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**Home Office Research Study 239**

# Evaluation of two intensive regimes for young offenders

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*The views expressed in this report are those of the authors, not necessarily those of the Home Office (nor do they reflect Government policy).*

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# Foreword

In the 1990s, there were calls to develop intensive regimes for young prisoners, along the lines of 'boot camps' in the United States. Two were set up for males aged 18-21: at a military establishment in Colchester and a Young Offender Institution called Thorn Cross. While neither regime exactly resembled an American boot camp, both were highly demanding.

Professor David Farrington (Cambridge University) organised a sophisticated evaluation of these regimes. Initial results, tracking prisoners for one year after their release, were published in 2000, as Research Findings 121. This showed that Thorn Cross ex-prisoners were reconvicted at a significantly lower rate than expected; but their Colchester counterparts did not achieve an equivalent improvement. The relative success of the Thorn Cross group was attributed to cognitive-behavioural thinking skills programmes and to substantial elements of education, training, mentoring and throughcare (whereas the Colchester regime was based primarily on physical activities).

For this more detailed report, the same groups were tracked over the longer period of two years. During the second year, the initial reduction in reconviction rates for the Thorn Cross group was not sustained. However, there were still important gains. First, over the two years as a whole, members of the Thorn Cross experimental group avoided reoffending for two months longer than a control group. Secondly, those in the Thorn Cross experimental group committed substantially fewer offences than the control group. Finally, the offences committed by the experimental group were less damaging. Cost-benefit analysis showed that, for every pound invested at Thorn Cross, a further five pounds was saved. By contrast, at Colchester, for every pound spent, almost as much again was lost.

Use of the military facilities at Colchester for non-military prisoners has ceased.

Chris Lewis  
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Many people have been involved in the implementation and evaluation of the Thorn Cross High Intensity Treatment (HIT) and Colchester Military Corrective Training Centre (MCTC) regimes. It is not possible to acknowledge them all by name. At Thorn Cross, Iain Windebank, Terry Williams and Liam Doyle were responsible for the regime. Mark Livingstone was the senior psychologist responsible for both the treatment and the assessments, and he also analysed the Thorn Cross assessment data. Area psychologist Graham Beck also contributed greatly, and psychologists Katie Bailey and Eddie Farren were involved in the evaluation at a later stage. At Colchester, Lieutenant Colonel Julian Crowe and Dick Peacock were responsible for the regime, and Gareth Hancock and Kate Painter were responsible for the assessments. Area psychologist Graham Towl also contributed greatly. Brigadier Ian Fulton and Major Lucy Stephens provided liaison from the Ministry of Defence. Gina Randall and Robert Jago assisted with the Colchester interviewing and Alan and Jacqueline Pate were responsible for computerising the interview data. Prison service area managers Ian Lockwood, Arthur de Frisching and Ivor Ward were generally responsible for the two regimes, and at prison service headquarters Kevin Heal, Tony Woolfenden, Richard Mason and Felicity Clarkson were involved in the development of the regimes and in the evaluation. John Ditchfield supervised the evaluation on behalf of the Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate, while Chris Kershaw and Philip Howard obtained criminal record and prison offending data and calculated reconviction prediction scores. Sam Brand and Philip Witcherly provided advice on the cost-benefit analyses and Darrick Jolliffe assisted with the analysis of Thorn Cross criminal record data. David Farrington had overall responsibility for the evaluation and particular responsibility for the analysis of Colchester assessment and criminal record data. This report was primarily written by David Farrington and efficiently word processed by Maureen Brown. For helpful comments on an earlier draft, we are very grateful to Carol Davies, Simon Jasper, Richard Mason, Martin Narey, Malcolm Ramsay, Roger Tarling, Graham Towl and Iain Windebank.

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## Summary

The aim of this research was to evaluate two intensive regimes for young offenders, one serving the North of England (Thorn Cross High Intensity Training – HIT – Centre) and one serving the South of England (Colchester Military Corrective Training Centre – MCTC). Both regimes included elements of Army life such as drilling, physical training, Outward Bound courses and full days of challenging and demanding activities. Colchester was more of a purely military regime, whereas the HIT regime combined military elements with a rehabilitative regime. Both regimes were labelled "boot camps" by the mass media but neither resembled an American "boot camp". Both regimes were introduced by Michael Howard when he was Home Secretary in the Conservative government and were intended to be rigorous and deterrent regimes for young offenders.

The HIT Centre was located in the grounds of Thorn Cross Young Offender Institution (YOI) near Warrington. The HIT regime basically added military training to a young offender regime designed according to the "what works" literature. The regime included educational, life skills and vocational training, programmes designed to address offending behaviour based on developing thinking skills, and a pre-release work placement in the community. The HIT Centre opened in July 1996 and is still operating. This evaluation covers the first two years of its operation, plus a two-year follow-up period in which reconvictions were assessed.

Colchester MCTC is an establishment for military offenders run by military staff. In 1997, the Prison Service agreed with the Ministry of Defence that civilian young offenders (YOs) should be accommodated in a special living unit on the site. This became Colchester YOI. The Governor was the Army Commandant, while the Deputy Governor was drawn from the Prison Service. Some civilian prison staff were outposted to Colchester, but the regime was mainly operated by military staff. There were no offending behaviour programmes but a lot of effort to help YOs with basic education, trade training, job applications, money management and similar practical life problems. Colchester YOI opened in February 1997 and was closed by the Labour government in March 1998 because it was considered to be too expensive. Colchester MCTC continues to accommodate military offenders.

Both regimes were evaluated by comparing "experimental" YOs who experienced them with "control" YOs who went to other YOIs. Initially, a pool of eligible YOs was identified in YOIs. YOs were eligible for HIT or Colchester basically if they had about six months of their

sentence left to serve and if they were considered suitable for open conditions (since both YOIs were open institutions). In practice, these two requirements were often mutually incompatible, causing case flow difficulties. In order to have six months left at the time of assessment, YOIs had to be serving a sentence of at least 15 -18 months, and few YOIs with such long sentences were suitable for open conditions. Therefore, the net had to be spread wide over many YOIs in the North, Midlands and South of England in order to identify a sufficient number of eligible YOIs for HIT and Colchester.

For HIT, the aim was to identify 28 eligible YOIs every five weeks, of whom 14 would be chosen at random for the HIT regime. However, because of case flow problems, the random allocation did not occur. In practice, YOIs who were not selected were those with less than six months to serve, those who did not want to go on the HIT programme or those whose behaviour in their current YOI gave cause for concern. The unselected YOIs were not exactly comparable with the selected YOIs. Therefore, a subset of unselected YOIs were chosen as controls, by matching them case by case with experimental YOIs on their predicted probability of reconviction. Unfortunately, this matching was not very exact, and it was still true that the controls were higher risk cases than the experimental YOIs. Therefore, in the main evaluation of the effects of the HIT programme on reoffending, predicted and actual reconviction rates of experimental and control YOIs were compared. The key issue was whether experimental and control YOIs differed in actual reconviction rates after controlling for pre-existing differences between them in predicted reconviction rates.

The reconviction analysis for the HIT regime was based on 176 experimental and 127 control YOIs. Taking account of predicted reconviction rates, HIT YOIs were significantly less likely to be reconvicted within one year than were control YOIs. This was true for HIT successes and HIT non-completers who spent at least six weeks in the HIT regime. HIT YOIs were not less likely to be reconvicted within two years than were control YOIs, but they did avoid reoffending for longer and commit fewer offences during this follow-up period. A cost-benefit analysis based on offences leading to reconviction showed that the savings from fewer crimes paid for the additional costs of the HIT regime. Taking account of undetected offences, the benefit:cost ratio for the HIT regime was at least 5 to 1. YOIs in earlier intakes did better, as did medium and high risk YOIs, younger offenders, those with three or more previous convictions, and those with no adjudications.

For Colchester, efforts were made from the beginning to assign eligible YOIs at random to experimental or control groups. The aim was to identify about 16-24 eligible YOIs every six weeks and to allocate 8-12 of them to the MCTC programme. However, the random assignment could not be maintained, partly because of the difficulty of identifying a



sufficient number of eligible YOs, partly because of the need to allow YOs to complete educational courses that they had started in their YOIs, and partly because allocating some YOs to Colchester would have caused visiting problems (because of the distance between Colchester and the YO's home). Therefore, for Colchester as well as HIT, predicted and actual reconviction rates of experimental and control YOs were compared. One problem for both regimes was that it was hard to persuade YOs to go to a regime that they perceived as unpleasant.

The reconviction analysis for the Colchester regime was based on 61 experimental and 97 control YOs. Taking account of predicted reconviction rates, there was no evidence that Colchester YOs were less likely to be reconvicted than control YOs within either one or two years. The cost-benefit analysis showed that experimental YOs committed more costly offences than did control YOs. Taking account of undetected offences, at least an additional 89 pence was lost for every £1 invested in Colchester YOI. There were indications that experimental YOs in earlier intakes did better, as did medium risk YOs and those with two or more previous convictions.

In addition to studying reconviction rates, the evaluation assessed changes in psychological assessments of thinking styles relevant to criminal behaviour, the ability to control aggression and attitudes to staff and inmates. It was expected that these abilities would be changed by the HIT programme and that they would be relevant to reoffending. The same tests were given in HIT and Colchester to experimental and control YOs just before experimental YOs went to HIT or Colchester (the pre-test) and just before the YOs were released (the post-test). The key comparison was between pre-test and post-test scores of experimental versus control YOs.

The psychological assessments showed that in the post-test HIT YOs had more favourable attitudes than control YOs to the YOI and to its staff, and that HIT YOs had greater control of aggression and higher self-esteem. However, HIT YOs had increased pro-offending attitudes, did not get on better with other inmates, were not more responsible, were not better behaved in the YOI, and did not find the regime less stressful.

Colchester YOs in the post-test also had more favourable attitudes than control YOs to the YOI and its staff, got on better with other inmates, felt less stress, and had higher self-esteem, greater physical fitness and more hope for the future. However, Colchester YOs were not more deterred from offending, did not have more anti-offending attitudes, did not have greater control of aggression, were not better behaved in the YOI, and did not have greater self-control.

It was concluded that the reduced number of reconvictions after HIT but not after Colchester was probably attributable to two key features of HIT that were not shared by Colchester. The HIT Centre used cognitive-behavioural skills training programmes based on the "what works" literature and made considerable efforts to find jobs for YO's both in the last five weeks of the programme and after release. While it is clear that many YO's liked being kept busy all day, liked an Army-style regime, liked sports and physical training, and became healthier, fitter and more self-confident, none of these benefits seemed to be followed by decreased reconviction rates. Certainly, these regimes did not deter offending by applying tough "boot camp" treatment.

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# 1. History and description of the Thorn Cross HIT regime

## American "boot camps"

Boot camp prisons were first introduced in the United States in 1983 in Georgia and Oklahoma. The focus of these early programmes was on creating a military atmosphere, with drilling, physical training, strict discipline and hard labour. Staff and inmates wore military uniforms and inmates entered in groups as squads or platoons. Later programmes added rehabilitative components such as counselling, academic education, cognitive-behavioural skills training and drug treatment. Boot camp prisons became more and more popular, and 36 states had them by 1994. Doris MacKenzie (1994; see also MacKenzie *et al.*, 1995) carried out the first large-scale evaluation of their use in eight states. Most were designed for young non-violent offenders without a previous extensive serious criminal history.

MacKenzie and her colleagues (1995) reported that inmates found the rules, discipline and activities stressful, especially in the first few weeks. They complained about verbal abuse and harsh treatment by staff. However, they also became physically fit and free from drugs. Compared with control inmates, boot camp inmates were more hopeful about the future, and especially hopeful about their chances of getting jobs. The boot camp staff were very enthusiastic about the programmes. They viewed their role as being supportive and helpful in enabling offenders to take responsibility for their actions and to change in positive ways. Probation and parole staff were generally more sceptical, but they reported that the improved appearance and training of offenders helped them to obtain employment. However, these staff emphasised how difficult it was for offenders when they returned home to face the influence of dysfunctional families, drug-using friends, and poor employment opportunities.

MacKenzie and her colleagues (1995) found that recidivism rates of boot camp inmates (compared with controls in other prisons) were lower in three states, higher in one state, and no different in four states. The programmes with lower recidivism rates were those that devoted the most time during the boot camp to rehabilitative activities, and those with more intensive supervision after release. Hence, Mackenzie (1994) concluded that the military elements of boot camps did not reduce recidivism.

The most recent and most exhaustive review of the effects of boot camp prisons on recidivism was completed by MacKenzie *et al.* (2001). They identified 44 controlled studies of the effects of boot camps on recidivism (i.e. comparing boot camp inmates with comparable control samples). Nine found that boot camps reduced recidivism, eight found that boot camps increased recidivism, and 27 found no effect on recidivism. The overall weighted average odds ratio was 1.02, not significantly different from the chance figure of 1.00. The only positive result was that boot camps for adults with after-care treatment led to reduced recidivism (odds ratio = 1.46). Therefore, the existing literature does not suggest that the military elements of boot camp prisons are effective in reducing recidivism.

### **History of the Thorn Cross HIT regime**

In light of the widespread concern about crime committed by young offenders that followed the James Bulger killing in 1993, Home Secretary Michael Howard visited the United States in January 1994. During this visit, he inspected a shock incarceration programme (popularly known as a "boot camp") in Texas. On his return, he commissioned the Prison Service to develop proposals for an intensive regime for young offenders which drew on the positive elements of American boot camp programmes.

In November 1994, a steering group under the chairmanship of Ian Lockwood, North West Area Manager, was formed to oversee the introduction of an intensive regime into the Prison Service. A project group chaired by Iain Windebank, Governor of Thorn Cross Young Offender Institution (YOI), was formed to plan, prepare and implement such a regime under the guidance of the steering group. Thorn Cross YOI was chosen to pilot the innovation because its regime and staff were perceived to be positive and because it had an unused residential unit available.

The terms of reference for the project group were agreed: to consider and make recommendations to the steering group on the setting up, monitoring and evaluation of a pilot regime which was to draw on the positive elements of American boot camp prisons. The terms of reference specified that the regime was to include:

- vigorous and demanding activities undertaken during a long, full and active day;
- sentence planning to determine the best use of time in custody and under supervision after release for each young offender;
- group work to address offending behaviour and encourage young offenders to think for themselves about how they behave and the effects on themselves and others;

- use of group pressure to encourage conformity and positive attitude change;
- basic education for those with inadequate literacy and numeracy skills;
- NVQ-based vocational training;
- involvement of the home probation officer in throughcare to ensure a smooth transition from custody to supervision in the community.

The young offenders who were to participate in this experiment were to be in the final stages of their sentences. It was thought that consideration should be given to including community work in the regime, as well as involving outside employers who might offer jobs on release.

The project group initially undertook a survey of available literature on the effectiveness of boot camps in the United States, the "what works" literature (e.g. McGuire, 1995; Vennard *et al.*, 1997) and the lessons learned from the "tough detention centres" or "short sharp shock" initiative of the early 1980s (Thornton *et al.*, 1984). Members of the project group paid visits to Colchester Military Corrective Training Centre (MCTC), the Airborne Initiative in Scotland (an Outward Bound initiative run by former members of the Airborne Regiments) and the United States.

During the American visit, two members of the Project Group were able to visit four boot camp prisons in and around Washington (DC), Pennsylvania and New York City. They were also able to meet and discuss the available and emerging research literature on boot camps with several leading academics, including Doris MacKenzie of the University of Maryland and Thomas Castellano of the US National Institute of Justice.

Although the original boot camp prisons were based on basic military training with a strong emphasis on drill, hard physical labour and strict discipline, there was a clear move by the newer facilities towards a much greater emphasis on education and training, challenging offending behaviour, improving life and social skills, improving employability and using planned release back into the community through halfway houses. Members of the project group concluded that the military regime had little or no effect on reconviction rates.

The proposals for a new intensive regime for young offenders were submitted to the Prisons Board on May 15, 1995 and to the Home Secretary and Minister of State for the Home Office on May 22, 1995. Approval to proceed with the programme was given on September 18, 1995 and announced by Home Secretary Michael Howard on September 25, 1995. The name High Intensity Training (HIT) Programme was chosen as the name for the project. The announcement was as follows:

The Prison Service has drawn up detailed plans for a tough, disciplined and demanding new regime for young offenders, designed to break the cycle of reoffending.

The regime will be piloted next year at a special unit at Thorn Cross YOI in Cheshire.

Prisoners will face a rigorous 16-hour day, starting with drill before breakfast and ending at 10 p.m. following a full and active daily programme.

Home Secretary Michael Howard came to Prison Service Headquarters at Cleland House to announce the plans. He told the Press Conference:

*"It is my duty as Home Secretary to look at every possible way of reducing crime. That is why I asked the Prison Service to take a fresh look at how young offenders are dealt with.*

*The new high intensity training regime to be introduced at Thorn Cross YOI will have discipline and hard work as its foundation. A prisoner's day will start at 6 a.m. sharp with drill and will be followed by an intensive schedule of training, education, work and other physical activity.*

*The emphasis will be on personal responsibility underlined throughout by very strict standards of behaviour.*

*Prisoners will be living in plain, austere accommodation. They will have very few personal possessions and will have to earn the very limited number of privileges available to them through good behaviour in the knowledge that they will be punished if they break the rules.*

*I am determined to reduce the level of reoffending among the 18 to 21 age group and believe that this combination of deterrence, discipline and training will be a step in the right direction."*

Some building work is required at Thorn Cross costing £1.7 million. This will take six months to complete after planning permission is granted and [the HIT Centre] is expected to open in the summer of 1996.

Young offenders will be selected from those with six months of their sentence left to serve who would benefit from the regime. At the end of the period in custody there will be work or further training in the community as well as intensive supervision after release.

In light of the new regime, the Prison Rules were changed in July 1996 as follows:

### ***Maintenance of order and discipline***

41 (1) Order and discipline shall be maintained, but with no more restriction than is required in the interests of security and well-ordered community life.

(1A) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), regimes may be established at young offender institutions under which stricter order and discipline are maintained and which emphasise strict standards of dress, appearance and conduct, provided that no inmate shall be required to participate in such a regime unless he has been first assessed as being suitable for it and no inmate shall be required to continue with such a regime if at any time it appears that he is no longer suitable for it.

(1B) For the purposes of paragraph (1A), whether an inmate is suitable for a stricter regime is to be assessed by reference to whether he is sufficiently fit in mind and body to undertake it and whether, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, experience of the regime will further his rehabilitation.

(2) In the control of inmates, officers shall seek to influence them through their own example and leadership and to enlist their willing cooperation.

### **Description of the regime**

In 1996-98, High Intensity Training was a 25-week programme comprising five phases of five weeks with a maximum of 14 young offenders (YOs) recruited into the programme every five weeks (Beck, 1997). Each of the five phases was based around a specific theme aimed at reducing each YO's risk of reoffending in the future. Progression through the phases was not dependent on the achievement of goals. YOs wore quasi-military style uniforms with bomber jackets, different coloured epaulettes on their shirts signifying their phase, and army boots.

### ***Phase 1: Initial assessment***

The first five weeks were geared toward assessing the educational, physical, personal and offending behaviour needs of each YO entering the programme. Basic education (including physical training) was provided, for example to develop basic skills in reading and writing. The HIT Centre operated the sentence management system introduced by the Prison Service (in which specific throughcare and offending behaviour targets were set for individual prisoners). The last week of Phase 1 was an Outward Bound course in Snowdonia or the Lake District ("Partnership and Leadership Skills") aimed at fostering group cohesion and team building in a demanding environment.

### ***Phase 2: Basic skills***

The second five weeks of the programme focused on classroom-based activity in which the YOs began to work toward nationally recognised educational qualifications, commenced a programme of basic life and social skills (e.g. managing finances, applying for jobs, interview skills) and took the accredited Enhanced Thinking Skills (ETS) course. The ETS comprises 20 two-hour group sessions of cognitive-behavioural intervention aimed at addressing some of the thinking styles associated with offending behaviour (see Ross and Ross, 1995; McGuire, 2001). Areas addressed include understanding the experiences of victims and the consequences of offending, problem solving skills, challenging thinking that leads to crime, managing emotions such as anger and anxiety, and dealing with others, including social skills and assertiveness training. The education programme culminated in week five of this phase when each YO gave a presentation on a topic of his choice to an audience of other YOs and programme staff.

### ***Phase 3: Vocational training***

The third five weeks of the programme were based around vocational training courses in a variety of fields (e.g. painting and decorating, plastering, welding, motor mechanics, catering, industrial cleaning), leading to relevant national qualifications. The type of vocational training was matched closely to the type of work/placement the YO would be undertaking in Phase 5. In vocational training, HIT YOs mixed with YOs from the rest of Thorn Cross YOI. Also during this phase, individual case conferences were held, to which external supervising probation officers were invited, and the offending behaviour programme continued. The purpose of the case conferences was to assess progress to date and set new targets where appropriate.



**Phase 4: Pre-release**

The fourth set of five weeks focused on pre-release issues. The YOs on the programme completed any outstanding vocational or education work, engaged in life and social skills training relevant to life outside prison and undertook a further programme of group work aimed at reducing reoffending after release. In the offending behaviour programme, attempts were made to challenge rationalisations and justifications for crime and to encourage YOs to resist peer pressure to offend after release. During this phase YOs attended interviews with prospective employers or training placements. On the final Friday before Phase 5, each YO was presented with his National Record of Achievement (detailing his qualifications gained in the HIT Centre) at an award ceremony.

**Phase 5: Community placement**

The last set of five weeks comprised a work or training placement in the community. The YOs were released on temporary licence from the programme each Monday and returned to the HIT Centre each Friday. Release was based on a risk assessment and an appropriate address (as verified by the Probation Service). YOs' placements were near their homes and could be long distances from Thorn Cross, for example in Hull or Birmingham. They might or might not be paid. The Phase 5 placement aimed to provide the YOs with a permanent job or training opportunity following release. During the Phase 5 placement they received support from their personal officers and from mentors in the community matched by the Society of Voluntary Associates (SOVA). The YO had to meet with his SOVA mentor at least once a week.

**A typical day**

The HIT programme operated a 16 hour day of structured activity beginning at 06.00 hours and finishing at 22.00 hours each weekday (07.30 - 21.00 at weekends). A typical weekday on the programme was as follows:

06.00	Rise, clean room and unit
06.40	Room inspection
07.20	Drill
08.00	Breakfast
08.30	Skills training, education, offending behaviour programme
12.00	Lunch
13.00	Physical education
14.15	Skills training, education, offending behaviour programme

16.45	Personal hygiene
17.00	Evening meal
18.00	Evening class (e.g. art, drama, computing, drug awareness)
20.00	Group meeting
20.30	Earned privileges
21.45	Personal hygiene
22.00	Lights out

The HIT programme was delivered by a carefully selected, multi-disciplinary team of well-trained and motivated staff with a clear sense of purpose and direction. They were selected through an assessment centre process specifically to work at the HIT Centre, and hence were considered particularly suitable to operate the regime and to deal with the particular YO population. All staff received a 9-week training course to supplement their existing skills; for example, all were trained as Sports and Games officers, in understanding adolescents, in managing aggression, and in the delivery of the ETS course.

In the early days of the programme all staff were actively involved in its design, thus creating a great deal of enthusiasm and ownership of the programme. However, there was a three-month gap between staff being appointed and YOs being received and this diminished the initial enthusiasm somewhat. The HIT staff also visited Colchester MCTC. The HIT programme received its first cohort of 14 YOs on July 22, 1996 and became fully operational with a full complement of 70 YOs by the end of 1996.

### **Operation of the HIT regime**

As might have been expected, the HIT regime experienced teething troubles. The first two intakes of YOs took advantage of the fact that everything was new and challenged every part of the programme. This had a negative effect on later intakes. Initially, staff were reluctant to use disciplinary procedures because of the risk of mass absconding or programme failures, especially in light of the media interest in the HIT Centre.

YOs did not like the disciplined and austere regime. Out of the 29 YOs in the first two intakes, only 12 completed the programme; 8 failed during phases 1-4 (including five who absconded) and 9 failed during phase 5. In order to reduce absconding, new intake YOs were housed upstairs in the living unit, and the doors were locked at night.

Staff and YOs did not like the long hours. By the evening, both were mentally and physically tired, and it was especially difficult to keep the attention of the YOs during the evening class from 18.00 - 20.00. YOs did not like and were not used to classroom-based activities.

Changes were made to overcome these teething troubles. Staff morale was generally high and staff were enthusiastic about the regime. They felt that YOs gained from the emphasis on cleaning kit and rooms. The rooms were spotless and the YOs had pride in their appearance. Drill sessions were thought to be excellent team-building exercises; the fact that the YOs drilled in teams meant that there was peer pressure on individuals to look good as a group and to get the drilling right. Also, the drill sessions provided opportunities for YOs to show off their immaculate kit and highly polished boots, and to increase their self-confidence. The kit and drilling of YOs were marked by staff and the marks determined the incentives and privileges received by the YOs.

An early report on the HIT Centre was positive (Appleyard, 1996). Terry Williams, Head of the HIT Centre, was quoted as saying:

*I personally don't think there's any comparison between the HIT unit and the American style boot camp. This is a positive approach to dealing with young offenders.*

The reporter noted that "...the day starts early. Rising at 6 to begin a gruelling 16-hour day, their first task is to clean their cell for inspection". Nevertheless, "the cells are immaculate". Terry Williams also explained:

*The room inspection and the drill are for the same thing. It's about working together, pride in appearance and building self-esteem and structure in your life because that's what most of these young men lack.*

However, the reporter also noted that:

*Instilling this kind of ethic into what must be a difficult group of young men is draining on the staff. A highly structured regime needing constant supervision means that staff have very little time to relax. Combined with the pressure to make this new initiative succeed, the stress staff are under is intense, but so too is their will to meet the programme's aims.*

A full inspection of Thorn Cross YOI was carried out by the Chief Inspector of Prisons in September 1998, at the end of the time period covered by this evaluation (Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1999). The report on the HIT Centre was glowing:

*The HIT Centre was one of the most exciting developments in the Prison Service. It was an inspiring attempt to create a whole regime that was not only a full and active one, but one that promoted change and progression in its participants at every turn and that followed this up with help in finding work and support in the community after release. Young prisoners completing the course had a real opportunity to benefit from the experience of being in prison – something that is far removed from the often very destructive nature of prison life. We commend the enterprise as good practice (p. 29).*

The Chief Inspector noted that staff and YOs in the HIT Centre rarely mixed with those from the rest of the establishment. The HIT Centre had significantly more staff resources than the remainder of the YOI. The Chief Inspector also noted that "the standard of cleanliness was the highest we have seen in a prison" (p.23). YOs told him that the regime was better than anywhere else in the country, that the staff were friendly, that the training was positive and constructive but hard, and that the Offending Behaviour programmes were challenging but also boring and tiring because of the long day. They liked the Outward Bound course, but they thought that weekends were boring because there were no organised activities. The frequent drug testing meant that it was not worth the risk of taking drugs.

## **Conclusions**

The main aims of the HIT regime were:

- to reduce the risk of reoffending, using knowledge from the "what works" literature
- to provide YOs with vigorous and demanding activities during a full and active day
- to provide nationally recognised education qualifications and vocational training
- to facilitate the reintegration of YOs back into the community following release.

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## 2.

## Analysis of HIT reconvictions

### Allocation criteria

YOs were eligible for allocation to the HIT regime if they:

- (a) were male, aged 18-21;
- (b) had about six months to serve;
- (c) were suitable for open conditions (no previous abscond/escape or sex offence);
- (d) had an IQ of 80 or more; and
- (e) had no history of mental illness.

Unfortunately, conditions (b) and (c) were inherently incompatible. For a YO to have six months left to serve when assessed, he would have had to have received, at the most optimistic, a sentence of at least 15 months (and hence spend 7.5 months in custody). Given the delays in identifying suitable YOs and in sending out selection teams to YOIs, plus the time spent in custody before sentence, most YOs with at least six months left to serve would have had to have received a sentence of at least 18 months. A person aged 18-21 would not receive such a sentence unless he was a serious violent offender or recidivist burglar (or similar), in which case he would probably not be considered suitable for open conditions. Indeed, the fact that Thorn Cross is one of only three open YOIs in England and Wales shows that YOs who are suitable for open conditions are thin on the ground. YOs serving sentences of up to four years were considered eligible for HIT.

### Design of the evaluation

The original plan was to identify 28 suitable YOs every five weeks and randomly allocate 14 of them to the HIT Centre and 14 to the control group. Unfortunately, this plan could not be carried through successfully. The main problem was that it was difficult to identify a sufficient number of suitable YOs, even though a wide net was cast over at least 13 YOIs in the North of England and the Midlands. There were suspicions that some YOIs were

concealing the existence of suitable YOs, especially if they were considered "good" prisoners whom they did not want to lose. At the beginning of the HIT programme, some staff in other YOIs were under the misapprehension that HIT would take troublesome YOs who were unsuitable for their regime and "give them hell". These staff did not encourage well behaved YOs to go to the HIT Centre, especially as such YOs would often be dropping down to a regime with fewer privileges.

The number of suitable YOs was increased by relaxing the selection algorithm for open conditions if it was felt that the YO presented a low risk to the public. In practice, the only types of offenders who were excluded were sex offenders and serious drug dealers; many violent offenders were considered suitable for the HIT regime.

Potential experimental YOs were identified initially by allocation unit staff in feeder YOIs (predominantly Hindley, Lancaster Farms, Stoke Heath and Brinsford). A selection team from the HIT centre visited each of the feeder YOIs and interviewed all potential experimental YOs, administered psychological tests and checked records. The selection process placed particular emphasis on a YO's motivation to address offending behaviour and his likelihood of absconding. YOs who did not wish to go to the HIT Centre, or who threatened to abscond if they were sent there, were not selected, as it was considered that such YOs were unlikely to respond well to the regime. Selection teams tried to "sell" the HIT programme to suitable YOs, by emphasising the physical challenge, that they would get qualifications, that they spent the last five weeks out in the community, and that they would be helped to find a job.

Control YOs were drawn from those who were eligible according to the above criteria but not selected. The main reason why they were not selected was because they had less than six months to serve on their current sentence. Also, YOs were not selected because they were considered to lack motivation for the HIT programme or because their behaviour in their current YOI suggested that they were not suitable for the HIT programme. Selection teams gave priority to filling the 14 HIT places and realised that the controls would be higher risk YOs on average. However, all control YOs were matched case-by-case with experimental YOs on the Copas *et al.* (1994) risk of reconviction score. It was possible to identify control YOs for only about two-thirds of experimental YOs.

Table 2.1 shows the number of YOs selected in the first 15 intakes (up to the end of 1997). A total of 184 experimental YOs started the HIT programme, but 43 did not complete Phase 1-4 and a further 35 did not complete Phase 5, leaving 106 HIT completers. Of the 43 who did not complete Phase 1-4, 27 absconded or failed to return, 6 failed because of disruptive bullying, 6 failed the PALS course (Partnership and Leadership Skills – the Outward Bound

course) and 4 were found to be unsuitable on further assessment. Of the 35 who did not complete Phase 5, 24 breached the licence conditions (e.g. not turning up for a job), 5 had positive drug tests, 3 were arrested, 2 refused the placement, and 1 was disruptive.

**Table 2.1** *Number of HIT YO's included in the evaluation*

Intake	Date	No. exptal.	No. DNC phases 1-4	No. DNC phase 5	No. Completers	No. controls
1	22. 7.96	15	4	3	8	8
2	27. 8.96	14	4	6	4	5
3	30. 9.96	14	3	4	7	8
4	4.11.96	11	1	4	6	7
5	9.12.96	11	6	0	5	6
6	13. 1.97	14	2	0	12	12
7	17. 2.97	12	3	1	8	11
8	24. 3.97	13	4	0	9	10
9	28. 4.97	11	2	3	6	6
10	2. 6.97	10	2	2	6	9
11	7. 7.97	10	0	4	6	8
12	11. 8.97	11	2	1	8	11
13	15. 9.97	10	0	3	7	3
14	20.10.97	14	6	1	7	12
15	24.11.97	14	4	3	7	14
Total		184	43	35	106	130

Note: DNC=Did not complete

## Results obtained with assessments

The before/after comparisons of psychological assessments were completed by relatively small numbers of YO's, and the results were not very clear-cut (none were statistically significant although two were almost significant at  $p = .05$ ). In the post-test, they show that:

- Experimental YO's had more favourable attitudes to the YOI and its staff
- Experimental YO's had greater control of aggression
- There were indications that experimental YO's had higher self-esteem

However:

- Experimental YO's had increased pro-offending attitudes
- Experimental YO's did not get on better with other inmates

- Experimental YOs were not more responsible
- Experimental YOs were not better behaved in the YOI
- Experimental YOs did not find the regime less stressful

These results are presented in detail in Appendix A.

## **Analysis of reconvictions**

The analysis of reconvictions aimed to compare predicted and actual reconviction rates of experimental and control YOs at one and two years after release. The key issue was whether experimental and control YOs differed in actual reconviction rates after controlling for pre-existing differences between them in predicted reconviction rates. Predicted reconviction scores were derived from the Offenders Index, while actual reconvictions were obtained from the Police National Computer (PNC). Of the 314 YOs (184 experimentals and 130 controls) in the first 15 intakes of the HIT Centre, 11 (8 experimentals and 3 controls) could not be found in either OI or PNC. Therefore, the one-year analysis of reconvictions was based on 303 YOs (176 experimentals, 127 controls).

The Police National Computer was searched on December 11, 2000 for reconvictions. In light of the delay of about two months between the occurrence of a conviction and its recording in the PNC, it is likely that convictions occurring up to October 11, 2000 would be recorded. The YOs' release dates ranged from February 4, 1997 to December 21, 1998, with a median date of September 5, 1997. Therefore, all except one of the YOs had been at risk of reconviction for at least two years, and the two year analysis of reconvictions was based on 302 YOs.

## **Reconviction prediction scores**

Two reconviction prediction scores were derived for open YOIs and calculated for each YO. These were based on the same principles as the revised OGRS score (Taylor, 1999). The first estimated the probability of a YO being reconvicted within one year of release, while the second estimated the probability of a YO being reconvicted within two years of release. The scores were based on data from the Offenders Index about age at sentence, age at first conviction, number of previous convictions, number of previous imprisonments, and number of previous offences of various types.



How accurate was the reconviction prediction score in predicting the actual percentage reconvicted? In Table 2.2, the prediction scores are divided approximately into quartiles. For example, on the two-year score, as many as 77 YO's had a greater than 90 per cent predicted probability of reconviction. It can be seen that the actual percentage reconvicted increased with the prediction score. Actual percentages were greater than predicted at the bottom end (low prediction scores) and less than predicted at the top end (high prediction scores), possibly reflecting statistical regression to the mean. Predicted and actual percentages agreed in the middle range for two-year prediction scores, but actual percentages were less than predicted in the middle range for one-year prediction scores.

**Table 2.2 Predicted versus actual reconvictions**

Prediction score (%)	Number of YO's	Mean prediction score	Percent actually reconvicted
One year			
0-30	87	16.9	24.1
31-50	58	41.1	29.3
51-70	66	60.5	48.5
71-100	92	82.5	66.3
Total	303	51.0	43.2
Two year			
0-50	72	31.3	41.7
51-75	69	64.6	63.8
76-90	84	83.8	81.0
91-100	77	95.6	88.3
Total	302	69.9	69.5

In total, 43.2 per cent of YO's were reconvicted in one year, compared with the prediction of 51.0 per cent; and 69.5 per cent of YO's were reconvicted in two years, compared with the prediction of 69.9 per cent. None of the predicted and actual percentages was significantly different on a chi-squared test, but the total one-year percentages were nearly significantly different (chi-squared = 3.58, 1 df,  $p = .058$ ). The 70 per cent reconviction probability of these YO's is similar to the 72 per cent figure for all male offenders aged 18-20 serving a sentence of over 12 months up to four years released from prison in 1997 (Home Office, 2001, Table 9.4).

The actual figure (based on the PNC) may be slightly less than the predicted figure (based on the Offenders Index) because the predicted figure includes "pseudo-reconvictions"; that is, reconvictions occurring after release for offences committed before a YO's current term of

custody. Such "pseudo-reconvictions" were excluded from the present analysis of actual reconvictions. All YOs (except one) who had a pseudo-reconviction also had an actual reconviction for an offence committed after release.

### Predicted versus actual reconvictions

Were experimental YOs less likely to be reconvicted than control YOs, taking account of the predicted reconviction rates of both groups? Table 2.3 shows that experimental YOs were less likely to be reconvicted in one year than predicted (predicted 47.2%, actual 34.7%; chi-squared = 5.86,  $p = .015$ ), whereas control YOs were reconvicted in one year about as often as predicted (predicted 56.1%, actual 55.1%). These figures were first published by Farrington *et al.* (2000). Average one-year prediction scores were significantly greater for controls than for experimentals ( $t = 2.85$ ,  $p < .005$ ). However, being an experimental or a control YO significantly predicted actual reconviction rates after controlling for predicted reconviction rates in a logistic regression analysis (Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared or LRCS = 7.54, 1 df,  $p = .006$ ). This analysis investigates the effect of the HIT regime after controlling for pre-existing differences between experimental and control YOs.

**Table 2.3 Predicted versus actual reconvictions of experimental versus controls**

	Experimentals			Controls		
	No. YOs	Mean pred. score	Percent reconv.	No. YOs	Mean pred. Score	Percent reconv.
Total						
One year	176	47.2	34.7	127	56.1	55.1
Two years	175	66.4	65.1	127	74.7	75.6
Successes						
One year	105	41.5	31.4	83	50.5	49.4
Two years	105	61.6	62.9	83	70.3	69.9
Non-completers						
One year	71	55.7	39.4	44	66.7	65.9
Two years	70	73.6	68.6	44	83.0	86.4

Experimental YOs were not less likely to be reconvicted in two years than predicted (predicted 66.4%, actual 65.1%), and neither were control YOs (predicted 74.7%, actual 75.6%). Average two-year prediction scores were significantly greater for controls than for

experimentals ( $t = 2.85$ ,  $p = .005$ ). Not surprisingly, being an experimental or a control YO did not significantly predict actual two-year reconviotion rates after controlling for predicted two-year reconviotion rates (LRCS = 0.89, n.s.).

Of the 176 experimental YOs, 105 were "successes" who completed the HIT programme, while 71 were non-completers. Did the successes do better than the non-completers, in terms of reconviotions? The controls who were matched with experimental successes are termed "control successes", while the controls who were matched with experimental non-completers are termed "control non-completers".

Table 2.3 shows that experimental successes were less likely to be reconvioted in one year than predicted (predicted 41.5%, actual 31.4%; n.s.), whereas control successes were reconvioted in one year almost as often as predicted (predicted 50.5%, actual 49.4%). Being an experimental or control success almost significantly predicted actual reconviotion rates after controlling for predicted reconviotion rates (LRCS = 3.62,  $p = .057$ ). However, experimental and control successes were reconvioted in two years about as often as predicted.

Experimental non-completers were also less likely to be reconvioted in one year than predicted (predicted 55.7%, actual 39.4%;  $p = .066$ ), whereas control non-completers were reconvioted in one year as often as predicted (predicted 66.7%, actual 65.9%). Being an experimental or control non-completer significantly predicted actual reconviotion rates after controlling for predicted reconviotion rates (LRCS = 4.45,  $p = .034$ ). Experimental non-completers were somewhat less likely to be reconvioted in two years than predicted (predicted 73.6%, actual 68.6%), whereas control non-completers were somewhat more likely (predicted 83.0%, actual 86.4%). In the two-year analysis, being an experimental or a control non-completer almost significantly predicted actual reconviotion rates after controlling for predicted reconviotion rates (LRCS = 2.92,  $p = .087$ ).

Of the 71 experimental non-completers, 19 failed in Phase 1 (the first five weeks), usually because of absconding, and so arguably experienced little of the HIT regime. In contrast, 35 failed in Phase 5 (the last five weeks) when they were allowed out during the week to work, usually because they failed to work satisfactorily. These YOs had experienced most of the HIT regime. The other 17 YOs failed between weeks 6 and 20, and so again had experienced a substantial part of the HIT regime.

Table 2.4 shows predicted versus actual reconviction rates for experimental non-completers in relation to time spent in the HIT centre. For the one-year follow-up, the greatest difference between predicted and actual reconviction rates was for those who spent 6-20 or 21 or more weeks in the HIT centre. Those who spent at least six weeks in the HIT centre were reconvicted considerably less than predicted (predicted 54.2%, actual 34.6%; chi-squared = 3.68, p = .055). For the two-year follow-up, experimental YO's had slightly lower than predicted reconviction rates irrespective of the time they spent in the HIT centre.

**Table 2.4    Reconvictions of experimental non-completers versus time spent in HIT**

Weeks spent in HIT	No. YOs	One year		No. YOs	Two years	
		Mean pred. score	Percent reconv.		Mean Pred. Score	Percent reconv.
1-5	19	59.7	52.6	19	80.2	73.7
6-20	17	55.3	35.3	16	71.5	68.8
21+	35	53.7	34.3	35	71.1	65.7
6+	52	54.2	34.6	51	71.2	65.7

**Further analysis of one-year reconviction rates**

As mentioned, there were teething troubles with the early experimental intakes in the HIT centre, as staff and YO's became familiar with and adjusted to the new regime. For example, there were somewhat more failures in the early intakes (1-7) than in the later ones (8-15); 44.3 per cent as opposed to 36.4 per cent (chi-squared = 1.16, n.s.). It might perhaps be expected that experimental YO's in the earlier intakes would be less successful than those in the later intakes, when the regime had settled down. However, Table 2.5 shows that YO's in the earlier intakes (1-7) were relatively more successful in one-year reconviction rates (predicted 43.9%, actual 27.3%; chi-squared = 5.54, p = .019). This may possibly be because the HIT centre was not full during this time, so that more time could be devoted to each YO. It is also likely that the staff were more enthusiastic at the start.

It might also be expected that the HIT programme would be more effective for medium risk YO's. Arguably, low risk YO's are unlikely to be reconvicted irrespective of the regime, while high risk YO's are likely to be reconvicted irrespective of the regime. However, Table 2.5 shows that the HIT programme was effective for medium and high risk YO's (prediction score 31-50, p = .057; score 51-70, p = .054; score 71-100, p = .058).

**Table 2.5** *Further analysis of one-year reconviction rates*

	Experimentals			Controls		
	No. YO's	Mean pred. score	Percent reconv	No. YO's	Mean pred. score	Percent reconv.
Total	176	47.2	34.7	127	56.1	55.1
Intake 1-7	88	43.9	27.3	55	49.7	49.1
Intake 8-15	88	50.6	42.0	72	61.0	59.7
Pred. score						
0-30	64	17.0	25.0	23	16.7	21.7
31-50	34	41.7	20.6	24	40.2	41.7
51-70	28	60.5	32.1	38	60.5	60.5
71-100	50	82.3	58.0	42	82.8	76.2
White	158	47.8	36.7	109	59.2	58.7
Non-white	18	42.7	16.7	18	37.2	33.3
Violence	76	33.3	28.9	53	46.5	52.8
Burglary	55	55.6	45.5	39	66.5	61.5
Other	45	60.5	31.1	35	59.1	51.4
Age at sentence						
18-	64	56.3	39.1	49	59.1	55.1
19	55	45.9	32.7	42	59.0	54.8
20	53	40.7	28.3	36	48.6	55.6
Precons						
0	31	18.2	25.8	15	20.2	20.0
1-2	44	31.9	29.5	24	37.2	37.5
3-6	49	54.5	24.5	45	59.0	51.1
7+	52	70.7	53.8	43	76.2	81.4
Prev. prison-no	95	33.8	23.2	61	41.3	37.7
Prev. prison-yes	81	63.0	48.1	66	69.8	71.2
Sentence length						
23m-	119	48.6	35.3	76	58.9	55.3
24m+	55	44.5	34.5	46	52.1	54.3
Time served						
299d-	101	47.1	33.7	57	57.5	59.6
300d+	75	47.4	36.0	70	54.9	51.4
Adjudications per year						
0	27	30.7	18.5	30	48.8	50.0
3.5-	75	47.1	30.7	50	55.1	50.0
3.6+	73	53.2	45.2	47	61.9	63.8

Notes: YO=Young Offender; d=days; m=months.

Was the HIT programme more successful with white or "non-white" YO's? Relatively few of those who were considered to be suitable for the HIT programme were classified by the Prison Service as "non-white". Only 18 of the 176 experimentals were non-white, as were only 18 of the 127 controls. Table 2.5 shows that, although the numbers were small, the HIT programme seemed to be more effective with non-white YO's (predicted 42.7%, actual 16.7%). Conversely, however, because of the small numbers, these percentages were significantly different for whites ( $p = .044$ ) but not for non-whites ( $p = .091$ ).

Was the HIT programme differentially effective according to the types of offences committed by YO's? Of the 176 experimental YO's, 76 had been imprisoned for violence (including robbery), 55 for burglary, and 45 for other offences. Of the 127 control YO's, 53 had been imprisoned for violence, 39 for burglary, and 35 for other offences. Table 2.5 shows that the HIT programme seemed to be most effective for those imprisoned for other offences (predicted 60.5%, actual 31.1%; chi-squared = 6.42,  $p = .011$ ), and least effective for those imprisoned for violence (predicted 33.3%, actual 28.9%). Conversely, however, among those imprisoned for violence, being an experimental or a control YO predicted actual reconviction rates after controlling for expected reconviction rates (LRCS = 3.68,  $p = .055$ ).

Was the HIT programme differentially effective with younger or older offenders (at the time of their prison sentences)? Table 2.5 suggests that the programme was equally effective for those aged 18 or less, 19, or 20 at the time of their sentences; actual reconviction rates were substantially less than predicted reconviction rates in all cases.

Was the HIT programme differentially effective with more or less experienced offenders? Table 2.5 shows that it was more effective with more experienced offenders (those with 3-6 or 7 or more previous convictions). Experimental YO's with three or more previous convictions had a predicted reconviction rate of 62.8 per cent and an actual reconviction rate of 39.6 per cent (chi-squared = 8.65,  $p = .003$ ). Experimental YO's with two or fewer previous convictions had a predicted reconviction rate of 26.2 per cent and an actual reconviction rate of 28.0 per cent (n.s.). There was a near-significant ( $p = .059$ ) interaction effect (0-2 versus 3 or more previous convictions by experimental versus control) on reconvictions after controlling for prediction score and the two main effects. Experimental YO's with three or more previous convictions did better than expected whether they were successes (predicted 58.4%, actual 35.4%; chi-squared = 4.34,  $p = .037$ ) or non-completers (predicted 66.9%, actual 43.4%; chi-squared = 4.37,  $p = .037$ ) in the HIT regime.

The majority of non-violent offenders (66%) had three or more previous convictions, but this was true of only a minority of violent offenders (46%). However, YO's with three or more

previous convictions did better than predicted, irrespective of whether they were violent or non-violent offenders (violent: predicted 48.2%, actual 28.6%,  $p = .094$ ; non-violent: predicted 70.7%, actual 45.5%,  $p = .015$ ). Similarly, YO's with two or fewer previous convictions did no better than predicted, irrespective of whether they were violent or non-violent offenders.

The HIT programme was equally effective with YO's who had or had not previously been in prison. Of the experimental YO's, 55 were serving sentences of two years or more, while 119 were serving sentences of less than two years, for their principal offence. Of the control YO's, 46 were serving sentences of two years or more, while 76 were serving sentences of less than two years, for their principal offence. Table 2.5 shows that the effectiveness of the HIT regime did not vary according to sentence length.

All of the experimental YO's spent time in other YO's. However, the fraction of time served in the HIT centre was not related to effectiveness. The 76 experimental YO's who spent less than half of their time in the HIT centre had a predicted reconviction rate of 48.5 per cent and an actual reconviction rate of 34.2 per cent. The 95 experimental YO's who spent more than half of their time in the HIT centre had a predicted reconviction rate of 46.1 per cent and an actual reconviction rate of 34.7 per cent. Table 2.5 also shows that effectiveness did not vary according to the total time served in all YO's, when this was dichotomized into 300 days or more versus 299 days or less.

It might be expected that YO's who behaved well in the establishment (having no or few adjudications) would be less likely to be reconvicted than those who were relatively badly behaved. Table 2.5 shows that this expectation was confirmed. Experimental YO's with no adjudications did much better than expected (predicted 30.7%, actual 18.5%; n.s.), as did those with a relatively low adjudication rate (predicted 47.1%, actual 30.7%;  $p = .038$ ). Those with a relatively high adjudication rate did better than expected, but not as much (predicted 53.2%, actual 45.2%; n.s.).

Of course, some of the adjudications of experimental YO's were for prison offences committed in other YO's. Effectiveness did not vary greatly according to whether or not experimental YO's had adjudications in Thorn Cross. The 54 experimental YO's with no adjudications in Thorn Cross had a predicted rate of 46.2 per cent and an actual rate of 31.5 per cent. The 45 experimental YO's with one adjudication in Thorn Cross had a predicted rate of 46.1 per cent and an actual rate of 37.8 per cent. The 77 experimental YO's with two or more adjudications in Thorn Cross had a predicted rate of 48.6 per cent and an actual rate of 35.1 per cent.

## Further analysis of two-year reconviction rates

Overall, actual two-year reconviction rates were similar to those predicted for both experimentals and controls. Was there any evidence of differential effectiveness according to the variables studied above? Table 2.6 shows that experimental YOs convicted of other offences did somewhat better than expected (predicted 75.8%, actual 65.9%; n.s.), unlike control YOs convicted of other offences (predicted 76.5%, actual 74.3%; n.s.).

The youngest offenders (aged 18 or less) did better than expected in the HIT centre (predicted 74.2%, actual 61.9%; n.s.), unlike the youngest control offenders (predicted 76.9%, actual 77.6%). The oldest offenders did worse than expected in both experimental and control conditions.

More impressively, experimental YOs with 3-6 previous convictions did considerably better than expected (predicted 77.3%, actual 60.4%; n.s.), unlike control YOs with 3-6 previous convictions (predicted 81.3%, actual 82.2%). However, the reverse results were found for YOs with 1-2 previous convictions; experimentals did worse than expected (predicted 56.9%, actual 59.1%; n.s.) while controls did better than expected (predicted 59.2%, actual 50.0%; n.s.).

The other noteworthy result in Table 2.6 is that YOs with no adjudications did considerably better in the HIT programme (predicted 51.0%, actual 33.0%; n.s.), while controls with no adjudications did somewhat better than expected (predicted 68.2%, actual 60.0%; n.s.). This was also true for adjudications only in Thorn Cross. The 53 experimental YOs with no Thorn Cross adjudications had a predicted rate of 64.7 per cent and an actual rate of 52.8 per cent. The 122 experimental YOs with one or more Thorn Cross adjudications had a predicted rate of 67.2 per cent and an actual rate of 70.5 per cent.

Experimental YOs had lower than predicted reconviction rates (compared with control YOs) one year after release, but not two years after release. In agreement with this, the average time between release and reoffending in the two-year follow-up was 228 days for experimentals and 177 days for controls, a significant difference ( $t = 2.32$ ,  $p = .021$ ). The average time to reoffending was 250 days for experimental successes versus 193 days for control successes ( $p = .066$ ), and 197 days for experimental non-completers versus 153 days for control non-completers (n.s.). The average time between reoffending and reconviction was also greater for experimentals (125 versus 113 days), but not significantly so. Therefore, it might be concluded that the HIT regime delayed reoffending by about two months.



**Table 2.6 Further analysis of two-year reconviction rates**

	Experimentals			Controls		
	No. YO's	Mean pred. score	Percent reconv	No. YO's	Mean pred. Score	Percent reconv.
Total	175	66.4	65.1	127	74.7	75.6
Intake 1-7	88	63.5	62.5	55	68.2	65.5
Intake 8-15	87	69.4	67.8	72	79.7	83.3
Pred. score						
0-50	54	32.0	42.6	18	29.1	38.9
51-75	37	64.7	62.2	32	64.6	65.6
76-90	42	83.1	76.2	42	84.5	85.7
91-100	42	95.5	85.7	35	95.7	91.4
White	157	66.9	65.6	109	77.7	79.8
Non-white	18	62.1	61.1	18	56.8	50.0
Violence	76	53.9	52.6	53	66.3	69.8
Burglary	55	76.3	81.8	39	84.6	84.6
Other	44	75.8	65.9	35	76.5	74.3
Age at sentence						
18-	63	74.2	61.9	49	76.9	77.6
19	55	66.2	60.0	42	77.3	71.4
20	53	61.2	73.9	36	69	77.8
Precons						
0	31	31.0	38.7	15	33.7	46.7
1-2	44	56.9	59.1	24	59.2	50.0
3-6	48	77.3	60.4	45	81.3	82.2
7+	52	85.6	90.4	43	90.8	93.0
Prev. prison-no	95	52.9	53.7	61	60.3	65.6
Prev. prison-yes	80	82.5	78.8	66	88.1	84.8
Sentence length						
23m-	119	67.2	66.4	76	78.0	73.7
24m+	54	65.1	63.0	46	70.1	76.1
Time served						
299d-	101	66.1	65.3	57	76.4	73.7
300d+	74	66.9	64.9	70	73.4	77.1
Adjudications per year						
0	27	51.0	33.0	30	68.2	60.0
3.5-	74	66.4	64.9	50	73.4	76.0
3.6+	73	71.9	76.7	47	80.3	85.1

Notes: YO=Young Offender; d=days; m=months.

The total number of offences leading to reconvictions during the two year follow-up period was significantly less for experimentals ( $t=2.8$ ,  $p<.005$ ). The 175 HIT YOs committed a total of 615 offences (mean 3.5 each), while the 127 control YOs committed a total of 654 offences (mean 5.1 each). The 114 reconvicted HIT YOs committed an average of 5.4 offences each, while the 96 reconvicted control YOs committed an average of 6.8 offences each. The next section reviews these figures in more detail in a cost-benefit analysis.

Since control YOs committed more offences, it is likely that they received more prison sentences and spent more time incarcerated than experimental YOs during the two-year follow-up period. Therefore, after correcting for time at risk in the community, the difference in offending rates between experimental and control YOs would be greater. Information about sentences was only available for the first reconviction. This showed that 65 (57%) out of 114 reconvicted experimental YOs were sentenced to custody, compared with 59 (61%) out of 96 reconvicted control YOs.

Assuming that YOs served half their sentence in custody, the average time served during the two-year follow-up period by YOs sentenced to custody was 154 days for experimental YOs and 157 days for control YOs. As a result of the first reconviction, the average experimental YO was in custody for 15.7 per cent of the follow-up period, while the average control YO was in custody for 20 per cent of the follow-up period. Therefore, experimental YOs committed 2.1 offences per year at risk, while control YOs committed 3.2 offences per year at risk. The difference between experimental and control YOs would have been slightly greater if it had been possible to take account of custodial sentences after later reconvictions.

## **Cost-benefit analysis**

It is difficult to estimate the cost of a place on the HIT regime, because many of the facilities of HIT are shared with the larger YOI of which it is a part. However, it was estimated that the average annual cost of a place on the HIT regime in 1997-98 was £22,732, while the average annual cost of a place in a standard regime YOI was £17,656. These figures were derived from the Prison Service Annual Report 1997-98 and were supplied by Thorn Cross. They were based on the assumption that the HIT Centre was full to its maximum capacity of 76 places. They are close to the figures given in the statement by Prisons Minister Joyce Quin on January 22, 1998 (£22,700 per HIT place per year versus £17,300 per year per place on a typical YOI regime): see Chapter 3. Assuming that the average length of stay was 25 weeks, the average cost per YO was £10,929 on the HIT regime and £8,488 on the standard regime. Therefore, the estimated additional cost per YO on the HIT regime was £2,441.

The Economics and Resource Analysis Unit of the Home Office has published estimates of the costs of different types of crime in 1999 (Brand and Price, 2000). These estimates take account of security expenditure, property stolen and damaged, the emotional and physical impact on victims, lost output, victim and health services costs, and criminal justice system costs. Table 2.7 show the estimates used in the present cost-benefit analysis. The estimates of non-criminal justice costs and of criminal justice non-disposal costs (e.g. of police or prosecution) are the latest Home Office estimates in February 2001. The estimates of criminal justice disposal costs (e.g. of prison or probation) were increased by about two-thirds to take account of the additional disposal cost when a YO was reconvicted. As mentioned, all these cost estimates are based on 1999 prices.

**Table 2.7** *Estimated cost to society per offence (in £)*

Offence type	Non-CJS costs	CJS non-disposal costs	CJS disposal costs	Total costs
Violence	4270	541	810	5621
Sex	14950	2148	5765	22863
Burglary	1810	504	2169	4483
Robbery	3330	1950	6548	11828
Theft	550	227	547	1324
Fraud	1090	1022	855	2967
Damage	450	573	701	1724
Drugs	225	453	1566	2244
Other	225	286	350	861

Note: CJS =Criminal Justice System

The estimates for violence were a combination of the estimated costs of serious violence (total £20,049) and common assault (total £811). About a quarter of the reconviction offences of violence involved serious violence (grievous or actual bodily harm). Of the remainder, about two-thirds were common assault or assault on a police officer and one-third were offences of possessing weapons. The cost of an offence of possessing weapons has not yet been estimated by the Home Office. However, it was assumed that this cost was the same as for common assault. Hence, the estimated cost of a reconviction offence of violence was £5,621 ( $£20,049 \times .25 + £811 \times .75$ ).

Table 2.8 shows the number of different types of offences committed by experimental and control YOs and leading to reconvictions during the two-year follow-up period. The "other" offences were mainly driving, public order and drunkenness offences. For example,

experimental YOs committed 49 violent offences; at an average cost per offence of £5,621, the total cost to society of these offences was £275,429. The average cost for all types offence was similar for experimental (£1,891) and control (£1,923) YOs. The average cost to society of offences committed by each experimental YO during the two-year follow-up period was £6,647, compared with £9,903 for the average cost of offences committed by each control YO. Therefore, each experimental YO cost £3,256 less than each control YO, largely because experimental YOs each committed fewer offences on average.

**Table 2.8 Estimated cost to society of reconvictions (in £)**

Offence type	Experimentals (175)			Controls (127)		
	No. offences	Cost per offence	Total cost	No. offences	Cost per offence	Total cost
Violence	49	5,621	275,429	54	5,621	303,534
Sex	0	22,863	0	1	22,863	22,863
Burglary	67	4,483	300,361	60	4,483	268,980
Robbery	3	11,828	35,484	5	11,828	59,140
Theft	132	1,324	174,768	160	1,324	211,840
Fraud	14	2,967	41,538	12	2,967	35,604
Damage	14	1,724	24,136	19	1,724	32,756
Drugs	16	2,244	35,904	20	2,244	44,880
Other	320	861	275,520	323	861	278,103
Total	615	1,891	1,163,140	654	1,923	1,257,700
Per YO	3.5		6647	5.1		9,903
Adjusted total per YO			7,423			

Note: YO = Young Offender  
The adjusted cost took account of differences in reconviction prediction scores.

However, there is the problem that experimental YOs were of lower risk to begin with. Of the experimental YOs, 30.9 per cent had a two-year reconviction prediction score of 0-50 (see Table 2.2), 21.1 per cent had a score of 51-75, 24.0 per cent had a score of 76-90, and 24.0 per cent had a score of 91-100. Of the control YOs, 14.2 per cent had a score of 0-50, 25.2 per cent had a score of 51-75, 33.1 per cent had a score of 76-90, and 27.6 per cent had a score of 91-100.

The average reconviction cost to society of each YO increased with the prediction score. For HIT YOs, the average reconviction cost was £3,211 for those with a score of 0-50, £5,459 for those with a score of 51-75, £7,677 for those with a score of 76-90, and £11,079 for

those with a score of 91-100. What would have been the average cost to society of HIT YOs if they had the same distribution of prediction scores as control YOs? This can be estimated by multiplying the above figures by the prediction score distribution of control YOs. The adjusted cost to society of each HIT YO was then £7,423 (Table 2.8).

Based on offences leading to reconviction and equating on prior risk of reconviction, the average HIT YO cost society £2,480 less than the average control YO (£9,903 – £7,423). This is slightly greater than the additional cost per YO on the HIT regime of £2,441. Therefore, based on offences leading to reconvictions in a two-year follow-up period, the crime savings from the HIT regime recouped its extra costs. This analysis is incomplete and conservative, because it does not take account of savings in other areas of life (e.g. reduced welfare benefits or health costs), nor of savings beyond two years. To the extent that people commit fewer offences, they are also likely to fare better in other areas of life. The analysis also does not take account of inflation between the programme in 1996-98 and 1999, the year for which the costs of crimes are calculated. If it did, the crime savings should be reduced by about 5 per cent to be more comparable with the programme costs.

It should be pointed out that offences leading to reconvictions represent only a small fraction of offences actually committed; at least five indictable offences are committed for every one leading to conviction. By comparing self-reported offending of 18-year-old London males with their convictions, West and Farrington (1977, p.28) estimated that one in 8 burglaries and one in 16 vehicle thefts led to a conviction. Over six types of indictable crimes (burglary, taking vehicles, stealing from vehicles, shoplifting, theft from automatic machines and vandalism), only about one in 30 crimes led to a conviction. Also, the probability of conviction given an offence has decreased in the last 20 years (Langan and Farrington, 1998).

If the true number of offences committed was five times as great as the number of offences leading to reconvictions for both experimental and control YOs, and if types of unconvicted offences were similar to types of offences leading to convictions, the average HIT YO would have cost society £12,400 less than the average control YO (£2,480 x 5). Therefore, the total savings per HIT YO would have been £9,959 (£12,400 – £2,441), and the benefit: cost ratio of the HIT regime would have been 5 to 1. In other words, £5 would have been saved for every £1 expended. This is arguably a more realistic estimate than one based only on offences leading to reconvictions, but it is probably still a conservative estimate. It is reasonable to conclude that, based on fewer crimes, *at least* £5 was saved for every extra £1 expended on the HIT regime.

## Conclusions

Taking account of predicted reconviction scores, HIT YOs were less likely to be reconvicted within one year than were control YOs. This was true for HIT successes and for HIT non-completers who spent at least six weeks in the HIT regime. HIT YOs in earlier intakes were relatively more successful than those in later intakes. Medium or high risk YOs, and those with at least three previous convictions, were most successful in the HIT regime.

Taking account of predicted reconviction scores, HIT YOs were not less likely to be reconvicted within two years than were control YOIs. However, the youngest YOs, and those with between three and six previous convictions, did better than expected in the HIT regime. Possibly, the HIT regime might be suitable for juvenile offenders. Also, HIT YOs with no adjudications did better than expected. On average, HIT YOs had a longer time to reoffending, and committed fewer offences leading to reconviction.

A cost-benefit analysis based on offences leading to reconviction showed that the savings from fewer crimes committed by HIT YOs recouped the extra costs of the HIT regime. Taking account of undetected offences, the benefit: cost ratio for the HIT regime was at least 5 to 1.

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### 3.

## History and description of the Colchester MCTC regime

### History of the regime

While the HIT regime was designed to be physically challenging, Home Secretary Michael Howard considered that there was still a need to establish a regime for YO's that more closely approximated American boot camps. In April 1995, he visited the Colchester Military Corrective Training Centre (MCTC) and was impressed by the quality of training offered to the servicemen under sentence (Crowe, 1997b). He also noted that MCTC had spare capacity, and considered that part of it could be used to accommodate YO's. He wrote to Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind and proposed a trial to compare the MCTC regime with the HIT regime.

Colchester MCTC began life in 1942 as a camp for 6,000 prisoners of war, mostly German, who built Nissen huts to live in. It became a military prison in 1946 and was renamed the MCTC in 1955. Between 1981 and 1984 the original Nissen huts were replaced by modern buildings. Nowadays it is the only military prison in England and houses detainees from the Royal Navy, Royal Marines and Royal Air Force as well as the Army. It occupies a large, open, partly wooded site which includes an assault course and a pig farm. While there is no perimeter wall, armed soldiers patrol the grounds.

The plan to establish a YOI within the MCTC was announced on April 17, 1996 at the MCTC by Prisons Minister Ann Widdecombe and Armed Forces Minister Nicholas Soames. Ann Widdecombe said:

*The Home Secretary and I have been very impressed by what goes on at the MCTC. The sense of discipline, of smartness, of calm, and, most importantly, of achievement is clear as one walks around and talks to the detainees.*

*We decided that if at all possible we would like to test whether the military approach to custody could benefit civilian young offenders and be effective in reducing the level of reoffending among them.*

*Later this year – our plans are for the autumn – we will begin sending young offenders to a new young offender institution we are establishing in the brand new building which the Army are making available to us.*

*It will be a young offender institution in the full sense of the term. The Home Secretary will be responsible for it in the normal way, and the YOI Rules and Prison Service policy will apply, not Military Law and Queen's regulations. But young offenders will find here a regime that is considerably more demanding and takes up a lot more of their time than they are used to.*

*As to the young offenders themselves, there will be 32 of them when the scheme is up and running. They will be aged between 18 and 21 and they will be serving several months here before being released back into the community.*

*They will sleep in the young offender institution but will eat and undertake most of their regime activities elsewhere on the MCTC site. They will normally be separate from the military detainees but will mix with them for education classes and vocational training.*

*We have decided that they should wear the same working dress uniform as military detainees because we want them both to look and to feel as if they fit in.*

*The young offenders at Colchester will be sent here if they meet certain criteria for suitability. These criteria are that they must be mentally and physically capable of dealing with the demands of the regime, likely to benefit from the experience, and suitable for open prison conditions. I saw it suggested somewhere that they would be volunteers – that is certainly not the case.*

*The young offenders' regime will be very similar to that experienced by those military detainees who are to be discharged from the armed services. Young offenders will not be trained to be soldiers. The Discharge Company regime was designed by the Army to prepare young men and women leaving the services for their new life in civvy street including the challenge of finding a job.*

*We are appointing the Commandant of the MCTC as the Governor of Colchester YOI. The rest of the carefully selected and thoroughly trained staff will be drawn from the Prison Service and the MCTC. All of them, unlike the young offenders in their charge, will be volunteers. Military staff will be formally appointed as officers of the young offender institution.*



*It is my belief that the particular combination of discipline, rehabilitation, education and training to be found at the MCTC will have a beneficial effect on the attitudes and behaviour of the young offenders sent here and will have a positive impact on the way they live their lives after release.*

Nicholas Soames added:

*I firmly believe that the Services have much to offer in the way of character development and that the regime practised here for military detainees can be applied successfully to civilian young offenders.*

*The Military Corrective Training Centre is justifiably proud of the excellent work that it does with its military detainees. Whilst here detainees are encouraged to build self-confidence, self-esteem and self-belief allied to the learning of practical skills designed to fit them to take up their rightful place in an ordered and civilised manner. We believe that these self-same skills and techniques can be imparted to civilian as well as military detainees and this is our aim.*

*I share with the majority of visitors to MCTC an admiration for its regime and ethos and I wholeheartedly welcome the opportunity for the Ministry of Defence to enter into the trial which Ann Widdecombe briefed you on. We plan to expose civilian young offenders to a regime as close as possible to that in place for military detainees. They will learn to be smart, to conduct themselves in a disciplined manner and they will be kept fully occupied throughout the day. The daily routine will be demanding but the physical requirements will be tailored to the capability of each carefully selected individual.*

The first YO's were not received by Colchester YOI until February 1997, because of lengthy negotiations between the Prison Service and the Ministry of Defence. One contentious issue (raised by the Prison Governors' Association) was whether the Army Commandant was competent to be Governor of a YOI. Eventually, it was agreed that he was. Other issues centred on whether YO's could wear watches and wedding rings and have access to telephones in the MCTC. In general, conditions in the MCTC were more restrictive than in a normal YOI; for example, it was common for servicemen to have all their possessions taken away on entry to the MCTC. Eventually, the Prison Service signed an agreement with the Ministry of Defence for YO's to be accommodated at the MCTC, from February 1997 to March 1998 in the first instance.

The new Labour government which took office on May 2, 1997 were not committed to Colchester YOI, and its closure was announced by Prisons Minister Joyce Quin on January 22, 1998 in response to a parliamentary question. She said:

*The Government is determined to pursue an active regime in YOIs as part of its commitment to focus the youth justice system on the prevention of offending by young people. Statutory provision for this is contained in the Crime and Disorder Bill.*

*We are therefore continuing the experimental "high intensity training" regime which the previous Administration established at Thorn Cross YOI. Although at £22,700 per place, this regime is more expensive than a typical YOI regime at £17,300 per place, the Thorn Cross programme has been shown to have a more sharply focussed and better integrated set of activities. We believe therefore that Thorn Cross represents value for money.*

*However, we have been unable to reach the same conclusion with Colchester. Colchester YOI opened on February 20, 1997 initially for one year. The costs per place at Colchester, at £31,300, have been running at nearly twice those for a typical YOI and nearly £9,000 more than those at Thorn Cross. The Colchester regime has encouraged positive change in attitudes amongst young offenders but the available evaluation has not supported the contention that it has been more effective in preventing reoffending than other initiatives.*

*In view of this, and of the very high costs, we have concluded that Colchester YOI does not represent value for money. It will therefore close on March 31, 1998.*

## **Criticism of the regime**

Colchester YOI attracted criticism from many sources, including the Labour government, the Prison Service, the Probation Service, and local and national newspapers. Colchester YOI Board of Visitors (1997) summarised this in their only Annual Report:

*Generally YOI Colchester has not met with a favourable response, either from the local press and community at large in Colchester, or from the Governor Grade/Senior Management Grade of the Prison Service who have worked elsewhere and have knowledge of the experiment. Principally because insufficient was done in the early days of the YOI to publicly reassure the local community, who*

*at that time held strong reservations, and some fear, about a "Boot Camp" in their midst and what might happen in the town. Also nothing was done to rebut false and misleading articles printed by journalists in the local and national newspapers.*

*With regard to sceptics among the Higher Management/Governor Grades of the Prison Service, they see in Colchester YOI all the facilities and high grade specialist staff and manning levels that they crave. The well equipped Gymnasium, Assault Course, Playing Fields, Running Circuits and Special Grounds. Add to these assets the high per capita costs of the project and they view it with an understandable amount of envy and a good deal of cynicism (p.14).*

The Board of Visitors recommended:

*We would like to see the Prison Service be more positive about the project and use the media to greater effect. The Military could also be more pro-active in their use of the media and press (p.16).*

However, all attempts to obtain favourable publicity were vetoed by the Prison Service. In his third quarterly report, Commandant Julian Crowe (1997c), the Governor of Colchester YOI, noted that "The TV Series Crimebeat asked to film a 5 minute item for their programme, but this request was turned down by the Area Manager." In his final report (Crowe, 1998), he stated:

*The decision to prevent all media coverage at the YOI is understood but regretted. The image of the "Boot Camp" was never put to bed and, even assuming a positive evaluation report is published on the future, it is suspected that the general public will never get a true impression of what was achieved at YOI Colchester (p.8).*

In his first quarterly report, Commandant Julian Crowe (1997a) stated that:

*The attitude of Essex Probation Service towards the project is disappointingly negative. Whilst accepting that positive results will probably be achieved, most probation officers seem to feel that the money would be better spent elsewhere (p. 7).*

However, Chief Probation Officer Martin Wargent visited Colchester YOI for the first time in December 1997 and subsequently wrote a very positive letter to Home Secretary Jack Straw (Wargent, 1997):

*When the YOI was first set up by your predecessor I was vocal in opposition to it, describing it as a "con trick" although I did say on a number of occasions on radio and in newspapers that I thought that the Army were likely to provide a good experience for the youngsters. I remain very sceptical of the rationale behind the inception.*

*However, the reality is a different matter, It is impossible not to be struck by the quality of the staff that the Army has and by the purposeful and clear regime in operation. There is evidently a freedom from bullying that is not generally replicated in Prison Service establishments ('you don't have to watch your back here') and no 'dead' time which is the curse of most prisons.*

*The combination of discipline and caring is very obvious and it seems to me these are always mutually dependent: the more you give of one the more you can give of the other. I found the atmosphere to be similar to, but better than, the best of the old Borstals.*

*What impressed me most was the way in which the staff obviously saw themselves as role models and were open and encouraging to the inmates. They very clearly wanted to see the young men succeed. It felt as though the offenders were valued not blamed, challenged not pointlessly punished, and they were set real targets to achieve. The staff saw the high levels of work and of discipline as means not ends.*

*What the Army wants to follow on from this experiment I don't know, but it does seem to provide a particularly valuable standard for how young prisoners can be managed and perhaps rehabilitated. Colchester is quite dissimilar to the 'boot camp' model with which it is sometimes compared. If prison numbers can be reduced then regimes like this would be of considerable value if the Prison Service could match the quality and the commitment of the instructors that the MCTC provide.*

In his final report Commandant Julian Crowe (1998) concluded that "Essex Probation Service was very helpful in providing an excellent service to the YOI throughout the period of the trial".

Especially after the Labour Government was elected in May 1997, Colchester YOI constantly lived with uncertainty about its future. Malicious briefing of journalists was common (Rufford, 1997):

*The government is preparing to scrap Britain's military-style 'boot camps' for young offenders, raising questions over Labour's pledge to get tough on crime.*

*Two regimes – at Colchester in Essex and Thorn Cross in Cheshire – will shut under plans being drawn up by the prison service. The move will reopen the debate over tackling youth crime which has risen dramatically in the past decade.*

*Thorn Cross, a young offenders' institution, was partly converted to so-called "high-intensity training" in June last year. The special centre at Colchester barracks was opened in February and will remain open until next year.*

*Both cost hundreds of thousands of pounds to equip. Although experimental, they were seen as models for a series of similar camps. "It is a very retrograde step" said Ann Widdecombe, the former prisons minister. "They are ditching our policies but they have nothing to put in their place."*

*The concept of boot camps was imported from America by Michael Howard, the former home secretary. The idea was to reform teenage criminals who failed to respond to other types of correction.*

*Colchester boot camp, part of a "glasshouse" for servicemen and women being disciplined, ran into controversy soon after it opened. It was dubbed the "Home Office Hilton" because inmates cost the taxpayer more than £850 each a week, enough to pay for a room at a luxury hotel. The average cost of keeping young offenders in other institutions is £250 a week.*

*The camp has been unpopular with its military hosts and with the prison service which saw it as an unnecessary expense.*

*"The army hated it. They put every possible obstacle in the way when it was being set up" said a senior Home Office source.*

*"The day that Colchester closes will be a day of great relief" said David Roddan, general secretary of the Prison Governors' Association. "It was a gross waste of public money in an effort to salvage the doomed political career of Michael Howard".*

*Home Office ministers believe the boot camp experiment has failed and want to redirect resources to provide education and skills training inside conventional young offenders' institutions.*

In fact, Colchester YOI was estimated to cost £521 per inmate per week (see Chapter 4), compared with an estimated cost of £340 per inmate per week in a YOI with a standard regime. Also, of course, the HIT Centre was not closed.

The Guardian described the closure of Colchester YOI (Gentleman, 1998):

*Inmates at Britain's first military-style 'boot camp' for young offenders are not allowed to wear watches. Their lives are punctuated by the shouted commands of sergeant majors who force them through an exacting timetable of parades, drills and physical exertion. From the 6 a.m. reveille until the 10 p.m. lock-up, hardly a moment in the prisoners' lives is unaccounted for. In this highly regimented existence, slackers are not tolerated.*

*But next week the relentless rhythm of army life will come to an abrupt halt. On March 28 the prison's parade ground will fall silent as inmates fold their military fatigues and polish their boots for the last time. After just over a year, the guard is changing at Colchester's Young Offenders Institute. Britain's expensive boot camp experiment has been abandoned – to predictable Tory wails and Labour cheers, but with the question unresolved of whether the regime actually works.*

*Colchester is closing because it is too expensive. Dubbed the Home Office Hilton – per night it is more expensive than a luxury hotel – its high cost was the main reason cited by prisons minister Joyce Quin on the announcement of closure in January. She told MPs that while a typical young offenders centre costs the taxpayer £17,000 per inmate a year, Colchester costs £31,000.*

*But there appears to be more to it than that. While Quin conceded that the boot camp had "encouraged positive change in attitudes among young offenders", she added that information available didn't suggest that the system was any better at cutting rates of reoffending than any other prison.*

*Proponents of the boot camp are outraged by this statement, countering that criminologists cannot properly assess how successful a regime is at preventing reoffending until three years have passed. Besides, they argue, if it were ultimately shown to have cut recidivism, it would have been cheaper in the long run. They claim that the decision to close Colchester before this time was up was purely political.*

Colchester, much vaunted by the Tory government – whose attitude to crime was summed up by John Major's injunction that 'we should condemn a little more and understand a little less' – was then Home Secretary Michael Howard's answer to the alarming 73 per cent reoffending rate of Britain's teenage criminals. Inspired by similar projects in the US, a wing at the Colchester Military Corrective Training Centre (MCTC) – where recalcitrant servicemen are sent to be punished – was converted to accommodate young offenders who would be given the same tough treatment by military staff.

Controversy surrounded Colchester from the start. Prison reform groups called the proposal absurd and Sir David Ramsbotham, the new Chief Inspector of Prisons, attacked it as merely a sop to the 'Bring Back National Service Brigade'. He said "I am intrinsically suspicious of things that come across the Atlantic like this. I'm not sure of the relevance of military training for young offenders, forming them up in threes and marching them around."

The military, meanwhile, were said to be annoyed at having to look after young delinquents, and the Prison Service apparently was reluctant to release its responsibility to the military.

On reaching government itself, Labour wasted little time in ditching the Tory concept which has been dismissed by David Roddan, general secretary of the Prison Governors' Association, as "a pretty shabby political trick designed to make the political administration of the time look tough on crime."

Stephen Shaw, director of the Prison Reform Trust, argues that from the beginning the project was a publicity stunt, designed to make the Tory government look hard on crime: "It was an extraordinary waste of public money. It was the sort of project that politicians dream up in the abstract and then expect officials to handle the consequences".

Shaw has no regrets about the closure: "The whole concept derived from a total lack of understanding of what young delinquents are like. A lot of the macho bombast fits in very well with the values of these boys anyway – they believe in being tough in the first place. If you sent them to a place where they had to spend all day knitting and sewing, that would put them off crime very quickly. What's more, it was wholly improper for servicemen to be charged with the care of young delinquents".

*The atmosphere inside the prison is one of disappointment as packing up begins. Most inmates and staff feel let down that the pilot scheme is not continuing, despite what appeared superficially to be positive results.*

The Thorn Cross HIT Centre did not attract such negative publicity because it had "something for everyone". Right-wing commentators liked the Army-style drilling and left-wing commentators liked the rehabilitative programmes such as Enhanced Thinking Skills. Importantly, because the HIT Centre was part of the Prison Service, malicious stories about it were not fed to the mass media by Prison Service sources.

### **Description of the regime**

The Colchester YOI regime was a military regime with an emphasis on physical training, physical fitness and drilling. The military staff were at pains to point out that it was not a "boot camp". The regime was as similar as possible to that provided for detainees of "D" company, but included some elements from the "A" company regime. "D" company comprises detainees who are being dismissed from the services; "A" company comprises detainees who are returning to the services. The YOI regime was based on firmness tempered with understanding. YOs wore military uniforms with coloured tags signifying what stage they were in. YOs were required to march about the establishment at all times and to request permission from staff to speak or carry out any action. They had a haircut on reception and every two weeks thereafter. There was an emphasis on smartness and room and kit inspections. The idea was that imposed discipline would lead to self-discipline.

The regime was in three stages. The stage 1 regime was austere. YOs had almost all personal possessions (including cash) removed, although they were able to earn some of these (e.g. trainers, a personal stereo) later. All correspondence (except legal) in and out was screened and read. YOs had no access to television, were escorted wherever they went, and were locked in their rooms at night (8.00 p.m. - 6.00 a.m.). They had a shower but not a bath, and were allowed one telephone call a week. Those judged to have the best room were allowed to listen to a radio from 8.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m. when there was lights out.

YOs gradually earned more freedom and better living conditions as they progressed from stage 1 to stage 3. Progression through the stages depended on getting recommendations in weekly reports by staff. Marks were given for such issues as appearance, inspection, attitude to staff and other YOs, effort and self-presentation.



In stage 2, YO's could wear their own trainers and have a personal stereo, and could watch a black-and-white television and videos. They were no longer locked in their rooms at night, although the living unit was locked. In stage 3, YO's were no longer escorted everywhere around the site, and could watch a colour television and have a bath. They also had access to a telephone and were allowed out to the town (Colchester) in the company of a responsible adult. The telephone and town visits were the most sought after privileges.

The YO's were housed in eight rooms each holding 4-5 YO's. Because there were a maximum of eight places on stage 3, YO's in stage 2 who were qualified for stage 3 but waiting to move up were placed on a "special stage" where they had many of the privileges of stage 3 including unescorted movement around MCTC and accompanied town visits.

The content of the stages was as follows:

#### Stage 1 (4-6 weeks)

- \* Reception, medical, welfare, haircut
- \* Orientation/briefing, fire and emergency drills
- \* Regime, conduct, standards, rules (e.g. on bullying and visits)
- \* Room/kit layout and cleaning, wearing of uniform
- \* Room and kit inspections
- \* Basic foot drill and marching
- \* Physical training, assault course
- \* Interviews and sentence planning
- \* Life skills
- \* Drugs, alcohol, anger management, offending, anti-bullying programmes
- \* Personal hygiene
- \* Literacy and numeracy
- \* Education and current affairs
- \* First aid
- \* Map reading
- \* Rules of the game and leadership exercise

#### Stage 2 (6-8 weeks)

- \* Room and kit inspections
- \* Drill
- \* Physical training

- \* Career counselling, job search, employment applications
- \* Social security, welfare, assistance agencies
- \* CVs and job interviews
- \* Education and training opportunities
- \* Money management
- \* Rehabilitation of Offenders Act
- \* Literacy and numeracy
- \* Trade training: bricklaying, carpentry, motor mechanics, painting and decorating, information technology

### Stage 3 (8 - 12 weeks)

- \* Room and kit inspections
- \* PT and sport
- \* Community projects (e.g. painting an old people's home, building a new play area at a primary school)
- \* Conservation projects (e.g. repairing paths in Brecon National Park in South Wales)
- \* Work on the MCTC farm with pigs and poultry
- \* Challenge pursuits expedition in Snowdonia
- \* Day release for college courses
- \* Resettlement education (help with jobs after release)
- \* Supervised town visits

### **A typical day**

06.00-07.00	Reveille; wash, shave, make beds
07.00-07.15	Unlock, stand by beds, roll call
07.15-08.00	Breakfast
08.00-08.40	Company administration and platoon officer's inspection
08.40-10.05	Parade followed by PT, sport, education, trade training*
10.05-10.20	Tea break
10.20-12.30	PT, sport, education, trade training*
12.30-13.30	Lunch
13.30-14.00	Company administration and platoon officer's inspection
14.00-16.15	Parade followed by drill, PT, sport, education, trade training*
16.15-17.00	Shower and company administration

17.00-17.30	Evening meal
17.30-18.30	Patrol on (room cleaning)
18.30-20.00	Daily debriefing, ironing and washing kit
20.00-20.15	Supper (Tea and chocolate bar)
20.15-22.00	Locked up, writing letters, games
22.00	Lights out

\* These activities depended on the stage a YO was in. YOs in stage 1 could be in basic education or drilling, YOs in stage 2 could be in trade training, while YOs in stage 3 could be out at the MCTC farm or away from the site on community and conservation projects.

There were some important differences between the regimes of YOs and military detainees. For example, YOs required an induction period into army life, including the development of physical fitness and training in drilling. Also, while military detainees typically served two-thirds of their sentences, the Commandant could allow them to be released early (as early as half-way through their sentences) as a reward for good behaviour and progress. In contrast, YOs were normally released at the half-way point of their sentences (although they could have additional days awarded for misconduct), and they did not receive any further reduction in time served as a reward for good behaviour and progress in the YOI. YOs played football against military detainees and interacted with them during trade training and meal-times.

## Operation of Colchester YOI

The rooms in which YOs lived in Colchester were spartan and they were deprived of many personal possessions, as explained. They were certainly shouted at and ordered around. However, the YOs thought that, in many ways, Colchester was better than other YOIs. The food was universally praised, in quality and quantity. The army uniform and kit were of high quality, and YOs were measured carefully on reception so that they had well fitting clothes. When offered the opportunity to keep their army boots and berets as souvenirs after leaving, all YOs kept these.

The drilling did encourage peer pressure and team spirit. The very high standards of cleanliness in Colchester compared favourably with other YOIs. The health, fitness and appearance of the YOs improved. Many YOs enjoyed the sport, physical training and the use of the gymnasium. Most also preferred the busy day in Colchester YOI to sitting on their beds all day doing nothing in other YOIs. They wore full military uniform for family visits, and many parents commented favourably on their smartness and bearing after seeing them on parade.

Colchester YOI staff were all volunteers and were drawn jointly from the military and from the Prison Service. In general they worked well together. Morale and optimism were very high at the start, but the delay in opening, the experience of dealing with YOs and the uncertainty of Colchester's future took their toll, and the morale of both staff and YOs plummeted after the closure decision was announced in January 1998. Military staff initially had some problems in dealing with YOs, who were not disciplined and did not obey orders like servicemen under sentence. In the early weeks, some military staff got angry with YOs who were abusive or swore at them and this led to a high rate of adjudications for prison offences.

The greatest bone of contention between the military and the Prison Service was the fact that there was hardly ever a full complement of prison officers, who were constantly being withdrawn from Colchester by the Area Manager to serve in other hard-pressed establishments. This meant that, in practice, the military staff were primarily responsible for running Colchester YOI. In contrast to Thorn Cross, it seems unlikely that Colchester YOI had the whole-hearted support of the Area Manager.

The YOs undoubtedly liked the military staff more than the prison officers. They said that the military staff treated them with respect and encouraged them a great deal (e.g. initially in drilling). The military staff would often sit down and chat with the YOs to give them paternalistic advice about their lives, and had a strong interest in the YOs' personal development. The YOs admired some of the military staff (e.g. the PT instructor) as firm but fair, masculine role models. Many YOs expressed the desire to join the Army, but they were not eligible because of their serious criminal records.

In contrast, however much the prison officers tried to behave like the military staff, they were still viewed with suspicion and regarded as "screws" by the YOs, who were less friendly with them. Many YOs spoke bitterly about their treatment by prison officers in other YOIs. They said that prison officers called them "scum" and only spoke to them to give orders. It was difficult for the Colchester prison officers to break down this negative stereotype, however pleasant and considerate they were to the YOs.

The military operated a "zero tolerance" policy to drugs and bullying, and impressionistically this seemed to be effective. YOs commented that bullying hardly ever occurred, despite the dormitory accommodation that was conducive to it (see e.g. McGurk and McDougall, 1991). Military staff believed that the removal of possessions prevented bullying connected with trafficking in possessions. The only positive drugs tests followed temporary release or resettlement leave, town visits or college attendance. The fact that no

contact was allowed during visits from family and friends prevented drugs from being passed on these occasions. There were initial worries about absconding, but in the event this never happened. Of course, it must be remembered that the YOI unit was locked at night and that armed soldiers were patrolling the grounds.

Colchester YOI did not have many of the programmes of other YOIs, such as thinking skills or offending behaviour programmes. In addition, Colchester YOI Board of Visitors (1997) thought that a drug rehabilitation project was needed and that the Probation Service should provide aftercare or supervision after release: "Without these issues being addressed the benefits of this project may soon be forgotten and inmates may return to their former criminal activities" (p.10).

## **Conclusions**

The main aims of the Colchester YOI regime were:

- (a) to reduce reoffending;
- (b) to give individuals self-confidence, self-esteem, self-discipline and self-pride;
- (c) to teach respect for individuals, authority, property and society;
- (d) to impart moral values;
- (e) to be physically demanding;
- (f) to teach life, educational and work skills;
- (g) to encourage personal and communal responsibility and self-reliance; and
- (h) to provide rehabilitation training.

The *Mission Statement* was as follows:

*To develop a model establishment, the aim of which is to turn young offenders into better citizens and prevent their return to crime. This is to be achieved through a demanding regime of training, rehabilitation and care intended to promote self-discipline, self-confidence, self-esteem, self-motivation and self-pride.*



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## 4.

# Analysis of MCTC reconvictions

### Allocation criteria

Basically the same criteria for allocation were used in Colchester as in the HIT Centre. YO's were eligible for allocation to Colchester YOI if they:

- (a) were male, aged 18-21;
- (b) had 4-8 months to serve;
- (c) were suitable for open conditions;
- (d) were able, mentally and physically, to cope with the regime; and
- (e) were considered likely to benefit from the regime.

Conditions (b) and (c) were inherently incompatible, leading to similar case flow problems to those experienced in Thorn Cross. In practice, allocation units in a number of YOIs were asked to identify possibly eligible YO's using a simple screening test (male, aged 18-21, 4-8 months to serve, no current serious sexual offence, e.g. rape). Colchester YOI staff then visited these institutions to sift prison records to try to find YO's who met the criteria and to interview eligible candidates.

Regarding suitability for open conditions, the primary consideration was the risk to the public. Therefore, any YO who was likely to be dangerous if he absconded, based on available evidence, was not selected. Ideally, the military staff wanted YO's with no prior custodial experience. However, very few YO's who were allocated to Colchester were totally suitable for open conditions; the algorithm for selection to open conditions was often overridden, taking careful account of particular features of each individual case. Unfortunately, selection teams did not keep records of why they rejected YO's.

Ideally, YO's should have been allocated to Colchester soon after sentence. If a YO had already been in custody for some time and had conformed and progressed through a YOI incentive scheme, he would be dropping down to a more austere regime with fewer privileges if he were then transferred to Colchester. However, delays in the selection process meant that the typical experimental YO was serving a sentence of 18 months, had served three months in some other YOI and then served six months in Colchester. YO's serving sentences up to four years were considered eligible.

## Design of the evaluation

Table 4.1 shows the number of YOs selected and the number who received the Pre and Post assessments (see Appendix B). The aim was to have an intake of 8-12 YOs every six weeks. Ideally, it was planned that 16-24 eligible YOs would be identified every six weeks and randomly allocated to experimental or control conditions. Efforts were made to assign YOs at random to experimental and control conditions for the first three intakes, but exceptions had to be made (e.g. to allow a YO to complete an educational course). For later intakes, the main criteria for allocating suitable YOs to experimental or control conditions were the distance of Colchester from the YO's home (because of visiting problems) and the need to allow YOs to complete educational courses that they had started (which meant that they were allocated to the control group).

**Table 4.1** *Number of YOs included in the evaluation*

Intake	N	Experimental		N	Control	
		Pre	Post		Pre	Post
1	14	13	10	7	6	2
2	10	10	8	8	7	5
3	8	8	8	6	6	5
4	8	8	6	1	1	1
5	11	11	10	5	5	4
6	12	10	9	13	13	12
7	9	9	6	24	23	21
Total	72	69	57	64	61	50

N = No. chosen.

Pre = No. assessed in Pre-test.

Post = No. assessed in Post-test.

Losses between No. chosen and Pre-test: Experimental: 2 refused, 1 dropped because of self-harm and outstanding charges; Control: 2 refused, 1 later experimental.

Losses between Pre-test and Post-test: Experimental: 1 dropped (outstanding charges), 5 failed, 2 transferred, 4 refused; Control: 9 refused, 1 on home leave, 1 missed.

There were great problems in identifying a sufficient number of suitable YOs. More suitable YOs were identified for intakes 6 and 7 because of the involvement of a senior research officer who assisted in the selection process, spending more time searching records in YOIs for potentially suitable candidates. Previous selection teams had given more priority to identifying experimental YOs than to identifying a sufficient number of eligible (experimental and control) YOs. The most efficient selection process was for intake 8 (34 eligible YOs were identified), which was then cancelled because of the closure of Colchester YOI.



Four experimental YOs refused to go to Colchester (two after completing the Pre-test assessment) because they had been given misleading information in their YOI about the regime. Prison officers in some YOIs would tell YOs that, in Colchester, they would be cutting the colonel's lawn with nail scissors, painting coal white, polishing dustbins until they shone, or scrubbing floors all day. Efforts were made to dispel these false impressions by producing a folder with coloured photographs of Colchester YOI and a detailed prospectus of the training programme. This worked well but it mysteriously disappeared for long periods. Proposals were also made to take Colchester YOs as ambassadors on selection visits to other YOIs, but Colchester prison officers were reluctant to do this.

Two control YOs refused to be in the control group because they were suspicious that they might subsequently be allocated to Colchester, and nine control YOs refused to complete the Post-test assessments. Only five experimental YOs did not complete the programme; two for bullying or assault, one for drug dealing, one for assault and drug use, and one for absconding on a town visit.

The 69 experimental YOs who completed the Pre-test assessment were drawn from Dover (27), Onley (20), Rochester (12), Hollesley Bay (5), Norwich (3) and Chelmsford (2). The 61 control YOs who completed the Pre-test assessment were drawn from Onley (26), Dover (17), Portland (7), Huntercombe (5), Hollesley Bay (3) and Norwich (3).

## **Results obtained with assessments**

The before-after comparisons showed that, in the Post-test, compared to control YOs:

- Experimental YOs had more favourable attitudes to the YOI and its staff
- Experimental YOs got on better with other inmates
- Experimental YOs were more mature and responsible
- Experimental YOs had greater self-confidence and self-esteem
- Experimental YOs had greater physical fitness
- Experimental YOs were more hopeful about the future and thought that their chances of finding a job had improved

However:

- Experimental YOs were not more deterred from offending
- Experimental YOs did not have more prosocial/anti-offending attitudes

- Experimental YOs did not have greater control of aggression
- Experimental YOs were not better behaved in the YOI
- Experimental YOs did not have greater self-control

These results are presented in detail in Appendix B.

### **Analysis of reconvictions**

The reconviction analysis was based on 66 experimental and 103 control YOs. The controls included 34 YOs who were screened as suitable for the planned intake 8 in January 1998 which was cancelled in the light of the closure decision on January 22, 1998. Of the 72 YOs originally allocated to the experimental condition, six did not go to Colchester because of outstanding charges or refusal. They were transferred to the control group. One YO was originally allocated to the control group but later went to Colchester, and he was counted as an experimental YO. This explains the discrepancy between 72 experimentals and 64 controls in Table 4.1 and 66 experimentals and 69 controls in intakes 1-7 in this analysis. The 57 experimentals and 50 controls analysed in Appendix B are subsets of the 66 experimentals and 69 controls in intakes 1-7 in this chapter.

More YOs were considered to be suitable for intakes 6, 7 and 8 than before because the criteria for suitability had become increasingly relaxed in the light of experience with YOs at Colchester. Thus, there were 47 experimentals and only 30 controls in intakes 1 - 5, but 19 experimentals and 39 controls in intakes 6 - 7. Also, the employment of a senior research officer in Colchester, who went out with the selection team, was a great help, as mentioned in Chapter 3.

The Police National Computer was searched on December 11, 2000 for reconvictions. In light of the delay of about two months between the occurrence of a conviction and its recording in the PNC, it is likely that reconvictions occurring up to October 11, 2000 would be recorded. Six YOs (three experimentals and three controls) could not be located on the PNC, so their reconvictions were not known. The YOs' release dates ranged from June 26, 1997 to September 16, 1998, with a median of April 1, 1998. Therefore, all of the YOs had been at risk of reconviction for at least two years.

## Reconviction prediction scores

Two reconviction prediction scores were derived for open YOIs and calculated for each YO. As explained in Chapter 2, the first estimated the probability of a YO being reconvicted within one year of release, while the second estimated the probability of a YO being reconvicted within two years of release. Since seven YOs (two experimentals and five controls) could not be found in the Offenders Index, prediction scores were calculated for 64 experimentals and 98 controls. Both the prediction score and reconviction data were available for 158 YOs (61 experimentals and 97 controls).

How accurate was the reconviction prediction score in predicting the actual reconviction percentage? In Table 4.2, prediction scores are divided approximately into quartiles. It can be seen that the actual percentage reconvicted increased with the prediction score. Actual reconviction percentages were greater than predicted at the bottom end (low prediction scores) and less than predicted at the top end (high prediction scores), possibly reflecting statistical regression to the mean. In total, 30.4 per cent of YOs were reconvicted in one year, compared with the prediction of 35.1 per cent; and 49.4 per cent of YOs were reconvicted in two years, compared with the prediction of 55.4 per cent. Comparison with Chapter 2 shows that the HIT experimental and control YOs were more risky and more often reconvicted than the Colchester experimental and control YOs.

**Table 4.2** *Predicted versus actual reconvictions*

Prediction score (%)	Number of YOs	Mean prediction score	Percent actually reconvicted
One year			
0-15	36	10.9	19.4
16-30	34	21.4	20.6
31-50	48	38.8	27.1
51-100	40	64.1	52.5
TOTAL	158	35.1	30.4
Two year			
0-30	30	22.8	33.3
31-55	45	42.0	40.0
56-75	45	64.7	48.9
76-100	38	85.8	73.7
TOTAL	158	55.4	49.4

The actual figure (based on PNC data) may be slightly less than the predicted figure (based on the Offenders Index) because the predicted figure includes "pseudo-reconvictions"; that is, reconvictions occurring after release for offences committed before a YO's current term of custody. Such "pseudo-reconvictions" were excluded from the present analysis of actual reconvictions. All YOs who had a pseudo-reconviction also had an actual reconviction for an offence committed after release.

### Predicted versus actual reconvictions

Were experimental YOs less likely to be reconvicted than control YOs, taking account of the predicted reconviction rates of both groups? Table 4.3 shows no evidence of any desirable effect of the Colchester programme on reconvictions. Among the experimental YOs 29.5 per cent were reconvicted in one year, compared with the predicted figure of 32.6 per cent; among the control YOs, 30.9 per cent were reconvicted, compared with the predicted figure of 36.7 per cent. These figures were first published by Farrington et al. (2000). After two years, the actual reconviction rates of experimental and control YOs were both about 6 per cent less than predicted. The experimental and control YOs did not have significantly different average one-year prediction scores ( $t = 1.11$ , ns), suggesting that they were reasonably comparable groups. Nor did they have significantly different average two-year prediction scores, although in this case the comparison was not far off statistical significance ( $t = 1.79$ ,  $p = .08$ ).

**Table 4.3 Predicted versus actual reconvictions of experimentals and controls**

	Experimentals			Controls		
	No. YOs	Mean pred. score	Percent reconv.	No. YOs	Mean pred. score	Percent reconv.
One year	61	32.6	29.5	97	36.7	30.9
Two year	61	50.9	44.3	97	58.1	52.6

### Performance in Colchester YOI

It might be expected that performance in Colchester might predict reoffending after release. As mentioned, only five experimental YOs did not complete the programme and were transferred out of Colchester. Table 4.4 shows that the five non-completers had a high prediction score and also a high reconviction rate after one year. However, their two-year reconviction rate was the same as the remainder of the experimental YOs.

**Table 4.4** *Reconvictions of experimental YO's versus performance in Colchester YOI*

		No. YO's	One year		Two years	
			Mean pred. score	Percent reconv.	Mean pred. score	Percent reconv.
Completed	Yes	56	30.3	28.6	48.7	44.6
	No	5	58.0	40.0	76.2	40.0
Downgraded	No	53	31.9	28.3	49.9	43.4
	Yes	8	36.9	37.5	57.8	50.0
Weeks to Stage 2	7-	37	27.7	32.4	45.2	40.5
	8+	24	40.1	25.0	59.7	50.0
Weeks to Stage 3	8-	17	22.5	23.5	36.4	35.3
	9-15	23	31.1	30.4	50.8	43.5
	Never	17	43.6	23.5	63.7	41.2
Adjudicated	No	40	30.5	30.0	48.2	45.0
	Yes	21	36.5	28.6	56.1	42.9
Time in Colchester	149d-	20	35.2	35.0	54.1	55.0
	150-175d	21	33.0	33.3	50.6	38.1
	176d+	20	29.5	20.0	48.1	40.0
Percent in Colchester	59-	32	38.1	43.8	56.8	59.4
	60+	29	26.4	13.8	44.5	27.6

Note: d = days.

If they behaved satisfactorily, YO's were intended to progress from stage 1 to stage 2 in 4-6 weeks and from stage 2 to stage 3 in 6-8 weeks. YO's who misbehaved could be downgraded (moved back from stage 2 to stage 1 or from stage 3 to stage 2). Table 4.4 shows that the eight YO's who were downgraded had higher prediction scores and higher reconviction rates than the remainder.

Speed of progress from stage 1 to stage 2 did not predict reconviction. On the contrary, YO's who took a relatively long time (eight weeks or more) had a lower than predicted one-year reconviction rate (25.0% as opposed to 40.1%). However, the two-year reconviction rate of the slow-progress YO's was higher than that of the fast-progress YO's.

Speed of progress from stage 2 to stage 3 also did not predict reconviction. On the contrary, YO's who never reached stage 3 had lower than predicted reconviction rates. YO's who did not have a full opportunity to progress to stage 3 because of the closure of Colchester were excluded from these figures.

Being adjudicated for an offence committed in Colchester did not predict reconviction. On the contrary, the adjudicated YO's had a lower than predicted reconviction rate.

The median time spent in Colchester YOI was about 160 days. Spending a relatively long time in the YOI was associated with a lower than predicted reconviction rate.

All of the Colchester YO's spent some time in other YO's. The median percentage of their time served that was spent in Colchester was 57 per cent. Table 4.4 shows that the YO's who spent at least 60 per cent of their time in Colchester had lower than predicted reconviction rates. However, because of small numbers, none of the differences in Table 4.4 was statistically significant on chi-squared tests comparing actual and predicted numbers.

### **Further analysis of one-year reconviction rates**

As mentioned, morale in Colchester plummeted when the closure decision was announced on January 22, 1998. It might be expected that YO's who completed their programme before this date (basically intakes 1-5) would do better than the later intakes who were affected by the closure decision. In agreement with this, Table 4.5 shows that 26.1 per cent of YO's in intakes 1-5 were reconvicted, compared with 40.0 per cent of YO's in later intakes. However, these figures were close to the predicted percentages of 30.8 per cent and 38.0 per cent respectively, so there is no evidence of differential effectiveness.

Did the programme work better for YO's at one level of risk than at another? Table 4.5 shows predicted and actual reconviction rates for experimental and control YO's divided into the four risk levels. There is some suggestion that medium risk YO's (with a prediction score of 31-50%) did better than predicted in the experimental programme (predicted 40.1%, actual 20.0%) but the numbers were small and the differences were not statistically significant.

Did the programme work better with white or non-white YO's? Of the 61 experimental YO's, 46 were white, 11 were black, and four were of other races. Of the 97 control YO's, 76 were white, 14 were black, and seven were of other races. Most of the "other race" YO's were Asians. Table 4.5 shows that the actual reconviction percentages of the whites were close to the predicted percentages for both experimentals and controls. However, the actual reconviction percentages of the non-whites were less than predicted for both experimentals and controls. White versus non-white appearance predicted reconvictions independently of the prediction score in a logistic regression analysis (LRCS = 6.82,  $p = .009$ ). This suggests that the reconviction predictor should be calculated separately for whites and non-whites. However, there is no suggestion that experimental non-whites did better than control non-whites.

**Table 4.5 Further analysis of one-year reconviction rates**

	Experimentals			Controls		
	No. YO's	Mean pred. score	Percent reconv.	No. YO's	Mean pred. score	Percent reconv.
Total	61	32.6	29.5	97	36.7	30.9
Intake 1-5	46	30.8	26.1	30	36.0	30.0
Intake 6-8	15	38.0	40.0	67	37.0	31.3
Pred. score						
0-15	19	10.6	21.1	17	11.3	17.6
16-30	12	21.1	25.0	22	21.6	18.2
31-50	15	40.1	20.0	33	38.2	30.3
51-100	15	61.9	53.3	25	65.4	52.0
White	46	33.5	34.8	76	38.7	36.8
Non-white	15	29.6	13.3	21	29.4	9.5
Violent	31	28.3	19.4	63	31.0	23.8
Non-violent	30	36.9	40.0	34	47.4	44.1
Age at sentence						
18-	25	36.2	36.0	38	40.9	26.3
19	20	35.6	25.0	37	33.3	32.4
20	16	23.1	25.0	22	35.2	36.4
Precons						
0	26	15.2	23.1	22	15.9	13.6
1	13	31.2	23.1	27	27.9	25.9
2+	21	54.9	42.9	47	51.6	42.6
Prev. prison-no	53	28.7	28.3	74	29.5	24.3
Prev. prison-yes	7	62.1	42.9	22	61.0	54.5
Sentence length						
23m-	41	32.5	24.4	34	38.2	32.4
24m+	20	32.7	40.0	63	35.9	30.2
Time served						
299d-	34	27.7	20.6	28	36.9	39.3
300d+	27	38.7	40.7	60	36.3	26.7
Adjudications per year						
0	26	27.8	23.1	31	35.9	16.1
2.5-	18	25.4	27.8	33	36.5	33.3
2.6+	17	47.4	41.2	24	37.2	45.8

Notes: YO = Young Offender; d = days; m = months.

Did the programme work better with violent or non-violent YO's? Of the 61 experimental YO's, 31 had been imprisoned for a violent offence (including robbery), 22 for burglary, and eight for other offences (including six for theft). Of the 97 control YO's, 63 had been

imprisoned for a violent offence (including robbery), 22 for burglary, and 12 for other offences (including six for drugs). Table 4.5 shows that the actual reconviction percentages were lower than predicted for violent offenders and about as predicted for non-violent offenders. There was again very little indication that experimental violent offenders did better than control violent offenders.

Is there any indication that Colchester was differentially more effective for younger or older YOs? Table 4.5 shows that 36.0 per cent of younger experimental inmates (those aged 17-18 at the time of the sentence) were reconvicted within one year, compared with 25.0 per cent of 19 and 20-year-olds. For control inmates, 26.3 per cent of those aged 17-18 were reconvicted within one year, compared with 32.4 per cent of 19-year-olds and 36.4 per cent of 20-year-olds. However, the actual percentage reconvicted was markedly different from the prediction score only for experimental YOs aged 19 (predicted 35.6%, actual 25.0%) and for control YOs aged 17-18 (predicted 40.9%, actual 26.3%). Neither of these differences was statistically significant.

For both experimental and control YOs, those with two or more previous convictions generally did better than predicted. Experimental YOs with no previous convictions did worse than predicted, but the number of previous convictions did not significantly predict reconvictions after controlling for prediction scores in a logistic regression analysis. Very few experimental YOs (seven) had previously received a prison sentence, but their reconviction rate was lower than predicted (42.9% as opposed to 62.1%).

Generally, YOs with shorter sentences did relatively better than predicted in Colchester (predicted 32.5%, actual reconviction rate 24.4%), while those with longer sentences did relatively worse (predicted 32.7%, actual 40.0%). Because of small numbers, this was not a significant effect in a logistic regression analysis. No corresponding effects were seen in control YOs.

Experimental inmates who spent a relatively short time (less than 300 days) in YOIs did somewhat better than predicted (20.6% as opposed to 27.7%), whereas control inmates who spent a relatively long time in YOIs did somewhat better than predicted (26.7% as opposed to 36.3%). There was a near-significant ( $p < .10$ ) interaction between experimental versus control condition and time served in predicting reconvictions after controlling for prediction score.

Control YOs with no adjudications had a lower reconviction rate than predicted (16.1% as opposed to 35.9%). Control YOs with a high adjudication rate (2.6 or more per year) had a higher reconviction rate than predicted (45.8% as opposed to 37.2%). A logistic



regression analysis showed that, in the control condition, the adjudication rate significantly predicted convictions after controlling for the prediction score (LRCS = 6.21,  $p = .013$ ). Therefore, institutional behaviour predicted post-release offending over and above prior criminal and prison history for control YO's. However, this was not true for adjudications in Colchester.

### **Further analysis of two-year conviction rates**

Table 4.6 shows that, at the two-year point, experimental YO's from intakes 1-5 were convicted less than predicted (39.1% as opposed to 49.7%), whereas experimental YO's from later intakes were convicted somewhat more than predicted (60.0% as opposed to 54.5%). This was not a significant effect in a logistic regression analysis.

As in the one-year figures, medium risk YO's (with a prediction score of 56-75%) did better than predicted in the experimental programme (predicted 65.7%, actual 41.2%) but not significantly so. Similarly, non-whites did better than predicted in both experimental and control conditions, and race predicted convictions after controlling for prediction scores in a logistic regression analysis (LRCS = 10.56,  $p = .001$ ).

There was a tendency for younger YO's (aged 17-19 on sentence) to do better than predicted in Colchester, and conversely for older YO's (aged 20 on sentence) to do worse than predicted. However, these effects were not statistically significant.

In the remainder of Table 4.6, effects were generally similar to those noted in Table 4.5 but less marked. However, there was no tendency for experimental YO's who had served a shorter time to do better than predicted (compared with control YO's), and in the control condition adjudication rates no longer significantly predicted convictions after controlling for prediction scores.

### **Conviction times and offences**

The average time interval between release and reoffending was similar for experimental (226 days) and control (219 days) YO's. However, the average time interval between reoffending and conviction was considerably longer for control YO's (128 days as opposed to 96 days). Although a month apart, these times were not significantly different ( $t = 1.40$ ) because of small numbers (27 experimentals and 51 controls convicted). Was the time interval between reoffending and conviction greater for control YO's because they

**Table 4.6 Further analysis of two-year reconviction rates**

	Experimentals			Controls		
	No. YOs	Mean pred. score	Percent reconv.	No. YOs	Mean pred. score	Percent reconv.
Total	61	50.9	44.3	97	58.1	52.6
Intake 1-5	46	49.7	39.1	30	57.9	53.3
Intake 6-8	15	54.5	60.0	67	58.3	52.2
Pred. score						
0-30	18	22.8	33.3	12	22.8	33.3
31-55	14	40.6	35.7	31	42.7	41.9
56-75	17	65.7	41.2	28	64.0	53.6
76-100	12	84.1	75.0	26	86.6	73.1
White	46	52.2	52.2	76	60.8	60.5
Non-white	15	47.0	20.0	21	48.5	23.8
Violent	31	44.4	35.5	63	51.9	47.6
Non-violent	30	57.6	53.3	34	69.8	61.8
Age at sentence						
18-	25	55.6	44.0	38	63.2	50.0
19	20	52.8	40.0	37	53.2	51.4
20	16	41.3	50.0	22	57.6	59.1
Precons						
0	26	29.6	30.8	22	32.4	36.4
1	13	51.4	38.5	27	50.1	48.1
2+	21	76.6	61.9	47	75.0	61.7
Prev. prison-no	53	47.0	43.4	74	50.7	47.3
Prev. prison-yes	7	79.3	42.9	22	83.6	68.2
Sentence length						
23m-	41	51.4	41.5	34	60.3	52.9
24m+	20	49.9	50.0	63	57.0	52.4
Time served						
299d-	34	45.6	38.2	28	59.7	53.6
300d+	27	57.6	51.9	60	57.4	53.3
Adjudications per year						
0	26	44.5	38.5	31	54.9	41.9
2.5-	18	43.3	38.9	33	58.8	54.5
2.6+	17	68.8	58.8	24	61.3	66.7

Notes: YO = Young Offender; m = months; d = days.

committed more serious offences? It might be expected that this time interval would be greater for offences remanded to the Crown Court and for those eventually receiving custodial sentences. Indeed, offences receiving custodial sentences had a longer time interval than those receiving non-custodial sentences (135 compared with 97 days). However, the fraction of reoffences receiving custodial sentences was similar for experimentals (55.6%) and controls (52.9%). For offences leading to custodial sentences, the time interval was greater for controls (148 compared with 110 days). For offences leading to non-custodial sentences, the time interval was also greater for controls (105 compared with 79 days). These differences in time intervals could reflect regional variations.

The total number of offences leading to reconvictions during the two year follow-up period was less for experimentals. The 61 experimental YOs committed a total of 93 offences (mean 1.5 each), while the 97 control YOs committed a total of 193 offences (mean 2.0 each). These numbers were not significantly different ( $t=1.04$ , n.s.). Also, it must be realised that the experimental YOs had somewhat lower prediction scores. The 27 reconvicted experimental YOs committed an average of 3.4 offences each, while the 51 reconvicted control YOs committed an average of 3.8 offences each. The next section reviews these figures in more detail in a cost-benefit analysis.

## **Cost-benefit analysis**

According to the final report of Colchester YOI (Crowe, 1998), its total budget was £1,179,000, but this was underspent by £85,000, leaving a total amount spent of £1,094,000. Of this, staff pay accounted for £730,000, of which £65,000 was spent on travel and subsistence because prison officers were on "detached duty". Arguably, this £65,000 should not be included in normal running costs, leaving a total cost of £1,029,000. Dividing this amount by the 66 experimental YOs who were actually received in Colchester yields a cost per YO of £15,591, compared with £8,828 for the standard regime (see Chapter 2). These estimates are close to the figures given in the statement by Prisons Minister Joyce Quin on January 22, 1998 (£31,300 per Colchester place per year or £15,650 per Colchester YO, assuming an average stay of 26 weeks; versus £17,300 per place per year in a typical YOI). However, for comparability with the HIT Centre calculations, it would be fairer to base the cost of Colchester YOI on its maximum capacity of 38 places. On this basis, the cost per YO was £13,539, and the estimated additional cost per YO in Colchester was therefore £4,711 (£13,539 - £8,828). The cost of each type of offence has already been estimated in Chapter 2.

**Table 4.7 Estimated cost to society of reconvictions (in £)**

	Experimentals (61)			Controls (97)		
	No. offences	Cost per offence	Total cost	No. offences	Cost per offence	Total cost
Violence	16	5,621	89,936	19	5,621	106,799
Burglary	12	4,483	53,796	9	4,483	40,347
Robbery	1	11,828	11,828	0	11,828	0
Theft	15	1,324	19,860	56	1,324	74,144
Fraud	3	2,967	8,901	7	2,967	20,769
Damage	3	1,724	5,172	14	1,724	24,136
Drugs	11	2,244	24,684	20	2,244	44,880
Other	32	861	27,552	68	861	58,548
Total	93	2,599	241,729	193	1,915	369,623
Per YO	1.5		3,963	2		3,811
Adjusted total per YO			4,650			

Note: YO = Young Offender.

The adjusted cost took account of differences in reconviction prediction scores.

Table 4.7 shows the number of different types of offences committed by experimental and control YOs and leading to reconvictions during the two-year follow-up period. For example, experimental YOs committed 16 violent offences; at an average cost per offence of £5,621, the total cost to society of these offences was £89,936. The average cost to society of offences committed by each experimental YO during the two-year follow-up period was £3,963, compared with the average cost of offences committed by each control YO of £3,811. Therefore, each experimental YO cost society £152 more than each control YO. Each control YO committed more offences on average (2.0 versus 1.5), but the average cost per offence was higher for experimental YOs (£2,599 versus £1,915).

However, there is the problem that experimental YOs were of lower risk to begin with. Of the experimental YOs, 29.5 per cent had a two-year prediction score of 0-30 (see Table 4.2), 23.0 per cent had a score of 31-55, 27.9 per cent had a score of 56-75, and 19.7 per cent had a score of 76-100. Of the control YOs, 12.4 per cent had a score of 0-30, 31.9 per cent had a score of 31-55, 28.9 per cent had a score of 56-75, and 26.8 per cent had a score of 76-100.

The average reconviction cost to society increased with the prediction score of experimental YOs, from £1,810 for those scoring 0-30 and £1,506 for those scoring 31-55, to £2,813

for those scoring 56-75 and £11,687 for those scoring 76-100. What would have been the average cost to society of experimental YOs if they had the same distribution of prediction scores as control YOs? This can be estimated by multiplying the average cost in each prediction score category by the prediction score distribution of control YOs. The adjusted cost to society of each experimental YO was then £4,650 (Table 4.7).

Based on offences leading to reconviction and equating on prior risk of reconviction, the average Colchester YO cost society £839 more than the average control YO (£4,650 - £3,811). Therefore, for every extra £1 invested in the Colchester YOI, society lost an additional 18 pence (£839/£4,711). If it was plausibly assumed that the true number of offences committed was at least five times as great as the number of offences leading to reconvictions for both experimental and control YOs, the conclusion would be even more bleak: for each extra £1 invested, at least an additional 89 pence would have been lost. Of course, it must be emphasised that this analysis does not attempt to calculate the possible non-crime benefits of Colchester YOI.

## Conclusions

The evaluation of Colchester YOI was hindered by the small number of YOs who went there. When this evaluation was first discussed, it was pointed out that Colchester needed to be kept open for at least two years in order to have large enough numbers of YOs to detect a 10 per cent decrease in reconviction rates, which was the hoped-for effect (Painter and Farrington, 1996, pp. 12-13):

*Sample size is a greater problem. Assuming 64 E and 64 C offenders, and that 50 per cent of the C group are reconvicted, 31 per cent of the E group (or less) would have to be reconvicted for this to be a statistically significant difference (at  $p = .05$ , two-tailed). Even taking account of the directional prediction (E should be convicted less), 34 per cent of the E group (or less) would have to be reconvicted for this to be a statistically significant difference (at  $p = .05$ , one-tailed).*

*The problem is that, historically, reductions in the percentage reconvicted greater than 10 per cent are unusual. Here, reductions of 15 per cent or greater would be required for statistically significant results, and this conclusion is not greatly affected by varying the percentage of the C group reconvicted. Hence, the sample sizes are too small for reliable detection of likely reductions in the percentage reconvicted. They may not be too small for reliable detection of changes in scores on*

*psychometric tests (depending on the mean and standard deviation of scores of the C group), but the percentage reconvicted is likely to be a key index.*

*The sample size difficulty might be alleviated by increasing the number of controls. However, given the difficulty of selecting as many as 24 eligible YOs at a time, this does not seem likely to be a viable option at present. There is also the problem of attrition; it is not yet clear how many of the E group might have to be deselected for one reason or another.*

*A better solution would be to continue the experiment for a further year. It should then be possible to accumulate a total of 128 experimental YOs and 128 controls. With these numbers, a 13 per cent reduction in the percentage reconvicted would be significant at  $p = .05$ , two-tailed, and an 11 per cent reduction would be significant at  $p = .05$ , one-tailed. These levels of reduction are historically attainable (given an effective programme), although it must be said that lower reductions (or even no reductions) are historically more likely. The main conclusion is that the effectiveness of the MCTC/YOI regime could be tested far more effectively with 128 E and 128 C YOs than with 64 E and 64 C YOs.*

The Prison Service (1996) responded:

*We have alerted Ministers to your concern about the small size of the sample and that, from the point of view of the evaluation, it would be preferable to run Colchester at least for a second year. The duration of the project is, of course, beyond our control. In our financial planning we are assuming that it will indeed continue for more than a year. If it does stop after that time we may have to be content with a non-significant result.*

The closure of Colchester after only one year means that many results seem potentially important but are not statistically significant.

Nevertheless, there was no evidence that Colchester YOI succeeded in reducing actual reconviction rates, after taking account of predicted rates. Perhaps the most positive result was that YOs who spent at least 60 per cent of their custodial time in Colchester had lower than predicted reconviction rates. The most negative result was that the cost-benefit analysis showed that the extra investment in Colchester YOI did not save any money from lower reoffending, but on the contrary lost money from more costly reoffending.

Among other interesting results was the fact that adjudications predicted reconvictions for control YOs but not for experimental YOs. Possibly, adjudications in Colchester were not used in the same way as adjudications in other YOIs. Also, the time interval between reoffending and reconviction was higher for control YOs, but the fraction of reconvictions that were followed by custodial sentences was the same for experimental and control YOs. There were indications that younger YOs, those from intakes 1-5, medium-risk YOs and those with two or more previous convictions did better than expected in Colchester.

Overall, however, this evaluation provides little evidence that the army-style regime at Colchester was effective in reducing reoffending.





The HIT regime was successful in reducing offending. HIT YO's committed fewer offences, and the savings from reduced crime more than paid for the extra costs of the HIT regime. YO's in earlier intakes did better, as did medium and high risk YO's, experimental non-completers who stayed longer in the HIT Centre, younger offenders, those with three or more previous convictions, and those with no adjudications.

In contrast, there was no evidence that Colchester YO's had lower reconviction rates. On the contrary, their offences were more costly to society than those of the control YO's. However, there were indications that YO's in earlier intakes did better, as did medium risk YO's and those with two or more previous convictions. YO's with no adjudications did better only if they were in the control condition.

The psychological assessments, involving before and after comparisons of experimental and control YO's, produced more puzzling results. They showed that HIT YO's had more favourable attitudes to the YOI and to its staff than control YO's, and that HIT YO's had greater control of aggression and higher self-esteem. However, HIT YO's had increased pro-offending attitudes, did not get on better with other inmates, were not more responsible, were not better behaved in the YOI, and did not find the regime less stressful.

In contrast, the psychological assessments showed that Colchester YO's had more favourable attitudes to the YOI and its staff than control YO's, and that Colchester YO's got on better with other inmates, felt less stress, had higher self-esteem, greater physical fitness and more hope about the future. However, Colchester YO's were not more deterred from offending, did not have more anti-offending attitudes, did not have greater control of aggression, were not better behaved in the YOI, and did not have greater self-control.

Why was the HIT regime more successful in reducing reoffending? In attempting to answer this question, it is important to focus on differences between the two regimes. The regimes were similar in many ways: in having austere conditions, a very disciplined approach, army-style drilling and physical training, vigorous and demanding physical activities, an emphasis on cleanliness and orderliness, attempts to inculcate team spirit and increase pride and self-confidence, basic education, trade training and Outward Bound courses.

There were two fundamental differences between the regimes. First, the HIT Centre focused a great deal on offending behaviour programmes based on the "what works" literature, and in particular on Enhanced Thinking Skills. There is much empirical evidence (e.g. McGuire, 1995, 2001) suggesting that these programmes are effective in reducing recidivism. Colchester YOI had no comparable programmes.

Second, the HIT Centre put a great deal of effort into finding jobs or placements for experimental YOs and supervising them (using community mentors as well as personal officers) in their work activities in the last five weeks of their sentences. This should have helped YOs greatly in their transition from the YOI to the community. Many years ago, Margaret Shaw (1974) found that having prison welfare officers help inmates towards the end of their sentences with accommodation and employment problems after release led to a decrease in reconviction, and more recently Doris MacKenzie and her colleagues (2001) discovered that boot camps were only effective if they had after-care resources. In contrast, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the after-care provision of Colchester YOI was criticised by the Board of Visitors.

What lessons can be drawn from this experiment? These regimes certainly did not deter offending by tough "boot camp" treatment. It is clear that many YOs liked being kept busy all day, liked an Army-style regime, liked sports and physical training, and became healthier, fitter and more self-confident. In Colchester, YOs liked being treated with respect and liked receiving paternalistic advice from masculine role models. However, none of these benefits of an intensive regime seemed to be followed by decreased reconviction rates. Purely from the viewpoint of reducing reoffending, cognitive-behavioural skills training programmes and assistance in the transition from the YOI to the community (especially in getting jobs) were probably more important. Hence, the main message that might be drawn from this evaluation is that more resources should be devoted to offending behaviour and after-care programmes for young offenders.

**Psychological assessments**

All experimental and most control YO's were assessed by the selection teams and given the Pre assessment. Of the 106 experimental successes, 93 completed the Post assessment just before release; six refused and seven provided unusable tests. Because of lack of resources, it was not possible to give Post-tests to experimental non-completers, who were in other YO's. There were 130 retrospectively matched controls, of whom 85 completed the Pre assessment, and 35 completed the Post assessment just before release. Few Post-tests were completed for controls in intakes 1-8 because of lack of resources and because the matched controls design was only put in place from intake 9. The current analysis, therefore, is based on 93 experimental and 35 control YO's with Pre and Post assessments.

**Key hypotheses to be tested**

It was hoped that both the cognitive-behavioural and military elements of the regime would make YO's more prosocial and less antisocial. It was hoped that the cognitive-behavioural elements would increase the self-control and control of aggression of YO's and decrease their criminal thinking patterns. It was hoped that the military elements would increase the self-confidence and self-esteem of YO's and make them more responsible and conscientious. Hence, the key hypotheses to be tested were as follows:

On the Post-test, compared with control YO's:

- (a) Experimental YO's have more prosocial and anti-offending attitudes.
- (b) Experimental YO's are better behaved in the YOI.
- (c) Experimental YO's have more favourable attitudes to the YOI and its staff.
- (d) Experimental YO's get on better with other inmates.
- (e) Experimental YO's find the regime less stressful.
- (f) Experimental YO's have greater self-confidence and self-esteem.
- (g) Experimental YO's have greater control of aggression.
- (h) Experimental YO's have greater self-control and lower impulsivity.
- (i) Experimental YO's are more responsible and conscientious.

## Measuring instruments used in the evaluation

In order to test these hypotheses, three psychological tests were completed by the YO's in the Pre and Post assessments:

*The Emotion Control Questionnaire (ECQ; Roger and Najarian, 1989; Roger and Masters, 1997):* This yields four scores:

(1) Control of aggression: this measures how far the YO controls his aggression.

Sample items are:

*"If someone insults me I try to remain as calm as possible" (a "True" response is scored)*

*"If someone were to hit me, I would hit back" (a "False" response is scored)*

(2) Rehearsal: this measures how far the YO dwells on past slights.

Sample items are:

*"I often find myself thinking over and over about things that have made me angry" (True)*

*"I generally won't bear a grudge – when something is over, it's over, and I don't think about it again" (False)*

(3) Emotional inhibition: this measures how far the YO controls his emotions.

Sample items are:

*"When someone upsets me, I try to hide my feelings" (True)*

*"I can't help showing how I feel, even when it isn't appropriate to do so" (False)*

(4) Benign control: this measures how far the YO thinks before acting.

Sample items are:

*"Almost everything I do is carefully thought out" (True)*

*"I often do or say things I later regret" (False)*

*The Custodial Adjustment Questionnaire (CAQ; Thornton, 1987)*: This yields four scores:

(1) Pro-staff: this measures positive attitudes to staff.

Sample items are:

*"I can respect most of the staff here" (True)*

*"Staff here order prisoners about too much" (False)*

(2) Pro-inmate: this measures positive attitudes to other inmates.

Sample items are:

*"I mix a lot with other prisoners" (True)*

*"It is dangerous to trust other prisoners" (False)*

(3) Stress: this measures how far the YO feels under stress in the YOI.

Sample items are:

*"I can't stand another day in here" (True)*

*"I am having an easy time in here" (False)*

(4) Deviance: this measures antisocial behaviour by the YO in the YOI.

Sample items are:

*"I have been involved in a fight here" (True)*

*"I have got so mad I've smashed things here" (True)*

*The Psychological Inventory of Criminal Thinking Styles (PICTS; Walters, 1995a, 1995b, 1996)*: all items are coded from 4 (strongly agree) to 1 (disagree) and added to produce scores on each of 8 scales.

(1) Mollification: this measures the extent to which the YO justifies his crimes.

Sample items are:

*"I find myself blaming society and external circumstances for the problems I have had in life"*

*"It is unfair that I have been imprisoned for my crimes when lawyers, businessmen and politicians get away with all sorts of illegal and underhand behaviour every day"*

(2) Cutoff: this measures how far the YO acts impulsively.

Sample items are:

*"I tend to act impulsively under stress"*

*"When frustrated, I stop thinking rationally and say to myself statements such as "fuck it" or "to hell with it""*

(3) Entitlement: this measures how far the YO believes that society owes him a living.

Sample items are:

*"The way I look at it, I've paid my dues and am therefore justified in taking what I want"*

*"There have been times when I have been right to break the law in order to pay for a vacation, new car or expensive clothing that I told myself I needed"*

(4) Power orientation: this means the desire to exert power over others.

Sample items are:

*"One of the first things I consider about another person is whether they look strong or weak"*

*"When I am not in control of a situation I feel weak and helpless and want to have power over others"*

(5) Sentimentality: this measures how far the YO believes he is basically a good person.

Sample items are:

*"Despite the criminal life I have led, deep down I am basically a good person"*

*"The way I look at it I'm not really a criminal because I never intended to hurt anyone"*

(6) Super-optimism: this measures how far the YO believes that he will not get caught.

Sample items are:

*"Although I have always realised that I might get caught for a crime I would tell myself that there was no way they would catch me this time"*

*"Outside, I believed I could use drugs and avoid the negative consequences (addiction, health risk) that I noted in others"*

(7) Cognitive indolence: this measures how far the YO is not conscientious.

Sample items are:

*"I tend to put off until tomorrow what should have been done today"*

*"I find myself taking shortcuts, even if I know these shortcuts will create problems later"*

(8) Discontinuity: this measures how far the YO fails to carry through tasks to completion.

Sample items are:

*"I will frequently start an activity, project or job but then never finish it"*

*"I have trouble following through on initial good intentions"*

## **Results obtained with psychological tests**

Table A.1 summarises results obtained in the Pre and Post assessments for the 93 experimental and 35 control YOs included in the present analysis. For example, the mean scores of experimental and control YOs decreased significantly on control of aggression on the ECQ. The statistical significance of changes between Pre-test and Post-test scores was assessed using a t-test. Whether changes in experimental scores were significantly different from changes in control scores was assessed using the interaction term in a two-way analysis of variance. This effectively controls for Pre-test differences between experimental and control scores. However, experimental and control YOs were not significantly ( $p < .05$ ) different on the Pre-test on any score.

None of the interaction terms was significant at  $p = .05$ , showing that none of the changes in scores for experimental YOs was significantly different from the corresponding change in scores for control YOs. However, there was a near-significant ( $p = .062$ ) tendency for the control YOs to become more anti-staff on the CAQ than the experimental YOs. There was no tendency for experimental YOs to show increased pro-inmate attitudes. While experimental YOs showed decreased Stress on the CAQ ( $p = .086$ ), so did control YOs ( $p = .014$ ). CAQ Deviance scores increased for both experimental and control YOs, indicating perhaps that behaviour in the YOI worsened for both. However, this result may be artefactual, because the Deviance items refer to ever behaving badly in this YOI. Therefore, Deviance scores inevitably worsen with time in a YOI. The more important finding is that the increase for experimental YOs was not significantly different from the increase for control YOs.

**Table A.1 Pre- and post- comparisons on psychological tests**

	Experimental (93)			Control (35)			Inter-action
	Pre	Post	Change	Pre	Post	Change	
ECQ - Control of aggression	8.1	6.9	0.002	7.4	4.7	0.001	0.072
ECQ - Rehearsal	4.6	4.9	NS	5.3	6.3	0.007	NS
ECQ - Emotional inhibition	7.4	6.6	0.015	7.8	7.7	NS	NS
ECQ - Benign control	7.4	6.8	NS	7.0	5.6	0.025	NS
CAQ - Pro-staff	5.9	5.8	NS	5.6	4.7	0.015	0.062
CAQ - Pro-inmate	2.8	2.6	NS	2.9	3.1	NS	NS
CAQ - Stress	4.1	3.6	0.086	4.5	3.1	0.014	NS
CAQ - Deviance	0.39	0.86	0.001	0.57	1.2	0.001	NS
PICTS - Mollification	14.3	15.6	0.063	14.6	14.9	NS	NS
PICTS - Cutoff	15.2	16.4	0.085	16.1	17.5	NS	NS
PICTS - Entitlement	13.1	15.0	0.008	14.2	15.2	NS	NS
PICTS - Power orientation	14.3	15.3	NS	15.9	16.5	NS	NS
PICTS - Sentimentality	17.6	18.1	NS	18.3	17.2	NS	NS
PICTS - Super-optimism	17.1	17.3	NS	16.1	16.7	NS	NS
PICTS - Cognitive indolence	17.4	16.6	NS	17.5	16.9	NS	NS
PICTS - Discontinuity	16.8	16.0	NS	17.6	17.1	NS	NS

Note: Mean scores are shown in the Pre and Post columns and p values in the other columns. Experimentals and controls were not significantly different on any variables in the Pre-test.

ECQ = Emotion Control Questionnaire

CAQ = Custodial Adjustment Questionnaire

PICTS = Psychological Inventory of Criminal Thinking Styles

On the ECQ, both experimental and control YO's decreased on Control of Aggression, but there was a near-significant ( $p = .072$ ) tendency for control YO's to decrease more. Therefore experimental YO's showed better control of aggression. Control YO's increased on Rehearsal, indicating that they ruminated more (bore more grudges) over past slights. Experimental YO's decreased on Emotional Inhibition, indicating that they became less good at controlling their emotions. Control YO's decreased on Benign Control, indicating that they became more impulsive.

On the PICTS, experimental YO's increased on Mollification, indicating that they justified their crimes more. Experimental and Control YO's increased on Cutoff, indicating that they acted more impulsively. Experimental and Control YO's also increased on Entitlement, indicating that they believed that society owed them a living and that crime was justified. There were no other significant changes on the PICTS.



## Behaviour in the YOI

On average, experimental YOs spent 155 days in Thorn Cross and 153 days in other YOIs. Control YOs spent 340 days on average in YOIs, significantly more than the total 308 days of experimental YOs ( $t = 2.51$ ,  $p = .013$ ). Experimental successes spent an average of 178 days in Thorn Cross (the expected 25 weeks), while experimental non-completers spent 120 days in Thorn Cross on average. Experimental successes and matched control successes spent about the same time in prison in total (317 versus 326 days;  $t = 0.56$ , n.s.). Experimental non-completers spent less time in prison than matched control non-completers (293 versus 367 days;  $t = 3.10$ ,  $p = .003$ ).

Information about adjudications for prison offences in disciplinary hearings was obtained from the Inmate Information System (IIS). A total of 176 experimental and 127 control YOs were found in the IIS. Unfortunately, the IIS did not provide data about adjudications in the HIT Centre, only about adjudications in Thorn Cross YOI. Some of the adjudications of experimental YOs in Thorn Cross YOI could possibly have occurred in living units other than the HIT Centre.

Table A.2 shows that experimental YOs had significantly more adjudications per year than control YOs (means 4.05 versus 2.93;  $t = 2.43$ ,  $p = .016$ ). However, experimental successes had a similar adjudication rate to matched control successes (means 2.44 versus 2.75;  $t = 0.58$ , n.s.). Experimental non-completers had a significantly higher adjudication rate than matched control non-completers (means 6.42 versus 3.28;  $t = 4.06$ ,  $p = .0001$ ). Therefore, the higher adjudication rate of experimental YOs was attributable to the experimental non-completers.

**Table A.2** *Annual rate of adjudications for prison offences*

	Thorn Cross	Other YOIs	Total
Total			
Experimental (176)	5.8	3.08	4.05
Control (127)	–	2.93	2.93
Successes			
Experimental (105)	2.74	1.71	2.44
Control (83)	–	2.75	2.75
Non-completers			
Experimental (71)	10.34	5.11	6.42
Control (44)	–	3.28	3.28

Experimental YOs had more adjudications per year in Thorn Cross than in other YOs (mean 5.80 versus 3.08;  $t = 3.44$ ,  $p = .0007$ ). This was true for both experimental successes (means 2.74 versus 1.71;  $t = 2.24$ ,  $p = .027$ ) and experimental non-completers (means 10.34 versus 5.11;  $t = 3.11$ ,  $p = .003$ ). As might have been expected, experimental non-completers had more adjudications per year in Thorn Cross than experimental successes (means 10.34 versus 2.74;  $t = 6.63$ ,  $p < .0001$ ).

Experimental and control YOs did not differ in their adjudications per year in other YOs (means 3.08 versus 2.93;  $t = 0.28$ , n.s.). Experimental successes tended to have fewer adjudications than matched control successes (means 1.71 versus 2.75;  $t = 1.86$ ,  $p = .065$ ). Experimental non-completers tended to have more adjudications than matched control non-completers (means 5.11 versus 3.28;  $t = 1.60$ , n.s.)

On the face of it, these results seem to indicate that experimental YOs were worse behaved in the HIT Centre than in other YOs. However, it is possible that misbehaviour was more likely to be detected and recorded in the HIT Centre than in other YOs, because of the high level of supervision. Table A.3 shows the types of offences leading to adjudications for experimental and control successes and non-completers. It can be seen that there were relatively more adjudications of experimentals in the "other" category. These adjudications included misbehaviour on temporary release (e.g. coming back late or drunk), and examination of the data confirmed that these "extra" adjudications occurred in Thorn Cross rather than in other YOs. Control YOs were far less likely than experimental YOs to be temporarily released. (Home Detention Curfew did not begin until January 28, 1999.) The HIT Centre was not particularly tolerant of adjudications; typically, an experimental YO would be failed after two or three adjudications.

**Table A.3** *Types of adjudications (%)*

Offence	Experimentals		Controls	
	Successes	Non-completers	Successes	Non-completers
Violence	27.4	19.5	22.6	33.3
Escape/abscond	1.1	8.9	2.4	3.5
Disobedience	24.2	25.8	31.6	34.0
Wilful damage	7	4.3	7.3	3.5
Un. Transactions	4.8	5.1	13.2	7.2
Drugs	10.8	14.0	9.7	5.7
Other	24.7	22.4	13.2	12.9

Note: Un. = Unauthorised

## Conclusions

The results of testing key hypotheses about the effects of the HIT regime were as follows:

### ***(a) Experimental YOs have more prosocial and anti-offending attitudes***

On Mollification (justifying crimes), Entitlement (society owes him a living and crime is justified), and Power Orientation (the desire to exert power over others), the scores of experimental YOs increased more than those of control YOs. These results from the PICTS indicate that the HIT regime led to increased pro-offending attitudes, although only the Entitlement result was significant at  $p = .05$ . However, Rehearsal on the ECQ (indicating how far the YO dwells on past slights) increased significantly for controls but not for experimentals. On balance, this hypothesis can be rejected.

### ***(b) Experimental YOs are better behaved in the YOI***

According to the CAQ Deviance scale and the data on adjudications, there was no evidence that experimental YOs were better behaved than controls. If anything, experimental YOs were worse behaved. Therefore, this hypothesis can be rejected.

### ***(c) Experimental YOs have more favourable attitudes to the YOI and its staff***

On the CAQ, control YOs became significantly less favourable towards YOI staff, but experimental YOs did not. Therefore, this hypothesis was supported.

### ***(d) Experimental YOs get on better with other inmates***

On the CAQ, there were no significant differences between experimental and control YOs on pro-inmate attitudes. Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported.

### ***(e) Experimental YOs find the regime less stressful***

Both experimental and control YOs decreased on the CAQ Stress scale. Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported.

***(f) Experimental YOs have higher self-confidence and self-esteem***

On the PICTS, control YOs decreased in Sentimentality (having a good self-concept), while experimental YOs increased, but neither change was statistically significant. Nevertheless, the indications were in favour of this hypothesis.

***(g) Experimental YOs have greater control of aggression***

On the ECQ, both experimental and control YOs decreased significantly on Control of Aggression, but there was a near-significant tendency for control YOs to decrease more. Therefore, this hypothesis was supported.

***(h) Experimental YOs have greater self-control and lower impulsivity***

On the ECQ, experimental YOs decreased on Emotional Inhibition (control of emotions), whereas control YOs decreased on Benign Control (indicating how far the YO thinks before acting). Both experimental and control YOs increased on the PICTS Cutoff scale (indicating impulsive behaviour). Thus, the evidence was mixed.

***(i) Experimental YOs are more responsible and conscientious***

On the PICTS, experimental and control YOs both decreased on Cognitive Indolence (suggesting that they had become more conscientious) and on Discontinuity (suggesting that they were more likely to carry through tasks to completion). However, there were no significant changes and no differential changes between experimental and control YOs. Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported.

### Psychological assessments

As described in Chapter 4, 57 experimental YO's and 50 control YO's in intakes 1 – 7 had Pre and Post assessments. Table B.1 shows the median dates of all assessments. Given the closure of Colchester YOI at the end of March 1998, the assessments for intake 7 were truncated so that they were all completed before that date.

**Table B.1** *Median dates of assessments*

Intake	Experimental		Control	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
1	13. 2.97	5. 7.97	16. 2.97	16. 6.97
2	2. 4.97	6. 9.97	4. 4.97	16. 9.97
3	13. 5.97	1.10.97	14. 5.97	3.11.97
4	29. 6.97	10.11.97	30. 6.97	13. 1.98
5	26. 8.97	18. 1.98	26. 8.97	17. 1.98
6	16.10.97	1. 3.98	16.10.97	10. 3.98
7	2.12.97	14. 3.98	9.12.97	25. 3.98

### Key hypotheses to be tested

On the Post-test, compared with control YO's:

- (a) Experimental YO's are more deterred from committing crimes in future.
- (b) Experimental YO's have more prosocial and anti-offending attitudes.
- (c) Experimental YO's are better behaved in the YOI.
- (d) Experimental YO's have more favourable attitudes to the YOI and its staff.
- (e) Experimental YO's get on better with other inmates.
- (f) Experimental YO's have greater self-confidence and self-esteem.
- (g) Experimental YO's have greater control of aggression.
- (h) Experimental YO's have greater self-control and lower impulsivity.
- (i) Experimental YO's are more mature and responsible.
- (j) Experimental YO's have greater physical fitness.
- (k) Experimental YO's have lower depression and stress.
- (l) Experimental YO's have improved life chances.

## **Measuring instruments used in the evaluation**

Because pilot interviews indicated that about half of the YO's had significant difficulties with reading and comprehension of the measuring instruments, all instruments were given during a one-to-one personal interview. Two categories of instruments are analysed here:

### ***(a) Psychological tests***

The same three psychological tests were given as in the HIT Centre: the Emotion Control Questionnaire (ECQ), the Custodial Adjustment Questionnaire (CAQ) and the Psychological Inventory of Criminal Thinking Styles (PICTS); see Appendix A for more details about these tests.

### ***(b) The Young Offender Attitude Survey (YOAS)***

This survey was developed for use in the Colchester evaluation. It measured:

- perceived physical health and fitness
- feelings of stress and depression
- perceived effects of the regime (e.g. on offending, self-confidence, future job prospects, self-control and anti-authority attitudes)
- bullying by inmates and staff.

## **Results obtained with psychological tests**

Table B.2 summarises results obtained in the Pre and Post assessments for the 57 experimental and 50 control YO's who completed both. In the Pre-test, experimental and control YO's were significantly different on Control of Aggression (experimentals higher), Rehearsal or rumination (controls higher), Benign Control (experimentals higher), Power Orientation (controls higher), Cognitive Indolence (controls higher) and Discontinuity (controls higher). In all cases, the controls were "worse".

The most interesting results in Table B.2 were obtained with the CAQ. Experimental YO's significantly ( $p = .001$ ) increased their pro-inmate attitudes, and the interaction term was significant ( $p = .003$ ), showing that the change for experimentals was significantly greater than the change for controls. Control YO's significantly ( $p = .011$ ) decreased their pro-staff attitudes, whereas experimental YO's increased their pro-staff attitudes. The interaction term

was almost significant ( $p = .076$ ), showing that the change for experimentals was different from the change for controls. Experimental YOs significantly ( $p = .007$ ) decreased in perceived Stress, and the near-significant ( $p = .058$ ) interaction term showed that the change for experimentals was different from the change for controls. Control YOs significantly increased in Deviance (bad behaviour), whereas experimental YOs did not change significantly.

**Table B.2 Pre- and Post- comparisons on psychological tests**

	Exptal (57)			Control (50)			Inter- action
	Pre	Post	Change	Pre	Post	Change	
ECQ - Control of aggression*	7.6	7.7	NS	6.2	6.8	NS	NS
ECQ - Rehearsal*	4.6	4.0	NS	6.1	5.3	0.038	NS
ECQ - Emotional Inhibition	6.7	6.3	NS	7.2	7.4	NS	NS
ECQ - Benign control*	7.5	7.5	NS	5.9	5.7	NS	NS
CAQ - Pro-staff	6.3	6.6	NS	6.6	6.1	0.011	0.076
CAQ - Pro-inmate	2.2	3.2	0.001	2.5	2.6	NS	0.003
CAQ - Stress	3.9	2.0	0.007	3.3	3.1	NS	0.058
CAQ - Deviance	0.51	0.68	NS	0.66	1.04	0.013	NS
PICTS - Mollification	14	13.1	0.093	15.4	14.1	0.007	NS
PICTS - Cutoff	14.7	13.8	NS	16.4	15.7	NS	NS
PICTS - Entitlement	12.4	12.7	NS	13.0	13.0	NS	NS
PICTS - Power orientation*	12.8	12.5	NS	15.4	14.4	0.068	NS
PICTS - Sentimentality	17.6	17.8	NS	18.5	17.3	0.053	NS
PICTS - Super-optimism	15.9	16.0	NS	16.8	16.7	NS	NS
PICTS - Cognitive indolence*	17.3	15.7	0.017	19.2	18.1	0.02	NS
PICTS - Discontinuity*	15.8	14.7	0.066	17.9	17.5	NS	NS

Note: Mean scores are shown in the Pre and Post columns and p values in the other columns

\* = Experimental and control significantly ( $p < .05$ ) different in Pre-test.

ECQ = Emotion Control Questionnaire

CAQ = Custodial Adjustment Questionnaire

PICTS = Psychological Inventory of Criminal Thinking Styles

The other results in Table B.2 provided little evidence of differential changes between experimental and control YOs. Controls decreased in Rehearsal or rumination, but so did experimentals. Both decreased on Mollification (justifying their crimes) and Cognitive Indolence (non-conscientious attitudes). There were near-significant decreases in Power Orientation (the desire to exert power over others) and Sentimentality (believing oneself to be basically a good person) for the controls, but no noticeable changes in these scores for the experimentals. Apart from the Sentimentality result, most changes were in a desirable direction.

### Results obtained with the Young Offender Attitude Survey

Table B.3 summarises results obtained with the YOAS in the Pre and Post-test assessments for the 57 experimental and 50 control YO's who completed both. The statistical significance of changes between Pre-test and Post-test percentages was assessed using the chi-squared test. The interaction term in a logistic regression was used to assess whether the change for experimental YO's was significantly different from the change for control YO's.

**Table B.3 Pre- and post- comparisons on the YOAS**

%	Experimental(57)			Control (50)			Inter- action
	Pre	Post	Change	Pre	Post	Change	
You are:							
Feeling more physically fit and in good health	25	46	0.031	34	20	NS	0.006
Feeling more over-tired and exhausted	19	12	NS	34	30	NS	NS
Keeping much more busy and occupied	9	30	0.009	18	26	NS	NS
Taking much more interest in physical fitness	39	28	NS	40	26	NS	NS
Taking much more interest in personal appearance	9	25	0.044	10	12	NS	NS
Gaining more confidence in yourself*	30	46	NS	52	60	NS	NS
More under stress/pressure because of routine	9	5	NS	22	16	NS	NS
More unhappy/depressed	30	2	0.001	28	14	NS	0.020
Feeling much more hopeful about future	30	39	NS	40	14	0.007	0.004
Experience in here will:							
Deter you from committing crimes in future	65	67	NS	58	62	NS	NS
Help you learn more self-control and discipline	61	79	0.065	66	68	NS	NS
Help you become a more mature person*	47	74	0.007	70	78	NS	NS
Help you become more responsible for your actions	72	75	NS	76	70	NS	NS
Help you become more self-confident	48	79	0.001	54	62	NS	0.067



Help you get on better with other people	50	65	NS	70	67	NS	NS
Help you become more physically fit	79	95	0.027	84	78	NS	0.015
Improve your ability to read and write	40	21	0.042	45	42	NS	NS
Improve your chances of finding a job	37	60	0.025	40	40	NS	0.097
Help you kick any drug habit	45	73	0.046	46	70	0.061	NS
Discipline/incentive scheme is fair	68	93	0.002	76	78	NS	0.024
Discipline/incentive scheme is harsh	22	42	0.048	27	24	NS	0.086
Discipline/incentive scheme is necessary	65	88	0.008	73	70	NS	0.022
Experience in here has made you:							
More likely to control your temper when provoked	53	65	NS	62	66	NS	NS
Less angry	26	46	0.051	32	42	NS	NS
Less violent	39	32	NS	52	46	NS	NS
Less anti-authority/anti-staff	23	28	NS	38	48	NS	NS
Less disillusioned with life	26	30	NS	34	56	0.044	NS
Get along better with other inmates	21	30	NS	32	22	NS	NS
Can share private feelings and confide in staff	12	39	0.003	10	6	NS	0.040
Bullying is part of life here*	67	47	0.059	92	94	NS	NS
Would tell staff if bullied	18	25	NS	16	4	0.096	0.026

Notes: Percentages are shown in the Pre and Post columns and p values in the other columns.

\* = Experimental and control significantly ( $p < .05$ ) different in Pre-test

YOAS = Young Offender Attitude Survey

Out of 31 comparisons, experimental and control YOAs were significantly different in the Pre-test assessment on only three: experimental YOAs were less likely to say that they were gaining more confidence in themselves, less likely to say that their experience in the YOI would help them become a more mature person, and less likely to say that bullying was just a feature of life in the YOI.

Pre-Post comparisons showed that, compared with control YOAs, experimental YOAs:

- Felt more physically fit and in good health
- Felt less unhappy/depressed

- Felt much more hopeful about the future
- Thought that they would become more self-confident
- Thought that they would become more physically fit
- Thought that their chances of finding a job would be improved
- Thought that the discipline/incentive scheme was fair
- Thought that the discipline/incentive scheme was harsh
- Thought that the discipline/incentive scheme was necessary
- Thought that they could share private feelings and confide in staff
- Thought that they would tell a member of staff if they were being bullied.

Experimental and control YO's were equally (increasingly) likely to say that the YOI would help them kick any drug habit they had. There were no significant changes between Pre and Post, and experimental and control YO's were equally likely to say that:

- They were taking much more interest in physical fitness
- They would be deterred from committing crimes in future
- They would become more responsible for their actions.

## **Behaviour in the YOI**

Information about adjudications for prison offences in disciplinary hearings was obtained from the Inmate Information System. Experimental YO's served a significantly shorter total time in YO's than control YO's: 313 days as opposed to 358 days on average ( $t = 2.55$ ,  $p = .012$ ). Therefore, the adjudication rate was calculated per year at risk in YO's. This rate was higher for experimental YO's (2.36 per year) than for control YO's (1.63 per year), but not significantly so. (Note: These figures include YO's in the cancelled intake 8 who were allocated to the control group.)

There was an impression that staff in Colchester YOI (who were mainly military staff) were more willing to "nick" YO's for minor offences of disobedience than were prison staff in other YO's. Indeed, experimental YO's had a higher adjudication rate in Colchester than in other YO's (2.90 per year compared with 1.98 per year; n.s.). However, this difference was entirely attributable to the five experimental YO's who did not complete the programme, who had an adjudication rate of 15.58 per year in Colchester and 3.72 per year in other YO's. The remaining 58 experimental YO's had the same adjudication rate in Colchester (1.81 per year) as in other YO's (1.83 per year). Comparison with Appendix A shows that HIT experimental and control YO's had higher adjudication rates than Colchester experimental and control YO's.

Table B.4 shows the types of offences leading to adjudications for experimental YOIs (in Colchester and in other YOIs) and for control YOIs. There were no escape/abscond offences. It can be seen that experimental YOIs had proportionally more disobedience and "other" offences, and fewer drugs and unauthorised transactions offences, in Colchester than in other YOIs. Most of the "other" offences in Colchester were failures to comply with temporary release conditions.

**Table B.4** *Types of adjudications (%)*

Offence	Colchester	Experimental Other YOIs	Total	Control Total
Violence	17.8	19.4	18.6	19.8
Disobedience	51.4	45.3	48.7	50.3
Wilful damage	1.4	1.8	1.8	4.8
Un. Transactions	6.3	11.8	8.4	8.4
Drugs	7.7	10.0	8.4	10.2
Other	15.4	11.8	14.2	6.6

Note: Un. = Unauthorised

Because of possible variations in thresholds between Colchester and other YOIs for determining what counted as a disciplinary offence, it cannot necessarily be concluded that the prison offending rate was any different in Colchester from other YOIs. Colchester staff were very reluctant to fail experimental YOIs, who consequently could accumulate many adjudications.

## Conclusions

The results of testing key hypotheses about the effects of the Colchester regime were as follows:

### **(a) Experimental YOIs are more deterred from offending**

According to the YOAS, the deterrent effect of Colchester was no greater than the deterrent effect of control YOIs. This hypothesis can be rejected.

### **(b) Experimental YOIs have more prosocial and anti-offending attitudes**

These attitudes were measured by four of the PICTS scales: Mollification (justifying crimes), Entitlement (society owes him a living and crime is justified), Power Orientation (the desire to

exert power over others), and Super-Optimism (the belief that he will get away with crime). None of the results obtained with the PICTS suggests any significant difference between experimental and control YOs. Mollification decreased for both, Entitlement and Super-Optimism did not change for both, and Power Orientation decreased for control YOs but not for experimental YOs. Also, Rehearsal on the ECQ (indicating how far the YO dwells on past slights) decreased more for control YOs. This hypothesis was not supported.

***(c) Experimental YOs are better behaved in the YOI***

This hypothesis was not supported by information about adjudications for prison offences. Scores on the CAQ Deviance scale increased more for control YOs than for experimental YOs, suggesting that the hypothesis was supported. However, this result may be artefactual, because the Deviance items refer to ever behaving badly in this YOI.

On average, the time spent by experimental YOs in Colchester up to the Post assessment would be less than the time spent by control YOs in other YOIs. Typically, an experimental YO might spend three months in another YOI up to the Pre assessment and then six months in Colchester up to the Post assessment, whereas a control YO might spend three months in another YOI up to the Pre assessment and then a further six months in the same YOI up to the Post assessment. The Deviance scores of experimental YOs may be less at the Post assessment than for control YOs because of the shorter time spent in this YOI (six months compared with nine months).

***(d) Experimental YOs have more favourable attitudes to the YOI and its staff***

On the YOAS, experimental YOs were more likely to say that they would share private feelings and confide in staff, and also more likely to say that they would tell staff if they were bullied. However, there were no significant differences between experimental and control inmates in being anti-authority or anti-staff. Experimental YOs were more likely to say that the discipline/incentive scheme was fair, harsh and necessary. On the CAQ, experimental YOs had more favourable attitudes towards staff. On balance, most evidence was in favour of this hypothesis.

***(e) Experimental YOs get on better with other inmates***

On the YOAS, experimental YOs were more likely to say that the YOI had helped them to get along better with other inmates. On the CAQ, experimental YOs had more favourable attitudes to other inmates. Therefore, this hypothesis was supported.

***(f) Experimental YOAs have more self-confidence and self-esteem***

On the YOAS, experimental YOAs thought that they had become more self-confident. Also, experimental YOAs were taking more interest in their personal appearance and physical fitness. On the PICTS, control YOAs decreased in Sentimentality (having a good self-concept) compared with experimental YOAs, but the difference was not significant. On balance, this hypothesis was supported.

***(g) Experimental YOAs have greater control of aggression***

On the YOAS, experimental and control YOAs had become less angry, but not less violent. Also, experimental and control YOAs did not differ significantly in control of aggression on the ECQ. Consequently, this hypothesis was not supported.

***(h) Experimental YOAs have greater self-control and lower impulsivity***

On the YOAS, experimental YOAs thought that their experience in the YOI would help them learn more self-control and discipline. However, there were no differences between experimental and control YOAs on the ECQ on Emotional Inhibition (control of emotions) or Benign Control (indicating how far the YO thinks before acting) or on the PICTS Cutoff scale (measuring impulsive behaviour). Overall, this hypothesis was not supported.

***(i) Experimental YOAs are more mature and responsible***

On the YOAS, experimental YOAs were more likely to say that the regime had helped them to become a more mature person, but experimental and control YOAs did not differ in saying that the regime had helped them become more responsible for their actions. On the PICTS, experimental and control YOAs both decreased in Cognitive Indolence, suggesting that both had become more conscientious. Also, experimental YOAs decreased in Discontinuity (measuring how far the YO fails to carry through tasks to completion). Overall, results were mixed.

***(j) Experimental YOAs have greater physical fitness***

Ideally, this hypothesis should be tested using a test of physical fitness. According to the YOAS, experimental YOAs were more likely than control YOAs to say that they felt physically fit and in good health. Also, more of the experimental YOAs thought that the regime would help them become more physically fit. However, there were no differences between experimental and control YOAs in taking much more interest in physical fitness. Overall, this hypothesis was supported.

***(k) Experimental YO's have lower depression and stress***

On the YOAS, the unhappiness and depression of experimental YO's decreased more than control YO's, and experimental YO's decreased more than control YO's on the CAQ Stress scale. However, control YO's were more likely to become less disillusioned with life, and experimental and control YO's did not differ significantly in feeling under stress/pressure because of the routine. The preponderance of evidence suggests that experimental YO's felt less stress.

***(l) Experimental YO's have improved life chances***

On the YOAS, experimental YO's were more likely than control YO's to say that the regime had improved their chances of finding a job. Also, experimental YO's were feeling much more hopeful about the future. Experimental and control YO's became less likely to say that the regime had helped them kick their drug habit, and experimental YO's were less likely to say that their experience in the YOI had improved their ability to read and write. Overall, this hypothesis was partially supported.

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