 words in length (including notes, but excluding contents pages, abstract, acknowledgements, list of acronyms, appendices and references). The total word count is 17,992.

I confirm that this thesis does not include any material that has previously been, or is currently being, submitted for any purpose other than the M.St. examination.

Except as indicated by specific references to or acknowledgements of other sources, this thesis is my own original work.

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List of Acronyms

HMIP Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons
HMPPS Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service
JC Justice Committee
MoJ Ministry of Justice
OSAG Operational and System Assurance Group
PGA Prison Governors’ Association
SOCT Security, Organised Crime and Terrorism Directorate
SMT Senior Management Team
1. Introduction

Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) has faced growing media and ministerial attention following rising violence, self-harm and suicides in prisons and breaches of physical security (MoJ, 2019b; BBC, 2019a; BBC, 2019b). Advances in technology and drugs have contributed to increased difficulties in preventing the supply of illicit articles which is a driver for drug use, debt, self-harm and a culture of violence in prisons. In response, HMPPS introduced ‘special measures’ to provide additional oversight in prisons considered to be facing the most significant challenges and failing to provide safe and decent regimes (Justice Committee, 2019). Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP) introduced a process of ‘urgent notification’ to highlight prisons giving rise to substantial safety and decency failings following inspection (HMIP, 2017). To date at least sixteen prisons have been subject to special measures and six prisons have been issued with urgent notification notices (Justice Committee, 2019; HMIP, 2019). This crisis has resulted in former Prisons Ministers pledging increased investment into safety departments (MoJ, 2016) and most recently the launch of the ‘ten prisons project’ to invest in and improve standards and security in some of the most challenging jails (MoJ, 2019a). At the time of writing, Category B local prisons were disproportionately impacted by these initiatives with fourteen local prisons subject to special measures, five having been issued with an urgent notification and six identified for the ‘ten prisons project’. This category will therefore be the focus of this study.

Keeping prisons safe and secure requires balancing the rights and well-being of individual prisoners with control measures to protect the public and those within the walls of the establishment. Research into prison work has described the conflict faced by prison officers when balancing these welfare and security duties (e.g. Crawley, 2004). This research has
extended into studies of Governing Governors, their personal values and an understanding that the Governor can influence the moral texture of their establishment (Bryans, 2007; Crewe & Liebling, 2012). Therefore, values matter and influence how managers make decisions and prioritise organisational objectives that affect the lives of their staff and prisoners in their care (Liebling, 2004; Bennett, 2015; Liebling & Crewe, 2016).

This study focuses on Heads of Security and Heads of Safety\(^1\) as the roles that manage the most serious risks within the establishment. This research gives an insight into the importance of values, impact of job role and peer-relationships in prisons from the perspective of safety and security governors who have been neglected in research to date. Bennett’s study of prison managers (2015) highlights that working practices are derived from the interaction between an individual’s agency and societal or organisational structures. This study addresses a gap in this literature by exploring how particular prison management roles influence or are influenced by values.

There is scarce work on operational managers who form the Senior Management Team (SMT) and how these individuals work together to implement the Governing Governor’s strategy and influence staff (Brookes, Smith & Bennett 2008; Bennett, 2015). This is an oversight as operational managers oversee the daily management of the prison regime, manage incidents involving prisoners, such as self-harm and acts of violence as duty governor, and deliver their own functional priorities. The Prison Governors Association (PGA) has argued that increased numbers of incidents, a more complex prison population and the consequent scrutiny has increased the workload and pressures of operational

\(^1\) Head of Safety or safety governor will be used to refer to the operational manager responsible for the safety function e.g. Head of Residence and Safety or Head of Safer custody or Head of Safety and Equalities.
managers (PGA, 2018). As violence, crime and suicides in prisons rise, understanding the individual managers responsible for the day-to-day management of these complex issues is necessary.

Previous research has highlighted the impact that relationships between staff and prisoners and staff and management have on prison culture and the experiences of those living and working within establishments (Liebling & Price, 2001; Liebling, 2004; Bennett, 2015). Yet, no research to date has explored the nature of relationships between senior managers. This study gives an insight into the working lives of operational managers in some of the most complex prisons in England and Wales and contributes to the growing body of literature exploring the complex relational environment of prisons where values and priorities often clash.

The structure of HMPPS creates a division between security and safety work from a policy and oversight perspective. In simplified terms, safety work refers to reducing suicides, self-harm and violence whilst security focusses on preventing escapes and trafficking of illicit articles including drugs. Two separate audits for security and for safety have recently been introduced by the Operational and System Assurance Group (OSAG) which aim to provide a more in-depth and comprehensive audit of safety and security processes. The Security, Crime and Terrorism directorate (SOCT) appears to work largely independently from the Safety Group and regional meetings with establishment leads are held separately. There are therefore no notable examples of joint-working or collaborative policies at this level.

This separation is reflected in the management structure within the establishment with distinct security and safety functions within individual prisons. However, the work of safety and security departments is inextricably linked, particularly with regards to prevention of violence and tackling the drug culture. A recent Justice Committee (JC) report highlights
that performance matrices have been heavily weighted towards safety and security outcomes (JC, 2019). The Committee welcomed a £100 million investment to improve security but called for a dual approach to safety and rehabilitation. A study of the interaction between security and safety departments within establishments is therefore timely as the need for effective working partnerships and inter-departmental cohesion is crucial to tackle the complex challenges faced by HMPPS.

This work hopes to stimulate organisational reflection within HMPPS on the value-orientations of operational managers and the relationship between security and safer custody functions. It is hoped that a greater understanding of those managing the operational delivery of these priorities and what facilitates effective working partnerships will encourage improved organisational cohesion in order to effectively achieve shared goals.
2. Literature Review

Prison managers are an under-studied group who play a significant role in prison management through the translation of organisational priorities and visions into practical strategies that front-line staff can make work on the ground (Brookes et al, 2008). There is limited research on prison management and no literature on safety and security managers in prisons and the relationships between them. This review will therefore focus on the research on prison managers, which has focussed principally on Governing Governors (e.g. Rutherford, 1993; Bryans, 2007; Crewe & Liebling, 2012; Liebling & Crewe, 2013; 2016) with very few exceptions (Brookes et al, 2008; Bennett, 2015). Wider prison research relating to the impact of values, culture and relationships will be drawn on as well as Braithwaite’s value balance model (Braithwaite, 1994).

2.1 Prison Managers

Liebling argues that:

“The role of Governors in shaping the quality of life in prison is crucial…Their abilities, interpretations of their role, and the values they bring to it influence life in an establishment to a very significant extent” (2004: 376-374)

The literature exploring the differing approaches and underlying values of Governing Governors is likely to help us to understand the approaches of different operational managers and an insight into the wider hierarchical culture in which operational managers work. Research has shown that values matter in prisons and influence the experience of staff and prisoners alike (e.g. Liebling, 2004; Tait, 2011; Bennett, 2015). It is therefore argued that the values of operational managers are likely to significantly impact the work delivered by
themselves and their staff in their area of responsibility. Motivation for joining the service, personal and professional experiences as well as the political landscape they work in moulds a governor’s working personality (Rutherford, 1993; Crewe & Liebling, 2012).

Recent research on prison managers has developed Rutherford’s work on the three working ‘credos’ of criminal justice practitioners: punishment, humanity and efficiency (Rutherford, 1993; Crewe & Liebling. 2012; Bennett, 2015). The most recent typology of Governing Governors by Liebling and Crewe (2012) describes six types of prison manager: operators, idealists, managerialists, entrepreneurs, moral dualists and the alienated. Underlying these typologies are distinct attitudes regarding the moral status of prisoners and the means and ends of imprisonment (Rutherford, 1993; Crewe & Liebling, 2012). Rutherford recognised that “the relationship between values and a person’s work must be regarded as a dynamic and developmental process” (Rutherford, 1993: 10). Liebling and Crewe (2016) accepted that individuals will sit at the edges of the varying approaches. Bennett (2015) critiqued these typologies for being too neat in what is a very complex social environment. He usefully divided the values expressed by prison managers in his study as relating to punishment and security; reform, rehabilitation and humane treatment and professionalism, but found there was continual overlap between Rutherford’s traditional credos.

**Punishment**

The punishment credo is characterised by a disdain for prisoners and unfettered power being wielded by the authorities (Rutherford, 1993). Bennett (2015) found that these attitudes were less likely to be expressed overtly by managers as this was not seen as organisationally acceptable. Crewe and Liebling (2012) found that many modern governors had a sense of belief in ‘just deserts’ punishment and individual ‘responsibilisation’. Bennett extended this credo to include managers’ attitudes towards security and order and distinguished between
those for whom security is of the utmost importance and both a means and an end, whilst for others, security is the means to achieve performance targets or positive outcomes, such as safety and rehabilitation (Bennett, 2015; Zedner, 2009).

Although not related to prison managers, two distinct typologies of security manager are described by Gill, Burns-Howell, Keats and Taylor (2007): the traditionalist and the modern entrepreneur. The traditionalist, often from a military background, enforces security as the dominating feature of the business regardless of cost and measuring success through security outcomes i.e. arrests. The modern entrepreneur is more integrated into the wider activities of the business and recognises the importance of influencing people, implementing change and cost-effectiveness (Gill et al, 2007). Strong commitment to security objectives therefore does not always tie in with traditional punitiveness demonstrating the complex interplay of different values and objectives (Bennett, 2015).

**Humanity**

The humanity credo reflected liberal-humanitarian ideals and encompassed values of compassion and empathy towards offenders, optimism and a commitment to rehabilitation and wider penal reform (Rutherford, 1993; Bryans, 2007). Crewe and Liebling (2016) distinguish between the ‘old-style’ of liberal-idealists as described by Rutherford, who were considered moral guardians of the service and who critiqued brutality and inhumanity in the system, and a younger generation of liberals. These modern liberals also believed in compassion, fairness, optimism for rehabilitation and social reform. Unlike their more romantic predecessors, they demonstrated a greater dedication to security and control and focus on positive outcomes for wider society rather than improving lives of individuals (Crewe and Liebling, 2016). Bennett (2015) reaffirmed that the humanity credo had evolved and found that for some ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘decency’ were seen by some managers as
prescribed organisational objectives. Yet, the notion of rehabilitation could also be interpreted more punitively as compelling prisoners to conform and comply with societal norms and prison rules. These findings once again blurred the lines between humanity, punishment and managerialism. Governors described by Liebling and Crewe (2016) as alienated, were those that had become disillusioned and isolated as a result of their more absolute approaches, at both ends of the humanitarian-punishment spectrum.

**Efficiency**

The rise of managerialism and bureaucracy was central to Rutherford’s efficiency credo. This approach is described as being detached from a moral discourse and focussed on getting the job done (Rutherford, 1993). This ‘new penology’ of the early nineties, which focussed on minimising risk of groups of offenders and measuring the efficacy of systems rather than rehabilitation and individual prisoners’ needs, was met with cynicism by some academics (Simon & Feeley, 1992). Conversely, the benefits of uniformed standards and accountability structures were used by senior practitioners to champion progressive agendas and encourage practices aimed at improving the quality of imprisonment (Wheatley, 2005; Whitty, 2011). Liebling (2004) described this as a new working credo focussing on the effectiveness of imprisonment which superseded and incorporated, to varying degrees, aspects of all three credos.

The expansion of managerialist practices, often referred to as the ‘audit explosion’, impacted the work of prison managers considerably (Power, 1996; Bryans, 2008; Bennett, 2015). Researchers have found that delivering results and performance targets is often prioritised over maintaining order and safety by middle-managers (Brookes et al, 2008). Concern with meeting performance targets can therefore dilute commitment to personal values relating to the humanity and punishment credo (Bennett, 2015; Liebling & Crewe, 2016). Greater
emphasis on controlling budgets and accountability has increased the complexity of and scrutiny over prison management (Bryans, 2008; Bennett, 2015). Liebling and Crewe (2013) have tried to make sense of the relationship between values and managerialism by distinguishing between “managerialism plus” and “managerialism minus” (Liebling & Crewe, 2013: 292). Managerialism plus is the use of managerialist structure in the pursuit of moral objectives. However, managerialism-minus describes the over-focus on targets and an emphasis on delivering cost-effective justice to the detriment of prison regimes and prison stability (Liebling & Crewe, 2013).

The most recent studies of prison managers suggest managerialists are emerging as the dominating type, and that traditional liberal-humanitarian values are in decline (Crewe & Liebling, 2012; Liebling & Crewe, 2016). Bennett (2015) also found that managers felt an “intensified and personalised commitment to meeting managerial targets” which for some was alongside an ethical dimension and commitment to having the right relationships with staff and prisoners (Bennett, 2015: 128). There was therefore “a dynamic tension and balancing between managerialism, organisational culture and individual values” (Bennett, 2015: 128). This suggests a conflict between managerialism plus and minus approaches and reinforces the difficulty faced by managers working in a dynamic people-orientated organisation with a growing performance culture.

There is evidence that an individual’s values interact with managerialist expectations and managerialism is not as absolute as sometimes presented. Managerialism may constrain scope for individuality or creativity (Bryans, 2008). Yet, Cheliotis (2006) argues that there remains space for discretion and individual interpretation of managerialist targets which can prevent managerialism eroding the delivery of justice. This comes down to the individual agency of managers who are able to make nuanced choices between rebellious resistance
and absolute compliance to organisational expectations. Cheliotis argues that this is necessary to ensure that the core aims of the criminal justice system are not undermined by “overly technocratic agendas” (2008: 257). Nonetheless, Bennett (2015) argues that organisational structure undoubtedly limits the extent to which this autonomy can be exercised and is thus likely to impact upon the working lives of safety and security governors.

This literature highlights the diverse range of approaches amongst prison governors, the rise of managerialist practices and the impact that attitudes and beliefs have on the working personality of managers. It follows that holding a security or safety focussed role may involve negotiation between personal and professional values as well as desired organisational values and objectives specific to each role. Literature regarding the effect of prison work and organisational culture on the behaviour of individuals is therefore relevant.

2.2 Wider Prison Literature

*The impact of role and environment*

A larger body of literature relating to prison officer attitudes evidences that values and beliefs influence how they carry out their role (e.g. Crawley, 2004; Liebling, 2000; 2004; Liebling, Price & Shefer, 2011). Various typologies of officers distinguish between differing attitudes towards prisoners and the mixed ability to reconcile rehabilitation, care and compassion with security, order and coercion (Gilbert, 1997; Scott, 2008; Tait, 2011). This reinforces the relevance of the distinction between cynical and tragic perspectives (Muir, 1977; Gilbert, 1997; Liebling, 2011). Cynics view individuals as good or bad and therefore place emphasis on individual responsibility and prisoners being less eligible as a consequence of their actions. Those with a tragic perspective view humanity as more
complex and will consider the context in which prisoners have made life choices (Gilbert, 1997; Liebling, 2011). In prison managers, Crewe and Liebling (2012) found that a cynical perspective was more prominent in operators and managerialists and that the tragic stance taken was by moral dualists and idealists. Moral dualists are described by Crewe and Liebling (2012) as prison managers that encompass the strengths of all of the other approaches and are driven by strong values and a sense of public accountability. They have the ability to confidently and competently reconcile the operational requirements of running a secure, safe and humane prison, meet targets and drive change whilst forging relationships of trust, respect and loyalty with staff and prisoners (Crewe & Liebling, 2012).

French sociologist Bourdieu (1980) argues that the interaction between an individual’s habitus and field influences actions and decision-making processes (Grenfell, 2012). Habitus is derived from an individual’s values, beliefs, life experiences, perceptions and feelings. The habitus is continually evolving and interacts with the social environment, or field, to guide practice (Bourdieu, 1980; Liebling, 2008; Lerman & Page, 2012). Furthermore, Bourdieu (1980) asserted that an individual’s habitus will ‘fit’ more comfortably in certain fields or indeed job roles than others but that individuals adapt over time to reconcile these conflicts (Grenfell, 2012).

There is strong empirical evidence that the nature and demands of prison work influence the personal and professional values of prison staff (Crawley, 2004; Crawley & Crawley, 2008; Lerman & Page, 2012). Cynicism within prisons has been described as infectious to those living and working within its walls (Warr, 2008). New officers internalise the culture, practices and values of the establishment (Crawley & Crawley, 2008). Officers have described being ‘hardened’ by the environment and this extending into their personal life (e.g. Kauffman, 1988; Crawley, 2004). Where the prison ethos contradicts the personal
values of an officer, this can create discomfort and a feeling of needing to put on an act to fit in or navigate ‘moral dilemmas’ (Kauffmann, 1988: 222; Crawley, 2004). Researchers have found that officers are likely to apply for job roles that allow their personal approach to work to flourish (Tait, 2011; Liebling et al, 2011). This may also apply to the job preferences and aspirations of operational managers. The position that a manager holds within a particular context is therefore likely to influence their perceptions and behaviours (Lerman & Page, 2012). Taking on a security or safety role may therefore strengthen or support existing values or give rise to internal tension and conflict when personal values contradict organisational expectations.

**Prison Culture**

The interplay between an individual’s values and the wider organisational culture has been shown to impact decisions and behaviours of prison staff and consequently outcomes related to security, violence and self-harm (Liebling, 2008; Bennett, 2015; Liebling & Kant, 2016). Organisational culture is complex and multi-faceted, and scholars have defined it differently (e.g. Martin, 1992; Parker, 2000). Parker (2000) asserts that culture is continually in flux and even where there are agreed organisational objectives, the means of achieving the end result will vary. Bennett’s discussion of prison culture highlights the fact that prisons are characterised by the continual tension between the competing values and priorities of different staffing groups and different managers (Bennett, 2015; Shein, 2004). The work of Liebling on ‘what matters’ in prisons demonstrates the correlation between prison culture and the experience of imprisonment for prisoners. She argues that whilst there are similarities in the occupational culture of the prison officer role across all establishments, how this culture manifests in every prison differs (Liebling, 2004; Liebling, 2008; Liebling & Kant, 2016).
Behaviours and decisions within prisons therefore arise from an evolving and continuous dialogue between dominant organisational ideas and structures and individuals and priorities that challenge and contradict them, or re-interpret and develop them (Parker, 2000; Cheliotis, 2006; Bennett, 2015). Prison culture is influenced not only by the Governing Governor but the biography of the prison and the experience and turnover of the workforce (Crawley & Crawley, 2008). For example, prisons with a defiant or resistant prison officer culture have been shown to be less effective at implementing new policies, embracing change and often display negative attitudes towards prisoners (Liebling, 2008; Liebling & Kant, 2016). Liebling and Kant (2016) suggest that the traditional-resistant culture is most prominent in public sector local prisons which are the focus of this research. This gives rise to the question of what influence safety and security governors have on the wider prison culture and in what ways this culture impacts upon their ability to achieve their objectives and drive change.

2.3 Security vs Safety?

This study looks to explore whether there are two distinct occupational cultures attached to the role of Head of Security and Head of Safety and in what ways managers in these roles embrace or resist traditional or stereotypical perceptions of the job role. Literature on approaches to security and safety work are relevant to understand which values may be more prominent in these roles.

Zedner asserts that “security is both a state of being and a means to that end” (2003: 155). In wider literature, the pursuit of public safety and national security has put actions justified in the name of security increasingly under the spotlight (Garland, 2001; Zedner, 2009). These actions often face minimal scrutiny or contest and can therefore be exploited or abused
In the prison context, following high-profile escapes in the 1990s there was an increased emphasis on security and maintaining order through tighter security protocols, increased supervision and the promotion of dynamic security (Liebling, 2004; Drake, 2008). Security work is often associated with traditional male qualities of dominance, authority and aggression (Crawley & Crawley, 2008). It is often painted in a rather negative light with an emphasis on oppressive physical security measures and being a dominant and unchallengeable authority within the establishment (King & McDermott, 1990; Liebling, 2004). In *Prisons and their Moral Performance* (2004), Liebling discusses the security values, including order, control and authority, and reflects upon to what extent security values contradict other important values, and the negative impact that both ‘too much’ or ‘too little’ commitment to security had on different establishments within the study. She concludes that a balance must be struck between security and other more humanitarian values to allow security to contribute to a perception of safety amongst staff and prisoners (Liebling, 2004).

Safety work or working with vulnerable prisoners and being seen to care ‘too much’ or being ‘too soft’ is often the source of workplace ridicule amongst uniformed officers (Crawley & Crawley, 2008). This has been seen at managerial levels also where senior leaders wanted to avoid being seen as ‘soft’ in their approach (Crewe & Liebling, 2012). Researchers have argued over the last fifteen years, prison officers (Crawley & Crawley, 2008) and managers (Bennett, 2015) have become less overtly punitive and brutal, but they still seem to be reluctant to openly embrace a caring or compassionate approach as this can be seen by peers as undesirable and at odds with the ability to deliver stability and order (Crawley & Crawley, 2008; Crewe & Liebling, 2012; Liebling & Crewe, 2013; Bennett, 2015). The effective use of authority and maintaining control therefore requires more than being ‘nice’ (Crewe, Liebling & Hulley, 2014).
Tait (2011) outlines a typology of prison officer approaches to care and distinguishes between true carers, limited carers, old-school, conflicted and damaged officers. This demonstrates the varied approaches towards prisoner care, with true-carers being in the minority. An attitude that prisoners are attention seeking or manipulating the system is often associated with the management of those that self-harm or make statements of suicidal intent (Liebling et al, 2011; Crawley, 2004). A distanced and almost blasé attitude when to discussing suicides however may be a means of coping (Crawley, 2004). Whilst security work is often associated with macho qualities, studies have found that women tend to play a larger role in delivering care to prisoners and are more likely to apply for care-related roles (Tait, 2008; 2011; Bennett, 2015). However, Tait’s (2011) study also found that occupational culture is more influential than gender on how people carry out their work.

Safety and security departments ultimately require similar work as the behaviours to prevent escape and suicide are linked, namely, vigilance and knowing your prisoners (Liebling, 2011). Researchers have described the difference between situational and relational approaches to prison work in the context of safety (Liebling & Kant, 2016), security (Drake, 2008) and maintaining order (Sparks, Bottoms & Hay, 1996). The choice of approach to managing risk within prison is a product of the prison’s culture, architecture and history as well as management decisions following incidents of violence, self-harm or security breach (Liebling, 2004; Sparks et al, 1996). Yet, there is no literature on how the managers of safety and security departments interact in practice.
2.4 Values

*Security vs. Harmony*

Understanding an individual’s value orientation is necessary in order to understand the diversity of attitudes, motivations and behaviours of prison managers in different contexts. Measuring what is important to people has shown that people have different “moral taste-buds” and that values contribute to voting behaviours, moral reasoning and decision-making (Haidt, 2013: 150; Braithwaite, 1998b; 2009). The extensive work of Braithwaite (1994; 1997; 1998a; 1998b; 2000) on value-orientations in the general population is a particularly useful framework to understand the interaction and balancing of conflicting values in prisons (Liebling, 2004) and prison governors (Crewe & Liebling, 2012). Braithwaite asserts that individuals will place differing importance on two independent value sets: security and harmony. Security values relate to social and economic status, national strength and order and propriety (Braithwaite, 1998). ‘Self-protective’ security values in the prison context may include security procedures, rule of law, crime prevention, stability and order. Harmony values represent respect and equality, personal growth and sharing resources. In prisons, ‘other-orientated’ harmony values reflect safety work including relationships, cooperation, conflict prevention, care, equality and respect (Braithwaite, 1994; Crewe & Liebling, 2012). Braithwaite (1994) suggests that the attainment of security values may be a pre-requisite to the prioritisation of harmony values supporting the notion that security and safety is the foundation of rehabilitation and relational work with offenders (e.g. Mcguire & Raynor, 2016).

Braithwaite has carried out a survey with this inventory in a variety of settings and has demonstrated that individuals will find importance in values across both harmony and security, but there is usually a preference towards one or the other (Braithwaite, 1994; 1997;
Individuals with stronger commitment to one set of values over the other are either security-oriented or harmony-oriented. Those who place high significance on both sets of values are considered moral dualists whilst those with weak overall commitment, moral relativists. Braithwaite has found that moral dualists are perhaps more flexible and able to adapt to the requirements of different roles as they appreciate different perspectives and viewpoints more readily (Braithwaite, 2000). However, a desire by moral dualists to balance competing values may make committing to action more challenging where a situation evokes a direct security-harmony conflict (Braithwaite, 2000). Liebling applied this framework to the moral performance of prisons and found that establishments also prioritised either security or harmony values despite a balanced approach being more desirable (Liebling, 2004). This project thus seeks to establish the value-orientations of operational managers and how they resolve conflicts arising within themselves and between one another.

**Moral Dualism: Care vs. Control**

Operational decisions often require consideration of the competing interests of individuals and the establishment as a whole (Bryans, 2008). Prison management therefore requires “balancing’ or walking tightropes…reconciling competing priorities and concerns in the face of different kinds of constraint” (Sparks et al, 1996: 137). Where the needs of staff and prisoners and the balance between control and care is not met sufficiently, this can result in chaos (Crawley & Crawley, 2008). The conflict between caring and welfare responsibilities or maintaining control and order is likely to manifest itself in the work of safety and security functions (Crawley, 2004; Tait, 2011). Indeed, traditional security and disciplinary attitudes of staff have been found to counteract the effect of care and concern for prisoners (Liebling, 2008). Moral dualism and careful use of discretion is therefore desirable in prisons (Liebling,
This “value balance dilemma” may involve reasoning between two managers who have different value orientations or agendas (Braithwaite, 1998a: 227). This may encourage complementary working practices in pursuit of a shared goal but may also lead to conflict and rivalry about the ‘right’ way to manage risk or particular individuals.

### 2.5 Relationships

Literature on prisons has demonstrated that prisons are complex relational spheres and research has continually stressed the importance of relationships in prison work (Liebling & Price, 2001; Liebling, 2004). Prison studies have explored staff-prisoner relationships (Liebling et al, 2011) staff-management relationships (Liebling & Price, 2001; Bennett, 2015) and the relationships between different staffing groups (Crawley, 2004; Bennett, 2015). There is however no literature on the relationships between prison managers.

Attitudes and values can influence the way officers relate to each other (Crawley, 2004). Prison officers are likely to align with others sharing similar interests, values and beliefs (Crawley & Crawley, 2008). This can be isolating for those who do not fit in and the pull to conform can leave people questioning themselves (Crawley, 2004). The experience of value conflict, particularly if you are in the minority, has been recognised as a source of workplace stress as rivalries exist between staff as a result of different values, beliefs and perception of the ‘right’ way to do things (Crawley & Crawley, 2008). Whilst there are benefits to diverse working personalities, there is frustration between officers who feel their efforts to build relationships are undermined by more authoritarian officers (Crawley, 2004; Tait, 2011). This suggests that the interaction of different value-orientations may be a point of friction, particularly between two managers trying to achieve the same ends through different means.
Liebling et al’s (2011) distinction between ‘good’ and ‘right’ relationships between prisoners and staff may also be relevant to peer relations. A relationship may be viewed as positive because it is friendly and lacks overt conflict, but ‘good’ relationships can be over-permissive, inconsistent or lacking in challenge and clear boundaries. A ‘right’ relationship is positive but permits a healthy level of challenge and use of discretion without eroding legitimacy or staff-prisoner boundaries (Liebling et al, 2011). In the context of peer relationships, this may be the difference between getting on well with your colleague but one department being more dominant or permissive when it comes to decision making and an equal, respectful relationship with healthy debate and challenge and consideration of different perspectives.

Conclusion

The literature evidences that practice is influenced by the interplay between an individual’s personal values, professional identity and organisational culture. However, there is limited understanding of the experience of operational managers adapting to specific roles within the prison, their values and relationships, particularly in safety and security departments. There is a clear gap in the literature exploring the dichotomy between security and harmony values in those leading safety and security departments. This study explores the values of these managers in order to establish to what extent their values complement their role and influence their work. In addition, relationships are established as central to prison work but there is no understanding of the dynamics of SMTs within establishments. This study aims to explore the nature of relationships between security and safety governors and the factors that hinder and encourage effective working practices.
3. Research Design and Methodology

3.1 Research Aims

In light of the complex challenges faced by Heads of Security and Safety, this project sought to explore the values of these individuals, the impact of a specific job role and explore how they interact with one another to achieve organisational objectives. My research questions are as follows:

1) What are the values and beliefs of Heads of Security and Safety? Do their roles reflect their value orientation? Does the job role have any influence on value-orientation?

2) What is the nature of the relationship between safety and security managers? What facilitates and frustrates a cohesive working relationship?

3.2 Research Design

A mixed methods approach was chosen to draw on the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies and provide a more comprehensive picture in terms of depth and breadth (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Semi-structured qualitative interviews were chosen due to the exploratory nature of the research (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Previous research demonstrates that qualitative interviews have been successful means of exploring value orientations of prison officers and prison governors as well as the complexities of human relationships and interactions in this context (Liebling, 2004; Crewe & Liebling, 2012; Bennett, 2015). Qualitative research can capture the depth and nuances of human behaviours and provide an insight into how an individual interacts with the world and others (Miles & Huberman, 1994). As this study sought to capture the nature of relationships and occupational cultures this method allowed me to further probe any emerging themes and the
opportunity to clarify feelings or perceptions. The study therefore involved twenty semi-structured interviews with ten ‘pairs’ of Heads of Security and Safety currently working in Category B local establishments.

These interviews were combined with the prior completion of a quantitative survey to measure value commitment and inform the semi-structured qualitative interviews. Surveys have been effectively used to measure values and attitudes in sample populations (e.g. Braithwaite, 1994, 1998), and are an effective way to gauge a representative picture of the attitudes of a large population and to compare views of sub-groups within the sample (Bachman & Schutt, 2016). The survey therefore captured data from a larger sample proportion than would have been possible qualitatively in small-scale, time-bound qualitative research. The survey was used to shape a purposive sampling strategy but also to explore the difference in value orientations between the roles and provide data for the interviews to further explore and build upon (Robson & McCartan, 2016).

3.3 Survey

Survey Design

The principal function of the survey in this project was to map out the 'value spread' of operational managers in security and safety functions. The work of Braithwaite has been cited and referred to in Crewe and Liebling’s (2016) study exploring the values of Governing Governors. The project sought to build upon this research and, replicating Braithwaite’s (2009) survey, was deemed a means of operationalising this research in the prison context and complements the qualitative aspect of the study. The survey itself replicated that used by Braithwaite with the general population to assess value orientations based on independent ‘harmony’ and ‘security’ value indices (Braithwaite, 1994; 1997; 1998a; 1998b; 2000;
These indices appeared to reflect safety and security perspectives in the prison context.

The use of an established methodology that has been validated in the general population and found to be resilient over time seeks to ensure credibility and accuracy in the results (Braithwaite, 1997). The inventory with the largest number of political, social and personal values was selected (Braithwaite, 2009). The survey consisted of 47 societal values that are each scored on a seven-point Likert scale from reject as important (1) to accept as of the utmost importance (7) (Braithwaite, 2000; 2009, see Appendices A & B). Braithwaite scores the survey responses by creating two subscales; ‘security’ and ‘harmony’. These index scores are calculated by summing the scores on particular variables and dividing the sum by the number of items, thus creating an average score for each subscale.

In order to centre data from any sample in the middle of the sample, Braithwaite uses a median split for the ‘harmony index’ and ‘security index’; and then uses this to identify those that are 'harmony oriented' (high harmony, low security), 'security oriented' (high security; low harmony), 'moral dualists' (high security and harmony) and, 'moral relativists’ (low security and harmony) (Braithwaite, 2000). Creation of these subscales and the four value orientation categories were generated from the data. It should be noted that the orientation-scores are valid within the research sample only and not the wider population.

Survey Sample

A representative sample of all Heads of Safety and Security is difficult to assess as there are too many variables such as age, gender, experience, category and geographical location to represent in small-scale research. The research therefore focuses on Category B establishments in England and Wales to improve generalisability by focussing on a larger proportion of individuals in a specific context (Bachman & Schutt, 2016). Interview
participants were further narrowed down to those working in Category B establishments with a local function i.e. serving the courts. These prisons are arguably the most complex and challenging environments for security and safety departments. They manage risks and vulnerabilities associated with receiving prisoners direct from court and managing a diverse range of prisoners without the added resources of the High Security Estate. During the interviews the words “busy”, “chaotic” and “complex” were used by almost every participant to describe their working environment. In light of the complexity of this environment and diversity of population characteristics, Category B prisons in many ways experience the full range of issues that will be faced to varying degrees of intensity in other types of establishments. Therefore, there are likely to be elements of the research findings that are transferable to the wider prison estate.

The link to the survey was distributed by email to the Head of Security and Head of Safety of thirty-two category B establishments in England and Wales with a brief overview of the study and participant information sheet (Appendix C). Only five establishments were not contactable or did not consent to participation. Forty-three responses from 26 different establishments were received (67% response rate) with a balanced response from Heads of Security (n = 22) and Safety (n = 21). Twelve respondents were female (safety, n = 5; security, n = 7), and the remainder were male. It is difficult to assess how representative this sample was due to limited information available of the characteristics of those in post. However, this sample appeared to be relatively representative in terms of gender based on my knowledge of individuals currently in post.

Survey Analysis

Graphs are a usual means of exploring data and identifying a distribution’s shape which aids identification of patterns and anomalies that may require further exploration (Bachman &
The results of the survey were mapped onto a scatterplot, with the two indices for the whole sample being placed against each other (albeit with Heads of Security and Heads of Safety plotted in different colours). The lines for the median of each index plotted inside this scatterplot to create four quarters representing each of the four value-orientations. This allows a visual suggestion of the comparative spread of value-orientations amongst participants which interacts with the subsequent qualitative exploration and findings. The scatterplot was used as a tool during the interviews to encourage participants to reflect upon where they thought they would score and to discuss their scores and how this related to their own understanding of their values.

Participants were asked to identify their current job role and gender in the survey to allow comparisons to be made between these two variables. Although this was a small sample size (n=43), independent samples t-tests of the mean ‘security’ and ‘harmony’ index scores were applied to compare the two groups (Heads of Security and Heads of Safety) to explore whether there was any statistical difference between the security and harmony dimension scores of those in different roles. Independent samples t-tests were also used to compare the means of male and female respondents. Paired samples t-tests were then applied to measure any significant difference between the harmony and security mean scores for the overall sample, and then broken down by role and gender. A 3D bar chart was used to visually demonstrate these findings (Bachman & Schutt, 2016).

3.4 Semi-Semi Structured Interviews

Participants and Sampling Strategy

Initially, the survey results were intended to be used as part of a purposive sampling strategy to identify ‘pairs’ of varying combinations of value-orientation but time-constraints and
delays with responses did not make this feasible. Therefore, establishments were identified through a combination of the survey results and varying geographical location and to ensure the representation of a wide range of experiences and performance scores. This included establishments that had escapes, murders and suicides in their recent histories, had received damning HMIP reports, been issued urgent notification or placed into special measures or been selected for the Ten Prisons Project to tackle high-levels of violence and drug-use. The sample of ten ‘pairs’ covered an equal split of establishments in the North and South Directorates and spanned eight different regions. Participants had all been in their current role for at least six months to ensure a good understanding of their role and adequate time to be able to reflect on their interactions with his/her colleague (Bachman & Schutt, 2016). On the basis of the survey results, eight (of sixteen) different combinations of value-orientations were represented.

The sample consisted of eight male and two female Heads of Security and seven male and three female Heads of Safety. Experience as an operational manager ranged from six months to twenty years with an average of twenty years in the Prison Service and vast experience of different operational and headquarters roles. Six participants were accredited to be Deputy Governors and four had experience of this role. The Heads of Security had a mean of 22 years in service ranging from ten to 32 years and a mean of three and a half years in their current role. This average could be attributed to one participant who had worked in security for over ten years, it was otherwise 22 months. Heads of Safety averaged 17 years in service with a range of seven to 23 years. The mean tenure in safety was 20 months. Ten participants had carried out their current role in previous establishments. Only three participants had worked exclusively in their current function as an operational manager, all in safety. Nine participants had worked in both safety and security throughout their careers at a managerial
level. Overall, the sample allowed a wide range of experiences, personalities and relationships to be captured supporting the validity and trustworthiness of the research.

*Interview Schedule*

A semi-structured approach ensured that the interview remained focused and did not deviate excessively from the core research aims. Unlike surveys, semi-structured interviews are flexible and enable lines of enquiry to be adjusted in order to understand underlying attitudes and beliefs and follow-up on any interesting or unexpected responses (Robson & McCartan, 2016). The same questions were asked of both Head of Safety and Security to allow comparative analysis of diverging and converging themes arising from responses that would address the research question. In addition, by interviewing ‘pairs’ of interviewees, both perspectives on the relationship and an understanding of both the individual’s, and their colleague’s perception of their values and personality were explored. This aided triangulating the data and getting a sense of the dynamics in the relationship.

The interview schedule was divided into three principal sections: current role, values and attitudes and relationship with security/safety colleague (see Appendix D). Questions were drawn from the literature and influenced by Crewe and Liebling’s interviews (2012) with senior leaders to encourage reflection on personal values. Questions relating to punishment, rehabilitation, compassion and managerialism derived from the various typologies of prison governors. Participants were urged to provide examples to demonstrate how they navigated moral and operational complexities. An appreciative stance in some of the questions was used to give a more rounded and dynamic narrative and thus understanding of the participants’ experiences and what mattered to them (Liebling, Price & Elliot, 1999). The participant’s survey results and scattergraph were used to initiate discussion regarding perceived value-orientations and their current role. Participants were encouraged to describe
their relationship with their colleague and their perceptions of similarities and differences between them and the interaction of the two functions. This was an effective exercise to stimulate reflections on values and for participants to compare themselves to their colleague. I found that after explaining the survey and revealing their results, participants expanded on the reasons for their responses and gave insights into why they felt more committed to either harmony or security values.

The interview schedule was piloted with a Head of Safety and Security who were known to me but were not part of the study, to further develop and adjust the schedule to best fit the research aims. Following the pilots, the questions were re-ordered to improve the flow of the interview. A question related to the perceived power-dynamic between the two functions was also added as a result of discussions arising in both pilots.

Procedure

A follow up email to the initial survey distribution was sent to potential interviewees, including a copy of the participation sheet and consent form (Appendix E). Interviews were scheduled in advance, coordinating dates with participants from the same establishment. Participants were interviewed separately in face-to-face interviews with the exception of one interview conducted by telephone. The schedule was designed to last approximately one hour and 15 minutes to minimise impact on the busy schedules of operational managers. In practice, interview length ranged from 46 minutes to 98 minutes with an average of 66 minutes. All interviews were recorded with a voice recorder and transcribed verbatim.

3.5 Qualitative Data Analysis

The role of data analysis is to make sense of the researched phenomenon by presenting interpretations of the narratives of participants whilst remaining true to the context of the
data (Miller & Glassner, 2016). The project was exploratory and was therefore analysed using adaptive theory (Layder, 1998). This iterative approach drew themes from previous research but allowed the flexibility to adapt to new ideas and themes that emerged from the specific context being researched. The survey content was used to support the qualitative data analysis framework. Transcripts were manually coded using a thematic framework which included ‘security’ and ‘harmony’ items from the survey that emerged from the data (Robson & McCartan, 2016). A role matrix was created to analyse Heads of Security and Safety separately and to draw out converging and diverging themes by role and differences and similarities in interactions and relationships described between the two functions (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Saldana, 2013).

3.6 Other Considerations

Ethical Considerations

Prison managers were informed of the purpose of the study and gave written consent prior to participation. Previous research of prison managers has demonstrated that they express their views and beliefs coherently and insightfully in interviews (Crewe & Liebling, 2012; Bennett, 2015). The consent process made clear that participation was voluntary and outlined a process to withdraw from the study without giving any reasons. Participants were informed that interviews were confidential unless they disclosed information that threatened the security of an establishment, constituted a criminal offence or amounted to professional gross misconduct. Permission to record interviews was sought and transcripts and notes were anonymised and stored securely.

As the research design studied ‘pairs’ of Heads of Security and Safety, colleagues were aware of one another’s participation in the study, creating challenges to anonymity. This
raised potential ethical concerns, particularly as we were discussing a relationship with a current colleague as well as personal beliefs and values (Robson & McCartan, 2016). There will therefore be no mention of the establishments involved and rather than providing pseudonyms or numbers to participants, which could risk identification of a particular relationship, individual or scenario, quotations are attributed to job role only.

Discussing a relationship with a colleague can be particularly sensitive as not all relationships are positive. During the interviews, a limitation identified was a perceived discomfort or reticence in some participants when discussing a colleague’s negative traits, and some people appeared to choose their wording very carefully and diplomatically. This was less of an issue with participants known personally to me but in most cases participants became more open as the interview progressed. The use of the survey appeared to be a comfortable way to stimulate reflection on their differences. Participants were more candid in discussing challenges when referencing their departments overall as opposed to individuals.

Insider Research

My role as a Head of Security within HMPPS raised the question of the benefits and challenges of insider research in both data collection and analysis (Greene, 2014). Advantages to insider research include access, ease in establishing a rapport and a nuanced understanding of complexities in the field of research (Chavez 2008; Greene 2014). Being seen as a peer was useful in giving me greater legitimacy in the field and encouraged more open discussion, in-depth conversations and a relationship of trust with participants (Chavez, 2008; Bennett, 2015). When some participants realised I was an operational manager too they appeared to voice opinions more freely but this also caused some of the interviews, particularly with Heads of Security to become a little side-tracked. The use of semi-
structured interviews was helpful to ensure that the conversations remained focused and relevant to the research questions.

Detailed knowledge of the field and personal experience of the researched topic could have given rise to disadvantage if not considered carefully. Complications include bias, pre-conceived ideas affecting interpretation and participants’ perceptions and expectations of the researcher (Chavez, 2008). On occasion, participants assumed knowledge or shared experience and had to be prompted to provide detailed explanations to give a more in-depth insight into their perspective. As a researcher, an awareness of any potential bias and willingness to clarify meaning and challenge initial interpretations was essential (Chavez, 2008). I did not use the same category of establishment as my own (Category C) to provide a greater distance between myself and the research environment.

Researching your own area of work requires careful and critical self-reflection and consideration of how you are perceived by your participants (Greene, 2014; Bennett, 2015). The advantages and disadvantages of insider research are not static and depend upon the participant, as well as the way in which the participant-researcher interaction evolves throughout the process (Greene, 2014). An awareness that my age, gender, background and perceived experience (or lack of, in some cases) influenced the way in which participants interacted with me was necessary. My role as a peer seemed to elicit a sense of trust in many cases but a limitation of some the interviews was participants presenting a very subjective version of themselves and a few participants presenting what felt like corporate responses rather than their personal views. Ensuring participants understood the exploratory nature of the study and my desire to understand diversity within and between the roles of security and safety encouraged less guarded responses.
4. Findings and Discussion

This Chapter is divided into two sections to address the two research questions. The first section will focus on values and will present the results of the survey followed by a discussion of the values espoused during the interviews. The second section explores the relationship between safety and security and describes the varied working dynamics between safety and security governors. This section will consider the factors that contribute to the nature of interaction between these individuals.

4.1 Values

The values of individuals contribute to their behaviours and interactions with others and have been shown to matter to prisoners, staff and prison managers in the prison context (Liebling, 2004). This section presents the findings of the value-orientation survey, which highlighted the broad spectrum of value-orientations amongst the sample population. Discussion of the interviews will explore themes of power, compassion and integrity and demonstrate the impact of managerialism on value commitment.

Survey Results

The variance in each group was compared using Levene’s tests, and there was no significant difference between groups in any measure, satisfying the assumptions to conduct independent samples t-tests.

Independent samples t-tests were used to compare harmony means and security means by role. It was found that Heads of Security appeared to have higher mean security scores, a finding which approached significance, t(41) = 1.651, p = 0.106. It is expected that a larger study with greater statistical power would show this difference more clearly, and therefore
this would merit further exploration in future research to verify this finding. However, there was no difference between Heads of Security and Safety when it came to their harmony mean, $t(41) = -0.497, p = 0.622$.

Independent samples t-tests were also used to compare harmony means and security means by gender. Females were found to have significantly higher mean harmony scores than males, $t(41) = -2.304, p < 0.05$. There was no significant difference between males and females on mean security score, $t(41) = -2.304, p = 0.648$.

Paired samples t-tests were used to compare harmony means and security means for the whole sample, and then broken down by role and by gender. There was no significant difference between harmony and security means across the whole population, $t(42) = -1.524, p=0.135$.

When broken down by role, Heads of Safety had higher scores on harmony mean than security mean, $t(21) = -3.228, p < 0.05$. There was no significant difference between harmony mean and security mean for Heads of Security, $t(20) = 0.749, p = 0.463$.

When split by gender, females had higher scores on harmony mean than security mean, $t(11) = -3.081, p < 0.05$. There was no significant difference between harmony mean and security mean for males, $t(30) = -0.055, p = 0.956$.

In essence, the survey results suggest that Heads of Security are more likely to have higher commitment to security values than their counterparts in safer custody, but job role did not influence commitment to harmony values independently. However, Heads of Safety and females were more likely to have higher commitment to harmony values than security values. Figure 1.1 provides a useful visual representation of these findings and demonstrates a clear variation in group harmony and security mean by role and gender.
Figure 1.1: Harmony and security means by role and gender

![Harmony and security means by role and gender](image)

The median score for harmony mean, $Md = 5.35$ and security mean, $Md = 5.25$ were calculated and placed as two indices on a scatter graph to map the distribution of the sample into Braithwaite’s four value-orientation categories (Security-oriented, Harmony-oriented, Moral-dualist and Moral relativist). Figure 1.2 shows the value-orientation distribution of the sample by role. This shows that the majority of the sample fall into the moral dualist and moral relativist categories with only a small number of participants demonstrating a strong prioritisation of security values ($n = 5$) or harmony values ($n = 4$). This suggests that the majority of the sample have a balanced prioritisation of both security and harmony but differ in terms of how much importance they place on the value items overall, as opposed to one or the other.

It can also be seen in Figure 1.2 that the darker dots, representing Head of Security feature more prominently than Heads of Safety in the top two sections of the graph with higher
security scores. But that both Heads of Security and safety are equally distributed over the harmony median on the right-hand side of the chart. This is in line with the findings of the t-test on the group mean scores above.

Figure 1.2: Value Orientation Distribution by Role

The distribution of value-orientation by gender is presented in Figure 1.3. This chart shows that the females are more highly concentrated on the right-hand side of chart with higher harmony scores but are relatively equally distributed on the security axis. The highest concentration of females sits in the moral dualist quadrant (n = 6). The males appear to be more evenly distributed across both axis. There appears to be a slight concentration of males in the moral relativist quadrant (n =13). Of those identified as security oriented four are male and only one is female. This is in line with the findings of the t-tests.
The interviewees represented a very broad range of personalities, experiences and viewpoints demonstrating the diversity within the operational managers’ rank, and supporting the literature that there are varied value-orientations represented amongst prison managers (Bennett, 2015; Liebling & Crewe, 2016). The finding that females tended to have higher harmony scores supports the findings of Bennett (2015) and Tait (2011), who both suggest that females often take on care-giving roles within the prison and therefore may be more attracted to the Head of Safety role than their male counterparts. The role of gender was not explicitly discussed in the interviews and therefore requires further exploration to understand this significance. The content of the interviews however gave an opportunity to add further depth to these findings and explore the correlation between values, job role and relationships.
As the survey demonstrated, the majority of interviewees were either moral dualists or moral relativists, suggesting an almost equal commitment to both harmony and security values. The use of Braithwaite’s security and harmony framework was therefore useful to identify patterns and shared values identified across both roles as well as some clear distinctions and preferences expressed upon interview.

**Moral Dualism in practice**

The role of an operational manager involves difficult decisions that require the balancing of different priorities, including the safety and security of individuals against the interests of the wider population. All interviewees described having to make these tough decisions regularly. Heads of Security regularly referred to decisions relating to funeral escorts and placing family members in closed visits as a source of moral dilemma. Several managers in both roles discussed the cuffing arrangements in hospitals of prisoners who were deemed high risk to the public but were terminally ill or physically impaired. It is not possible to conclude from the data how the balanced value-orientations (moral dualist or moral relativist) differed in terms of how easily these decisions were made. As Bennett (2015) found, it was difficult to separate personal and professional values and to divide the managers into neat categories of differing attitudes, beliefs and approaches. Pre-established typologies were too simplistic to capture the layers of moral reasoning that interviewees described. Therefore, values were explored through the varying attitudes to recurring themes including power, compassion, integrity and managerialism.

**Security Values**

**Rule of Law**

It was unsurprising in a prison context that there was an underlying commitment to security values across both roles, particularly regarding the rule of law and use of authority. This
included a desire for the strict adherence to rules, consistent challenging of wrongdoing and exerting authority appropriately over prisoners to maintain order. Many promoted increased ‘responsibilisation’ of prisoners and believed there should be consequences for poor behaviour, such as staff assaults and ongoing criminality. Heads of Security in particular took pride in their participation in crime detection and prevention and joint-working with the police. Yet, five interviewees felt that the authority of officers had been eroded and that this had negatively impacted staff safety:

    I think we have lost that discipline for the staff which helps to keep the staff safe. That frustrates me. (Head of Security)

Achieving stability and control in the prison was often voiced as the foundation for the attainment of more harmony-oriented initiatives, supporting Braithwaite’s (1994) argument that harmony values are often secondary to the fulfilment of security. Heads of Safety therefore appreciated the importance of security work, which may explain why many scored highly in both indices in the survey:

    I think control, or operational grip as it’s called now a days, is really important. That’s why security and safety are linked so closely because if we haven’t got a secure place, where people feel safe, then we might as well go home. (Head of Safety)

Power

Values linked to power, knowledge and personal authority were more prominent in security governors than safety governors, but the extent to which these values were embraced was mixed. Traditional Heads of Security were characterised by interviewees as powerful, knowledgeable and in many ways cynical towards prisoners and more humanitarian objectives. Interviewees described a ‘my way or the high way’ approach of previous Heads
of Security and described security as traditionally insular and unwilling to communicate information to the wider establishment. However, a punitive and negative attitude to prisoners was not displayed by any of the interviewees, reflecting the literature that Rutherford’s punishment credo is now less prevalent (Bennett, 2015).

Security governors described their role as protecting the governor, the public and the establishment from harm, and this description echoed the security values on Braithwaite’s index. This version of security reflected Gill et al’s (2007) traditionalist security manager approach, where robust security is considered to be justified above all other functions:

That idea that a Head of Security is somebody with a square peg in their back to turn and just send them off to think about nothing but security was an organisational decision. (Head of Safety)

There was a strong sense that the Head of Security still wielded a disproportionate amount of authority in comparison to other roles. This power appeared to derive largely from staff’s perception of the knowledge of the security governor:

Everyone assumes you know more than other people. (Head of Security)

Access to intelligence was a source of power and a means of justifying decisions and countering any objections to actions. This was recognised by current Heads of Security and for some seen as a perk of the job and a reference point influencing their own behaviour in their role:

Security also has a lot of power because we are the vanguard, we are the gatekeeper, we are stopping people escaping. (Head of Security)

I think it's a sexy department, isn't it? It carries a lot of clout…I feel important in my role. (Head of Security)
However, others were more cautious in their approach and wanted to ensure they did not overuse their power:

I can’t just be the Genghis Khan style security governor that just says no to everybody. (Head of Security)

I think, as a security governor in an old fashioned Victorian local, I could be an absolute arse and get away with it because of my title, which is just wrong.

(Head of Security)

There was a strong traditional occupational culture derived from power and knowledge that Heads of Security were aware of and in many cases working within. However, there were several security governors who sought to challenge this and do things differently. This appeared to be driven by more harmony-oriented goals including co-operation with other departments, trying to give prisoners a second chance and supporting rehabilitative initiatives. This more nuanced approach to security increased the moral dilemmas faced by Heads of Security who previously could say ‘no’ in the name of security and were now being asked to say ‘why not?’ in the name of rehabilitative culture. This shift in approach may explain the absence of more security-oriented managers in the survey.

**Harmony Values**

**Care and Compassion**

There were distinctions between interviewees in the emphasis placed upon the importance of compassion. In comparison to their security counterparts, safety governors more regularly said they needed to be caring, people-orientated and have the ability to think creatively or outside of the box to solve complex problems. Some Heads of Security described their safety colleagues as “fluffy and frilly”, naïve and idealistic, but these terms were usually stated
tongue-in-cheek and were rejected by Heads of Safety themselves. Although Heads of Safety recognised their caring traits, they were keen to emphasise that this was not synonymous with weakness or a lack of appreciation for control:

I think [security is] much more clinical. Whereas safety has to be a bit more...

I don't want to use the word fluffy because I'm not fluffy. And I refuse that when people say I am. I refuse that but I think there has to be much more grey when it comes to safety. (Head of Safety)

The role of a safety governor invoked a greater commitment to humanity, improving the lives of others and preventing individuals harming themselves and one another within the establishment. In other words, the safety role encompassed many of the values of the harmony index and these values were for the most part emphasised more readily upon interview:

People that like security are not people people. I think that fundamentally, and not every Head of Safety is a people person but fundamentally, Heads of Safety thrive off other people’s energy. (Head of Safety)

Heads of Safety were unanimous in the importance of showing compassion towards prisoners. Care for individuals and ensuring that prisoners were looked after was pivotal to their role, even if for a few this was not initially natural to them. Heads of Security regularly referred to their counterpart as ‘more caring’. The three female Heads of Safety demonstrated the highest degree of commitment to caring for others and were perceived as such by their male counterparts, providing support for the survey result that females are likely to have higher commitment to harmony values.
There was a divide in attitudes of Heads of Security and whether compassion was valued to those in this role. Some felt that it was integral to the role and ensured that decisions were not having a disproportionate impact upon individuals:

You need to have compassion because there is a time when you have to throw the rulebook out. And you may have to display compassion as the decision you have to make is about doing the right thing. (Head of Security)

However, others felt that compassion or an excess of compassion could impact decision making negatively and prevent managers from making difficult decisions to ensure the security and protection of others:

I try to not see it [compassion] in myself. And I see it as unprofessional in other people…I appreciate that they are probably not in control of it. But that is part of the point, they should be in control of it because they have a big job to do. (Head of Security)

I think it may be wrong to be compassionate when you are Head of Security…You do have to think about the greater good rather than the single good. (Head of Safety)

Interestingly those who were more hesitant in demonstrating compassion, scored higher in security mean in the survey, with a security-oriented Head of Security saying “Sometimes I come across as callous and hard. I don’t wish to be that way…sometimes I can act a little bit uncaring”.

Nonetheless, becoming a manager or moving into a safety role had influenced several managers attitudes who appeared to have developed greater commitment to compassion over time:
I was quite austere, everything was discipline, my background is security so I was very penalising actually. I still have that side of me, don’t get me wrong but I have to look at other sides so it’s trying to balance the security side with the other side. (Head of Safety)

I’ve had to learn compassion and stuff like that. My mum says I’m a very cold fish, I don’t get very emotional….so I’ve had to learn that. (Head of Security)

This suggests a distinction between innate values that individuals brought into their working personality and those that developed over time and were a result of exposure to a specific working environment or role.

**Rehabilitation**

Most interviewees expressed a personal commitment to rehabilitation and improving society, but had come to accept that local prisons often struggled to meet the needs of individuals trying to reintegrate into society:

> Rehab culture, I think it’s amazing but you can’t have a rehab culture in a local Cat B because we rack ‘em and stack ‘em and get them in and get them out. (Head of Security)

For some however rehabilitation seemed to be an organisational objective as opposed to a personal endeavour.

Heads of Safety were largely positive about rehabilitative culture and saw it as a means to strengthen safety objectives and improve staff-prisoner relationships and reduce prisoner distress. For several safety governors, the renewed organisational focus on rehabilitation was the organisation catching up with the way they had always worked as a result of their personal values:
I’ve always, and others might think differently, I’ve always tried to work in a rehabilitative way because it’s just, that’s just the person that I am. (Head of Safety)

The inability to deliver rehabilitative initiatives was a source of frustration for interviewees who had worked in other more rehabilitative establishments and felt that the service was therefore failing prisoners and the public:

The regime is horribly indecent and completely undermines legitimate authority and any chance of a safe and rehabilitative culture. (Head of Security)

Heads of Security were again more divided with some dedicating themselves to becoming an enabler rather than a blocker to rehabilitative projects. These managers tended to have experience in safety and reducing re-offending roles previously:

I want a well-functioning proportionate security setup, which supports and rehabilitative culture. (Head of Security)

Other security governors felt rehabilitation was being prioritised disproportionately over getting the basics right and providing a safe and secure environment that would benefit from increased security resources:

I haven’t really pushed with the rehab culture here, because it’s not safe and it’s not secure yet…I think it is a case of us building a house too tall when we haven’t got the foundations right. (Head of Security)

Three Heads of Security felt that rehabilitative culture was undermining security culture and providing confused messaging to staff. Further exploration of how to effectively consolidate security concerns with rehabilitative culture would therefore be beneficial.
Giving prisoners a second chance

Numerous examples of difficult decisions made as duty governor were referred to, such as giving violent or problematic prisoners a second chance by giving them a job, reintegrating them with the wider population from segregation, or choosing to give them a fresh start on arrival from other establishments. Safety and security managers described choosing to take these risks in the hope of longer-term benefits for the individual. These decisions were often met with criticism by staff, but interviewees often described the need to do something different and use discretion in an attempt to break the cycle of violence and help the individual:

He had assaulted people and you have to sort of push that out, because actually by putting him in the segregation unit or leaving him there to rot if you like, he is only getting worse, we need to do something that is different. (Head of Safety)

The ability to use discretion appropriately as described in Liebling’s (2000) work on prison officers seems to remain an important skill as an operational manager, albeit in a much less discrete forum. The ability to carefully balance the rights of individuals and the wider prison was the strength of Crewe and Liebling’s (2012) ‘moral dualist’ governors. Every interviewee described having to make these sorts of decision regularly, and those with more experience seemed to do so with greater ease. The realities of a busy and somewhat chaotic prison environment meant that managers had to prioritise the difficult task of maintaining order and control, reacting to increasing violence and organised criminality alongside more idealistic long-term projects or bespoke individual care.
**Integrity**

In Bennett’s (2015) study, integrity, alongside honesty and conscientiousness, were described as normative values which managers linked to professionalism. This study proved no different, with values of honesty, integrity and hard-work described regularly as core values of the utmost importance to interviewees:

Integrity is absolutely fundamental. Without integrity you can't do anything in this job so I passionately believe in integrity, honesty and being trustworthy. Honesty is so massive to me (Head of Security)

I think core values of mine are honesty and integrity. If I think people are not being honest with me I hate it, that really irks me. We are public servants and we are here to do that job…getting that integrity right and this is the moral bit isn’t it, that we are looking after them [prisoners] correctly. (Head of Safety)

Throughout the interviews the use of the word ‘integrity’ was linked to security values of conscientiousness and honesty, but also harmony values of fairness and treating others with respect.

Overall, the attitude of the interviewees towards prisoners reflected Muir’s tragic stance towards humanity and the situation of prisoners was often described with an understanding that society had at some point failed them (Muir, 1977; Rutherford, 1993; Gilbert, 1997). In general, interviewees in both roles demonstrated commitment to treating prisoners with respect and humanity, but this tended to be expressed more directly by those in safety roles:

I believe society fails people before people fail society and prisons should be about rehabilitation, helping people to become more productive citizens and giving them a second chance. (Head of Safety)
You know I’ve always been that person who says we are not here to punish them, we are here to look after them, their punishment is being here in the first place. (Head of Safety)

Interviewees spoke of doing ‘the right thing’ and challenging wrongdoing as an integral part of their role. Colleagues who acted without integrity and were dishonest were described as causing breakdowns in professional relationships and being difficult to work alongside. Several Heads of Safety described investigating or challenging unlawful use of force or misconduct in staff and doing so regardless of being the only one to do so:

I just think people should be treated decently regardless of what they've done.
I think this is why I like being in charge of use of force so much because just because we can, doesn't mean we should. I'm not naive to think that there aren't still officers that are bit handy but everyone in this prison knows my stance…I will take action and people absolutely know that. (Head of Safety)

I didn’t want to work in a place where there were draconian staff, horrible people being horrible to prisoners. I would fight against staff treating prisoners like cattle, but I was in the minority and that’s why I had to move. (Head of Security)

Heads of Security in particular emphasised the need to have integrity and professionalism as a result of their involvement in risk management and staff corruption detection.

This sense of acting with integrity often meant making decisions in favour of prisoners and to the detriment of staff. Two interviewees said they had overturned decisions made by officers when procedural justice principles had not been followed and said that they did so to send the message that they wouldn’t tolerate unfairness. These decisions however were not always straightforward and involved an element of negotiation between gaining
legitimacy with staff and prisoners. Bennett (2015) describes this as walking a tightrope between traditional occupational culture and humanitarian aims. However, in this study, the notion of upholding a moral standard appeared to trump any potential discord amongst staff which suggests a change in current prison managers priorities from the time of Bennett’s work. Heads of Safety, in particular, appeared to be less compromising when it came to upholding standards of decency and respect towards prisoners:

In terms of safety, it's about not compromising…I think it is about saying this is this is the minimum standard we're prepared to accept and sticking to that. (Head of Safety)

**Managerialism**

Over time, the work from Rutherford (1993) to Bennett (2015) has tracked the increasing importance of managerialism and pursuit of targets as a prominent feature in the prison management. This study reinforced this trend as the importance of performance measures and pressure to meet targets and improve scores in audits dominated the priorities of each operational manager. This was especially the case in prisons subject to special measures and Urgent Notification scrutiny:

Performance in my role, in my SMT, is absolutely paramount. The Governor will not accept anything less than a perfect score. (Head of Security)

A distinction was identified between managers who measured their success through performance data and those that focussed on individual prisoners and their progression. The difference in priorities reflecting the distinction between harmony and security-oriented individuals.
Managerialist processes, assurance and a more clinical approach to managing risk were described as characteristic of security work. This was further supported as Heads of Security more frequently referred to motivations and achievements relating to results and improving processes. Security governors were largely positive about the recently introduced security audit and felt it measured the right things by testing prison-wide quality and knowledge as well as the existence of process. This was an opportunity to promote wider commitment to security values across the establishment.

However, an organisational focus on efficiency and statistics concerned many of the safety managers who felt this undermined core values of human dignity and personal growth of individuals. Many recognised that chasing targets could come at the detriment of meaningful outcomes for prisoners and performance data failed to provide a narrative to what was actually happening in the prison. A few interviewees described having to choose between filling in an action plan or doing the actions:

> I think there is potential for staff to focus on the performance on the expense of the prisoners. I think it’s always a risk. We focus too much on the managerialist approach where everything is about targets and everything is about targets rather than the fundamental basics of what we do as core business. (Head of Safety)

Some Heads of Safety described prisons continually transferring prolific self-harmers due to their disproportionate impact on the performance matrix. This prevented these prisoners from receiving the individual care and attention to reduce their self-harming behaviours:

> I think when you try and weight up what’s best for the prisoner and what’s best for the establishment, they are really conflicting because of performance matrix. No prison is going to take the risk of somebody significantly violent
or a significant self-harmer, to try and do that quality work, because it looks like you can’t manage your population. (Head of Safety)

This appeared to reflect what was described as managerialism minus by Liebling and Crewe (2013), with managerialist targets distracting from the morality of prison management. However, as Cheliotis (2006) predicated, some staff tried to balance doing the right thing with meeting targets.

Heads of Safety made stronger moral arguments against hard performance targets and appeared to place more weight on what Bennett (2015) described as ‘softer’ performance measures, such as HMIP, than on process-based audits:

> With security, I think there are very clear lines of the way things should be done and processes that should be followed. And it's when there are slips in those processes that things go wrong. And although there are processes with safer custody with regards to ACCT documents and things like that, actually the care given is more important than the process being followed to the tee.  
> (Head of Safety)

The Head of Safety role appeared to encourage more engagement and promotion of a value-based approach over the process-driven security structure. Heads of Safety appeared to be more likely to demonstrate the resistance to managerialist practices described by Cheliotis (2006) and gave more examples of adopting a flexible or innovative approach to meet targets. This is not to say that there were not examples given by Heads of Security where they had creatively interpreted the rules to stay true to their personal beliefs, but the nature of security targets formed part of a more rigid framework than safety targets. This structure permitted a greater detachment from moral discourse for some but created difficulty for security governors trying to challenge organisational norms.
A square peg in a square hole?

A consequence of different approaches and value commitments was that individuals with particular experience or character traits were perceived as more suited to particular roles. This was rarely a choice of the manager as the decision was usually made by the Governing Governor, with only three of the interviewees having requested to be in their current roles:

There is not much science behind it. I just think it’s square pegs for square holes. I told them don’t put me in safer custody, that’s not my bag. (Head of Security)

Regardless of the decision not often being within the control of the operational managers, interviewees expressed preferences for different functions and described themselves as and their colleagues as fitting more naturally into certain roles than others:

He's a process man. He’s security, all the way. He's been Head of Safety as well. But security is more of a natural home for him. He's facts, figures and process. (Head of Safety)

I think [my role] suits me as a person, I am very caring and I feel it’s very important that we keep people safe. (Head of Safety)

It doesn’t inspire me at all, being Head of Safety. (Head of Security)

This speaks to Bourdieu’s principles of habitus and field by demonstrating that an individual’s habitus will be better suited to certain fields and the field will also influence habitus (Bourdieu, 1980). The occupational culture of the safety and security roles appeared to encourage managers to present themselves in a particular way to fit what they felt the organisation required of them, reflecting Bennett’s (2015) argument that it is important to
consider the interaction between individual agency and organisational structure when seeking to understand the behaviours of prison managers:

I am quite a flexible person. So if you put me as Head of Security you would get a very different me from what you get as Head of Safety. (Head of Safety)

Security governors who were not considered to fit the stereotype described both putting on a façade or having to change their approach to fit their role to meet what they felt was expected of them by others:

I am a bit of a softy when people get to know me, but I try to present a very firm black and white manager and I think staff appreciate that. (Head of Security)

Security is a little bit insular where you have got to work behind the scenes and can’t tell people things. I don’t think I am quite wired in that way, so I have got to act outside my natural instincts really. (Head of Security)

Operational managers presented as adaptable and drew upon the values they perceived most suited to carrying out a specific job role. Three Heads of Safety described how they had developed a passion for the subject matter that they had not expected, particularly those who had significant security experience. The opportunity to take on a role they would not necessarily have chosen had changed them both professionally and personally:

It [safety] is a lot more emotion based…safety was not a choice but has definitely become a passion…I think I’m much more people driven now. (Head of Safety)
I’ve grown to love safety. I’m quite passionate about it...we’ve got to think outside the box a little bit and weigh up that duty of care against levels of security, it’s a hard balance that not everybody in my opinion can do particularly easily but it’s a role that I’ve grown in and I’m thoroughly enjoying it. (Head of Safety)

Not only was there evidence that the job role impacted the individual, but it was evident that individuals were often interpreting and trying to redefine their role reflecting Cheliotis’ (2006) argument that prison managers do not blindly conform to the expectations of HMPPS:

I want to move away from it being big bad security. (Head of Security)

This meant that where there was not a clear natural fit this had the potential to encourage not only personal growth and development as a professional but also to push the boundaries of the role and advance and change practice. However, this also could lead to discomfort and a lack of confidence in the role.

The interviews demonstrated a connection between individual values and occupational culture which may have influenced the survey results. There was a stronger commitment to harmony values such as compassion, human decency and giving others a chance by Heads of Safety during the interviews which supported the survey finding that Heads of Safety are more likely to have a higher harmony mean than security mean. The more diverse views with regards to compassion and rehabilitation expressed by security governors may explain why there was no significant difference between their security and harmony scores. However, a more distinct and imposing occupational culture may account for higher security means in Heads of Security in comparison to Heads of Safety. Understanding how
these value-orientations influence operational decision making would be worthy of academic attention.

4.2 Relationship between Head of Safety and Head of Security

This section looks at the relationships between safety and security governors. This follows previous prison research that has emphasised the central importance of relationships in the prison context.

Safety vs. Security

Despite the different occupational cultures outlined above, it was generally accepted that safety and security outcomes were interrelated but that the means of achieving these objectives differed. There was difference in opinion as to the extent of the overlap, with some believing there was no difference and others identifying clear areas of difference. This appeared to influence the nature of the relationship and the vision of what ‘good’ should look like:

I think that we have a common goal which is to keep everybody safe but how we go about doing that is where is differs. Our end goal is equivalent, the difference is we are looking to find the best in people whilst security is looking and expecting to root out the worst and that is where we have the most conflict. (Head of Safety)

Some interviewees recognised that despite wanting to create a safe and secure environment the differing approaches caused a ‘rub’. Situations such as decisions to segregate vulnerable prisoners who were also involved in drug trafficking activity or whether to manage a prisoner through strict adherence to policy or taking a more individual approach were given as examples of areas of occasional disagreement:
My overriding sense of compassion and care for the individual might rub with his sense of process and I suppose, not austerity, but firm line with regards to the security of establishment. (Head of Safety)

The relationship between the Head of Safety and Security often mirrored the balancing of security and harmony values and the tension between providing care and control described in studies of prison officers and Governing Governors (Crawley, 2004; Liebling et al, 2011; Liebling & Crewe, 2016).

**Differing nature of relationships**

There were four patterns of behaviour or modes of working identified within the relationships described by interviewees: siloed, boundaried, supportive and cohesive. This was a spectrum and there was fluidity in the nature of the relationship at any given time. At one end of the spectrum was *siloed or fractured* relationships where there was a limited or non-existent relationship between the two functions. These relationships were usually characterised by a clash of personalities and poor personal relationship where there was a lack of trust, communication and information sharing:

> I came into a situation where the Head of Security and the Head of Safety were pretty much pistols at dawn. And their teams still are filled with great animosity and there is almost a rivalry. (Head of Security)

When participants described these sorts of relationships, siloed working was generally described as a feature of the wider management team. This was a source of frustration as it was understood this was not an effective or desirable mode of working. Challenge and disagreements existed but outcomes were dysfunctional:
I feel like I constantly compromise and try and make concessions so I’m kind of at the point now where I can’t do much more, so I’m just going to do me and he is just going to do him and someone else can have that battle. (Head of Safety)

I feel like sometimes I’m banging my head a little bit against the wall. (Head of Security)

As relationships improved, safety and security became \textit{boundaried}. There was a recognition that outcomes were related but work was still done largely in isolation from one another. There was a sense of clear boundaries and separation of responsibilities. Communication happened in formal settings rather than informal conversations and both the professional and personal relationship was distant. These pairs were preoccupied with championing their own departments and associated values. A distinguishing characteristic of these pairs was the idea that joint working was secondary to getting their own function up and running and effective, rather than joint working being part of that process:

I think the thing is that we both have priorities that supersede the things that we could do together. They feel like nice to have’s rather than fundamental things that we need to do so they are not priorities for either of us. (Head of Safety)

We normally only get together when something is broken and we kind of need to fix it and sometimes that works and sometimes it breaks more. (Head of Security)

This boundaried mode of working was more prominent in prisons that described resistant prison officer cultures and those subject to increased external scrutiny, such as special
measures. Rather than any debate or challenge, there appeared to be an apathy towards one another:

There should be debate and challenge which there isn’t here. There isn't that closeness of working…there's not positive or negativity, there's just not challenge mode. (Head of Security)

These partnerships shared limited information and security managers struggled to get their teams to buy in to more open communication and collaboration.

I want to share information, overcoming my team’s resistance to share that information is a daily challenge. (Head of Security)

When we are talking head of function, that works well but when you start going lower down in the ranks, that is when you get “We are security I’m not telling you anything” (Head of Safety)

Heads of Safety and Security both described the challenge of establishing a prison-wide culture embracing their departments’ priorities.

When joint-working became more routine, the relationship took on a more supportive arrangement. There was a close professional relationship and mutual respect of each other’s priorities. Often these pairs had managers that had worked across both functions so there was an increased understanding of the challenges faced by their colleagues. Whilst there remained some division between their teams, managers saw each other as a source of support and often reassurance:

There are days when it's just really hard work and sometimes you just need someone to ring up and say, is there anything I can do. I know you are busy as well but I recognise where you are. (Head of Security)
There is always that element of you just want someone else just to say, yeah that sounds fine and then you go with it. (Head of Safety)

This approach created a space for ideas and strategies to be discussed and challenged in a productive way and where the different skill sets and priorities of one another benefitted effective decision-making:

We're challenging each other's thinking…we have healthy challenges and discussion, because actually you need competitive analysis to dictate your risks. (Head of Security)

[The Head of Safety] tends to think an awful lot outside the box and occasionally fixes problems for me that I would have struggled on for weeks and weeks. (Head of Security)

The majority of pairs recognised that there was a need for an improved working dynamic between their functions and most aspired to create fully cohesive relationships but had not yet managed to achieve this:

We are building communications capability between the two, and we're sharing information better. But that's still not as it should be. (Head of Security)

These relationships would have open communication across all levels of their teams to give a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of risks within the establishment and a joint approach to problem solving and risk management. Resources would be shared and there would be a healthy level of debate, challenge and compromise that promoted individual care and maintained proportionate security. The most cohesive pair complemented one another and capitalised on their differences to achieve shared outcomes:
It’s the ying and the yang…they put people into positions to provide balance and to complement certain functions, I think they’ve done a good job. We are not polar opposites but we have got different skill sets and I think they work well together. (Head of Security)

There was no definitive pattern of value-orientation combinations of the pairs correlating to the nature of the relationships. Only two pairs had the same value-orientation (moral-dualist/moral-dualist and moral-relativist/moral-relativist) which demonstrated that difference between managers was more common than similarity. This supports the argument that prison managers are less homogenous than prison officers (Bennett, 2015). It was notable that pairs with a moral dualist were usually at the supportive end of the spectrum. This supports the idea that moral dualists are able to appreciate different perspectives more easily and adapt accordingly to a given situation (Braithwaite, 2000). However, having experience across both departments rather than value-orientation was also a relevant factor in terms of quality of relationship and understanding one another.

Some interviewees felt that the departments should actually be merged and that the final barrier to overcome in terms of working collaboratively was the management structure itself, which encouraged divisive working practices. A Head of Safety claiming that “by separating the departments, we are separating mindsets”. This view supports Bennett’s assertion that prison management structures “work[ed] against deeply felt camaraderie”. (2015: 65). The expectations of their peers, their staff and their Governors alongside their own personal approach influenced the effectiveness of working relationships. The majority of pairs seemed to move back and forth between a boundaried and supportive paradigm. The nature of the relationship between these two pivotal managers was not straightforward but most were attempting to navigate their way towards as cohesive relationship as possible.
What hinders and promotes cohesion?

This journey to cohesion was influenced by personality, values and wider prison culture but the influence of the Governing Governor, the role of analysts and the availability of resources were also identified as pivotal factors.

The influence of the Governor

Almost every interviewee described the impact of support and direction, or lack of, from the Governing governor and in many cases the Deputy Governor on their work. Some Governors had explicitly directed security and safety governors to improve their working relationship and sought to break down barriers between all functions. It was often the Governing Governor who encouraged safety and security meetings to join, communication between departments to improve and relationships to become more collaborative. In particular, some security governors noted that their more open and enabling approach was at the behest of their Governor:

They briefed me when I took over that I needed to improve the relationship with Safety. (Head of Security)

The Governor’s expectation is that we work collaboratively and that’s his expectation across the piste. (Head of Security)

Conversely, the Governor’s strong allegiance to one department over the other, most often security over safety, could create a perception of a power imbalance and further divide. Lack of support was equated to lack of investment, disproportionate allocation of resources or failure to drive and promote the priorities of the department. One Head of Safety described their Governor as having “a lack of attention to things that aren’t security conscious to get the violence down.”
As Liebling and Crewe’s findings (2016) would suggest, there was an increased drive to meet performance measures and less of an ethical or humanitarian rhetoric being communicated by Governors, with only a few exceptions. The value-orientation, as well as previous experience, of Governing Governors and Deputy Governors, was thought to influence their approach to each department although attaining performance targets was usually at the forefront of the Governor’s priorities:

I’d say the governor is safety focussed and the dep is security focussed. (Head of Safety)

He [the Governor] knows safer custody is important and that it’s a ministerial priority to reduce violence and get prisoners safer so he knows he’s got to focus on that but he sits more with security. (Head of Security)

In addition, significant events such as escapes, deaths in custody or poor inspection or audit findings impacted the Governor’s prioritisation of different departments and could change the working dynamic between security and safety:

Historically security has always held the upper balance, but now the consequences of a death in custody are very important to the Governor. Therefore he will flex his patronage of an area based on what is happening.
So for instance the security audit is coming up and I’m suddenly getting a load of resources. (Head of Security)

In addition, the culture of the wider SMT led by the Governor appeared to filter down to the officers and influence cohesiveness throughout the establishment. Those pairs that described a very supportive and united SMT appeared to have less of a struggle to gain staff buy-in and were able to deliver performance targets more easily than those teams where there was division, tension and a lack of trust:
The SMT are very supportive of each other so that’s a bonus. There is no backbiting, everybody is trying to make us the safest prison so that’s a big bonus here…it is very much a whole prison approach which I think is why we’ve managed to get a green [in the safety audit]. (Head of Safety)

However, interviewees, with the exception of one region, were unaware of any joint-working between regional security and safety teams. This led to mixed messages, duplication of work and an exacerbation of any competing priorities at establishment level. Many felt that stronger direction, a more cohesive approach to risk and sharing of best-practice at regional level could facilitate better collaboration.

*The role of the analysts*

The second main external contributor to the nature of the relationship between safety and security managers was the role of analysts. Security analysts make assessments of intelligence with a view to providing an overview of threats, vulnerabilities and risks within the establishment. A safety analyst role has recently been developed to focus on violence and safer custody trends. The competence, attitudes and in some cases availability or existence of analytical resources was pivotal to the effective communication and interaction between safety and security departments:

> To me safer custody and security should be one group, they are so interlinked, they should be sharing, certainly from an analytical point of view. (Head of Security)

The most cohesive relationships shared analytical resources or had analysts that had worked preciously in the other department:
I have a safety officer that I have worked with for two years and is now a security analyst, so he knows exactly what I need to know. (Head of Safety)

This gave analysts an understanding of the importance of information-sharing and the value of gaining a security and safety perspective when assessing risks within the establishments:

You get this cross-pollination twice a week in a formal setting and daily in an informal setting of dealing with the prisoners who we are both interested in. (Head of Security)

Where analysts were resistant to cross-departmental working, or where resources were extremely scarce, this had a negative impact on the interactions between the Heads of the departments. Not all safety departments had access to analysts which was a source of tension and often a blocker to joint-working and communication.

We should have [a safety analyst], but we don’t and the reason is I’d like to but I don’t want to take that resource away from me if that makes sense. (Head of Security)

A battle for resources

It was evident in this study that pressures on time and resources affected the relationship between safety and security managers and were regularly the reasons interviewees gave for an inability to work cohesively. The literature demonstrates that battling for resources and meeting targets does not support collaborative working (Cheliotis, 2006; Bennett, 2015).

If we both had shed loads of staff at our disposal regularly then I think we would absolutely be doing more work together…I think the problem is the resource and the time to do what we’d like to do. (Head of Safety)
This view supports Bennett’s (2015) findings that shared targets could facilitate collaborative working but that there can be competitiveness and distrust as a result of managers trying to hit targets and protect the interests of their own area:

I think you do get tunnel vision of your own department, especially when resources are involved. (Head of Safety)

Cross-deployment of staff and difficulty recruiting into key administrative roles fuelled a sense of struggling to cover all bases and increased reluctance to share or pool efforts:

I’m trying to fight my corner more than I have done in the past because my resources are taken from me all the time. (Head of Security)

Another Head of Security described consciously removing resources from some aspects of safety work because it was not possible to stretch resources to every priority. The perception of inadequate resources was a justification for more insular working and in establishments where resources were being shared, this was not seen as sustainable in the long-term:

Sometimes they [safer custody] want more from us, than we can give them in time and energy. (Head of Security)

The allocation of resource was perceived to be linked to the importance that the Governor was placing on safety and security priorities and at least half of the pairs both felt they were under-resourced in comparison to their counterpart:

As much as people keep saying safety is our number one priority…as far as resources go, in my opinion security are far superior to what we get in safety. (Head of Safety)

The structure of the departments and division of resources to achieve results, albeit inter-related, was therefore seen as inherently problematic and created a state of a continual
compromise and negotiation. These findings provide useful insight that more than shared-values and positive relationships between safety and security managers is required to attain meaningful collaborative working with positive outcomes.
5. Conclusion

This study sought to further develop the understanding of prison managers from the perspective of safety and security governors who are responsible for identifying, reducing and responding to complex risks, including suicides, crime and violence, within their establishment. Prison research to date has demonstrated that relationships are central to the quality of prison work. Both personal values and organisational structures influence the decisions, attitudes and priorities of prison managers (Liebling, 2004; Bennett, 2015). This study suggests that what is important to operational managers in these key roles and how they interact with one another is relevant to the quality and effectiveness of safety and security outcomes. It therefore matters who is in these roles and how they approach their work.

The quantitative and qualitative findings of this study demonstrate that personal values and job role are intrinsically linked. The survey results suggest that value-orientation has a strong correlation to job role, although most managers have a balanced value-orientation as opposed to a stronger commitment to harmony or security values. There was a broad spectrum of value-orientation scores highlighting diversity rather than homogeneity amongst governor grades. There was a continual interaction between the personal values of the Heads of Safety and Security and the distinct occupational culture of each role. This was often the result of individuals with certain characteristics and personality traits being selected by the Governor to take on a specific role within the management team. However, the governors interviewed were seen to adapt to their role and express stronger commitment to the values they felt were necessary to effectively carry out a safety or security role. Where personal and occupational values were not aligned, this was not insurmountable and was an
opportunity for personal development or to challenge stereotypes and push the boundaries of organisational expectations.

Heads of Safety were unanimous in their attitudes towards the importance of compassion, flexibility and a commitment to individual care in their role and appreciative of the need for security measures and controls. However, security governors were more divided with conflicting views expressed with regards to compassion, rehabilitation and commitment to joint-working. There were divisions between managers that embraced the traditional security culture of power, authority and insularity, and those that were trying to do things differently as a consequence of the changing priorities of HMPPS and increased focus on rehabilitative culture. This shift in security culture from traditional to an enabler of rehabilitative initiatives was not a comfortable transition for most and messaging from HMPPS was often conflicting. This changing face of security in prisons would therefore be worthy of further academic attention and organisational reflection.

This study further reinforced the findings of Bennett (2015) and Liebling and Crewe (2012) that managerialism has an increasing influence over the working practices of prison managers. Bennett’s study demonstrated that individual agency is heavily influenced by the organisational structure that prison managers work within and focus on managerialist targets and efficiency has continued to grow. In the context of diminishing resources and increasing complexity of prisoners and security risks, the findings of this study suggest managerialism has created greater tension between competing priorities. Safety governors, in particular, found the volume of managerialist processes to be detrimental to their ability to deliver prisoner-focussed outcomes. Safety and security governors strived to attain high audit and inspection scores and felt increased pressure to do so. This focus on targets could however distance prison management from moral and ethical considerations and encourage a
narrowing of managers’ attention to their own department’s needs over what is beneficial for the wider establishment. This study has therefore demonstrated the need for a review of the organisational structure itself in order for oversight mechanisms to support tangible outcomes rather than distracting operational resources from the practical implementation of safety and security objectives.

A clear framework to support and encourage a collaborative approach to shared or connected objectives would be welcomed. There was a clear recognition that it was desirable for safety and security functions to work more collaboratively but this was a challenge in most establishments. The extent of cohesion varied between establishments from siloed to supportive relationships. Prisons facing the most instability were more likely to retreat into siloed working rather than seeing joint-working as a means to improve their performance outcomes. There was little evidence of clashing values hindering working relationships between managers. The effectiveness of working relationships was however affected by external factors such as the influence of the Governing Governor, resistant staffing groups and a lack of resources. As HMPPS strives to improve safety outcomes and strengthen security across the prison estate, careful consideration of how to better nurture the relationship between these two departments and encourage and support improved cross-departmental working is necessary. Safety and security departments are likely to benefit from pooled analytical resources, open lines of communication at all levels rather than battling for resources and struggling to negotiate divided lines of responsibility. Whether the current managerial structure hinders effective cohesion should also be a consideration for the organisation.

This study has limitations as it was only able to include a small sample of operational managers in two roles within the SMT. Nonetheless the findings suggest that the nature of
relationships between senior managers will impact prison culture and affect both staff and prisoners’ perceptions of safety and legitimate security measures. Further research into the values and relationships of operational managers, beyond safety and security roles would be useful to further understand to what extent the SMT influence the culture and performance of the prison. It would be valuable to explore further the manner in which operational managers make decisions and balance competing priorities in the role of duty governor. This research also invites prison managers to reflect upon the composition and working-dynamic of their own SMT with a view to improving cross-departmental collaboration and outcomes.
References


Braithwaite, V (2009) Defiance in Taxation and Governance: Resisting and Dismissing Authority in a Democracy, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham, UK)


Appendix A - Braithwaite’s Inventory for harmony-security values

V. Braithwaite (2009) Defiance in Taxation and Governance: Resisting and Dismissing Authority in a Democracy, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham, UK) (p124)

**Security**

**Social and Economic Status**
- Economic Prosperity (being financially well off)
- Recognition by the Community (having a high standing in the community)
- Authority (having power to influence others and control decisions)
- Competitiveness (always trying to do better than others)
- Ambitious (being eager to do well)

**Propriety**
- Conscientious (being hard working)
- Polite (being well mannered)
- Patriotic (being loyal to your country)
- Prompt (being on time)
- Refined (never being course or vulgar)
- Clean (not having dirty habits)
- Self-disciplined (being self-controlled)
- Reliable (being dependable)
- Neat (being tidy)

**Competence and Effectiveness**
- Efficient (always using the best method to get the result)
- Showing Foresight (thinking and seeing ahead)
- Resourceful (being clever at finding ways to achieve a goal)
- Knowledgable (being well informed)
- Logical (being rational)

**National Strength and Order**
- National Greatness (being a united, strong, independent and powerful nation)
- National Security (protection of your nation from enemies)
- Rule of Law (living by laws that everyone might follow)
- National Economic Development (having greater economic progress and prosperity for the nation)
- Reward for individual effort (letting individuals prosper through gains made by initiative and hard work)

**Harmony**

**Personal Growth and Inner Harmony**
- Wisdom (having a mature understanding of life)
- The pursuit of knowledge (always trying to find out new things about the world we live in)
- Self-Knowledge/Self Insight (being more aware of what sort of person you are)
- Self-Respect (believing in your own worth)
- Self-Improvement (striving to be a better person)
- Inner Harmony (Feeling Free from Conflict within yourself)

**A positive orientation to others**
- Forgiving (Willing to Pardon Others)
- Trusting (having faith in others)
- Giving Others a Fair Go (Giving others a chance)
- Generous (sharing what you have with others)
- Understanding (able to share another’s feelings)
- Helpful (always ready to assist others)
- Cooperative (being able to work in harmony with others)

**International harmony and equality**
- A good life for others (improving the welfare of all people in need)
- Rule by the people (involvement by all citizens in making decisions that affect their community)
- International Cooperation (having all nations working together to help each other)
- Social Progress and Reform (Readiness to change our way of life for the better)
- A World at Peace (being free from war and conflict)
- Human Dignity (allowing each individual to be treated as someone of worth)
- A world of beauty (having the beauty of nature and the arts: music, literature, art)
- Equal Opportunity for all (giving everyone an equal chance in life)
- Greater Economic Equality (lessening the gap between the rich and the poor)
- Preserving the natural Environment (preventing the destruction of nature’s beauty and resources)
### Appendix B – Sample Survey Question

Q8. Please score each of the below societal values on the below scale based on how whether these items are important to you in your life.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clean (not having dirty habits)</th>
<th>I reject this</th>
<th>I am inclined to reject this</th>
<th>I neither reject nor accept</th>
<th>I am inclined to accept this</th>
<th>I accept this as important</th>
<th>I accept this as very important</th>
<th>I accept this as of the utmost importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognition by the community (having a high standing in the community)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Prosperity (being financially well off)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgiving (willing to pardon others)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logical (being rational)</td>
<td>○</td>
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<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law (living by the laws that everyone might follow)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conscientious (being hard working)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
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<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-respect (believing in your own worth)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
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<tr>
<td>Generous (sharing what you have with others)</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
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<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C - Participant Information Sheet

The pursuit of cohesion: An exploratory study on the values of, and the relationships between the Heads of Security and Heads of Safety in prisons

Abigail Sloan

I am currently carrying out research as part of a Masters in Criminology, Penology and Management at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge. This research has been subject to Institutional and Organisational approval. I am also an operational manager, currently in the position of Head of Security at HMP Brixton.

What is the study?

I am interested in the importance of values, impact of job role and peer-relationships in prisons from the perspective of Heads of Safety and Security. The work of safety and security are inextricably linked but national and regional policy teams are distinct entities. As prisons face increasingly complex challenges the need for effective working partnerships is crucial. This study should give an insight into the working lives of operational managers in some of the most complex prisons in England and Wales, namely Category B establishments. This work aims to complement existing research relating to prison managers and contribute to a growing body of literature exploring the complex relational environment of prisons where values and priorities often collide. It will be the first study to focus explicitly on Heads of Security and Heads of Safer Custody.

This work hopes to stimulate organisational reflection on the value-orientations of operational managers and the relationship between security and safer custody functions. It is hoped that a greater understanding of those managing the operational delivery of these priorities and what facilitates effective working partnerships will encourage improved organisational cohesion in order to achieve shared objectives.

What does participation involve?

Participation is voluntary and your decision to participate or not will not disadvantage you in any way. You can change your mind and withdraw from participation at any time and ask for removal of all or part of your data up until 31 August 2019.

Online Survey

This involves completion of an online survey that will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. This survey aims to establish the range of value-orientations within Heads of Safety and Security based on an established security-harmony scale.

This does require you to disclose your role and establishment for the purposes of identifying a suitable sample of potential interviewees. However, this data will only be held by the researcher and will not be personally attributed to you in the publication of any findings.

I intend to use the survey both to help me to understand the spread of value orientations, and to help me to select people whom I will interview.
**Interviews**

This will require you to participate in a one-to-one interview lasting between 45 – 90 minutes. Interviews will be arranged at a time and location of your convenience.

Interviews will be recorded and transcribed verbatim. These recordings will be treated as confidential and will be held securely for use in this research only. Transcripts will only be viewed by myself and my supervisor and all data will be deleted upon completion of the research. The data from the interview, including quotations will be used in the research findings. Any data will be anonymised to ensure that you cannot be identified by its use.

As you are aware, the Head of Security/Safety in your establishment is likely to also be a participant in this study. I will therefore not be disclosing establishment names and will attribute any quotes to job role e.g. Head of Security or Head of Safety rather than pseudonyms to ensure anonymity. If I wish to use a quote that may risk identification by your colleague, I will check with you in advance.

**Are there risks to taking part?**

The interview will entail questions relating to challenges faced in your role and your relationships with others. Depending on your circumstances, this may give rise to negative emotions. You do not have to answer any questions that you do not wish to and you will be given the opportunity at the end of the interview to discuss anything you found difficult. If you require any additional support, the Employee Assistance Programme is also available to you.

**What are the benefits of taking part?**

Participation cannot be financially rewarded, but you may feel that talking about your experiences and reflecting upon your working life and relationships helpful. You will also be contributing to an understanding of your role and relationships within SMTs which may advance academic understanding and inform future research and practice.

**How will the results be used?**

The research may be published upon completion and may form part of discussions and presentations with members of HMPPS as well as academics. The research findings may also contribute to further publications such as academic articles that I may wish to write. The final thesis along with a summary paper will be provided to HMPPS to inform future practice. You will also receive a copy of the summary paper.

Please be advised that should you want any further information or wish to complain about any aspect of the research, you can contact me directly or write to my supervisor, Dr Alice Ievins, Institute of Criminology, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge, CB3 9DA who will forward your query to the relevant person.

**Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet.**
Appendix D - Interview Schedule

Introduction explaining the aims of the study, ensuring participants have read and understood the participant sheet and signed the consent form. Explain structure of interview into three sections.

Background

Ask participant for a brief outline of their career history in 3 minutes? (including motivations for joining the service, other head of function roles held, establishments worked in how long they have worked in security/safer custody and previous Head of Function roles)

What are your daily priorities?

What is it like to be a head of function here? How does this compare to previous roles?

Current Role

Can you tell me about what motivated you to take on your current role?

What is the best part of or what do you enjoy most/find most valuable about your role?

- What makes a “good” head of Security/Safer custody?
- How would you compare your style to others?

Can you give me an example of time when a clash between the organisations expectations and your own personal views have led you to feeling uncomfortable or having to compromise?

- In what ways do you think your personal values and beliefs complement your role? Example? Does your current role influence how you make decisions?

How much power do you think you have in the establishment? Is this linked to your role or you as a person? What do you have influence over?

How confident do you feel in your job and what are the things that make you feel more/less confident?

Do you take your work home with you? How has the job impacted your personal life?

Value-orientation

How would you change the way we manage prisoners today? (regime, IEP, treatment)

- Can you give me an example where compassion or sympathy for offenders has helped you do your job/hindered you?
- Does the current system get the balance between prisoners rights and public protection?
- How does the current focus on a rehabilitative culture in prisons impact upon your work? Is this a good thing?

Can you tell me about a time where you’ve had to balance the rights of an individual with the interest of the wider establishment? What is difficult about these decisions?

In your opinion, how do you effectively achieve good order and reduce violence in prisons?

- Does coercion have a role in prisons?
- How would you describe good relationships?

Can you tell me a bit about the importance of performance measures in your job? Do they help/hinder you?

Why are you the way you are? Where do you get your confidence/moral compass from? Where do you think this came from?

Discuss survey score and reflect upon answers to above and discuss whether they would have considered themselves to be more security or harmony orientated.

What are the types of things that you have strong opinions on? What really bothers you? What are you most passionate about?

Interaction of Safety and Security

Can you explain how your role differs from that of Head of Safety/Security? How do your priorities differ?

Where do you think that your functions overlap?

What sorts of people do you think Heads of Security attract? What about Safety?

Can you describe your relationship with your Head of Safer custody/Security in three minutes?

- In what ways do you think you differ from your Head of Safer custody/Security? In what ways do you complement each other?
- What are some of the strengths/weaknesses of your relationship? What are the barriers to a better relationship?

What do you think is the organisations expectation of the relationship between the two functions?

- What is your Governor’s expectation of your relationship with each other?

In what ways could your relationship be more cohesive?

- How often do you meet? What information do you share? What is not shared and why?

How do you compare this to your relationships with other members of the SMT?

How do you manage and share the responsibility for risks with each other?

- Can you give me an example of when you have disagreed about how to manage a risk or an individual in the establishment? How was this resolved?
- Can you give an example of when you have worked together to resolve a problem with in your establishment?

Is there anything else that you would like to add?

Do you have any questions for me?
Appendix E - Consent Form

Project Title: The pursuit of cohesion: An exploratory study on the values of, and relationship between Heads of Security and Heads of Safety in prisons

Researcher: Abigail Sloan

Please tick the boxes if you agree with the following three statements.

1. I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet for the study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I do not have to answer any of the researcher’s questions if I do not wish to, and that I can withdraw my participation, without giving reasons, until 31st August 2019.

3. I agree to take part in the study, which means being interviewed by the researcher.

Please answer YES or NO to the following two statements by ticking the appropriate box.

4. I agree to my interview being recorded.

5. I agree to let the researcher use quotes from our interview and conversations, as long as this is done in such a way that I cannot be identified.

Name of participant:
Date:
Signature:

Name of researcher:
Date:
Signature: